
**JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION HISTORY**

**REVUE D'HISTOIRE DE
L'INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE**

**ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER
EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION**

edited by the

Groupe de liaison des professeurs d'histoire contemporaine
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The Liaison Committee of Historians came into being in 1982 as a result of an important international symposium that the Commission had organized in Luxembourg to launch historical research on European integration. The committee is composed of historians of the European Union member countries who work on contemporary history.

The Liaison Committee:

- gathers and conveys information about work on European history after the Second World War;
 - advises the European Union on research projects concerning contemporary European history.
- Thus, the Liaison Committee was commissioned to make publicly available the archives of the Community institutions;
- enables researchers to make better use of the archival sources;
 - promotes research meetings to get an update of work in progress and to stimulate new research: seven research conferences have been organized and their proceedings published.

The Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'intégration européenne – Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration is in line with the preoccupations of the Liaison Committee. Being the first history journal to deal exclusively with the history of European Integration, the Journal offers the increasing number of young historians devoting their research to contemporary Europe, a permanent forum.

The Liaison Committee works completely independently and according to historians' critical method.



Le Groupe de liaison des professeurs d'histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission des Communautés européennes s'est constitué en 1982 à la suite d'un grand colloque que la Commission avait organisé à Luxembourg pour lancer la recherche historique sur la construction européenne. Il regroupe des professeurs d'université des pays membres de l'Union européenne, spécialistes d'histoire contemporaine.

Le Groupe de liaison a pour mission:

- de diffuser l'information sur les travaux portant sur l'histoire de l'Europe après la Seconde Guerre mondiale;
- de conseiller l'Union européenne sur les actions scientifiques à entreprendre avec son appui; ainsi le Groupe de liaison a assuré une mission concernant la mise à la disposition du public des archives des institutions communautaires;
- d'aider à une meilleure utilisation par les chercheurs des moyens de recherche mis à leur disposition (archives, sources orales...);
- d'encourager des rencontres scientifiques afin de faire le point sur les connaissances acquises et de susciter de nouvelles recherches: sept grands colloques ont été organisés et leurs actes publiés. L'édition du *Journal of European Integration History – Revue d'histoire de l'intégration européenne – Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration* se situe dans le droit fil des préoccupations du Groupe de liaison. Première revue d'histoire à se consacrer exclusivement à l'histoire de la construction européenne, le *Journal* se propose de fournir un forum permanent au nombre croissant de jeunes historiens vouant leurs recherches à l'Europe contemporaine.

Le Groupe de liaison organise ses colloques et publications en toute indépendance et conformément à la méthode critique qui est celle des historiens.

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Introduction History and theory

Jan van der HARST

History and theory of European integration have for a long time been widely diverging and sometimes conflicting areas of study. Whereas political scientists tended to treat historical accounts primarily as useful pieces of evidence for their predetermined conceptual frameworks, historians focused their work on narrowly describing and analysing what they discovered in archival sources and primary documents, without asking themselves the broader and more fundamental questions. Simply said, where historians addressed the “what” of Europe’s post-war development, theorists mainly concentrated on “how” and “why” Europe evolved as it did. As a consequence, historians generally proved reluctant to involve themselves in the theoretical debate on European integration. From the late 1950s till the early 1970s, IR theory was dominated by the so-called neofunctionalist school of thought, which was not only a-historical but also a-European, since dominated by American political scientists like Ernst Haas, Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold.¹ Neofunctionalists studied European integration as a process, stimulated by various forms of spillover pressures and cultivated by an activist European Commission. They predicted an evolutionary development towards a supranational Europe, in which the nation-state would gradually grow obsolete. Neofunctionalist ambitions fitted in the “grand theory” way of thinking which prevailed in US academic circles in those days. In comparison, historians were much less “daring” in their way of approaching Europe: most of the historical work at the time was written from either a national perspective (based on domestic archival research) or from a classical federalist/functionalist point of view, with a prominent role attributed to the WW II resistance movement² and the “great men who created Europe” (Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, etc.).³ Likewise, in the 1970s, the broader reflection on the transition from supranationalism to intergovernmentalism was initiated by political scientists (Stanley Hoffmann in particular, followed later by Andrew Moravcsik). The historical work done in this period was empirical and often parochial.

It was not before the mid-1980s that this changed in a rather sudden and unexpected manner. In 1985, the European University Institute in Florence organised a debate on the current state of European integration studies between the

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1. See e.g. O. WAEVER, *The Sociology of a not so International Discipline: American and European Developments*, in: *International Relations, International Organization*, 4(1998), pp.687-727.
 2. See e.g. W. LIPGENS, *Europa-Föderationspläne der Widerstandsbewegungen, 1940-1945: eine Dokumentation*, Oldenbourg Verlag, München, 1968.
 3. See e.g. R. MAYNE, *The Recovery of Europe. From Devastation to Unity*, Harper and Row, New York, 1970; A.J. ZURCHER, *The Struggle to Unite Europe 1940-1958*, New York University Press, New York, 1958.

American political scientist Philippe Schmitter (a former student of Ernst Haas) and the British economic historian Alan Milward. At this occasion, the renowned Schmitter defended the legacy of neofunctionalism⁴, albeit that Haas' original concepts had been amended substantially and - as often in these cases - had taken a form of sophistication close to sheer non-intelligibility. It was during this debate that Milward expounded his conceptual ideas about the start of post-war integration, founded on his seminal work "The Reconstruction of Western Europe" which was published shortly before the event.⁵ For Milward, Europe was neither the product of the "great men" nor the indispensable result of spillover pressures by supranational organisations and transnational lobbies aiming at an erosion of the nation-state. Basing his argument on the empirical evidence traced in the government archives of the member states and the United States, he argued that there could be no talk of an integration logic towards a supranational Europe - on the contrary, the few results booked in the area were the outcome of laborious negotiations between governments and bureaucracies, emphatically clinging to their sovereignty and defending (perceived) national interests. Only when they were able to find a lowest common denominator of their individual preferences - mostly on economic issues - supranational solutions were within reach. Most of the times such a denominator proved unavailable. For Milward, European integration was not a zero-sum game, as it had been for traditional intergovernmentalists: national states did not necessarily "lose" what they delegated to the supranational level. Due to their involvement in the European Community, they were in the position to perform beneficial tasks for their citizens, most notably in the area of economic and social welfare, which they probably would not have been able to deliver in the absence of integration. As a result, Europe contributed to an increase of legitimacy of governmental elites whose motivation for integration was the preservation of executive capacity at the national level, not its erosion. In other words: Europe helped to "rescue" the nation-state.⁶

Enunciating his views, Milward made huge impression on his Florentine audience in the 1980s and, later on, on many audiences and readers of his work. To his widespread reputation of economic historian was added a similar reputation as a theorist of European integration. In fact, Milward was among the very few historians who managed to gain an established position in the theoretical debate on Europe.⁷

4. Which he continues to do up to the present, see e.g. P.C. SCHMITTER, "Neo-Neofunctionalism", in: A. WIENER, T. DIEZ (eds.), *European Integration Theory*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, pp.45-73

5. A.S. MILWARD, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-1952*, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1984.

6. A.S. MILWARD, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, Routledge, London, 1992; another highly accessible introduction to Milward's theoretical thinking is: A.S. MILWARD c.s., *The Frontier of National Sovereignty. History and Theory, 1945-1992*, Routledge, London, 1994, pp.1-32.

7. See e.g. B. ROSAMOND, *Theories of European Integration*, Macmillan, Houndmills, 2000, pp.22-23 and 138-140.

This volume of the *Journal of European Integration History* attempts to deepen the link between history and theory, by presenting contributions from both established and younger historians. It is a very welcome development that the latter group shows a determined interest in applying theoretical concepts to their empirical work, an impression which is confirmed by recent activities of the PhD networks RICHIE and HEIRS. The young historians also tend to approach European integration research from a transnational perspective, no longer making their work strictly dependent on the accessibility of archival documents in the place of residence. In this volume, the relationship history-theory is studied from three different angles, which all contribute to a deeper understanding of the growing symbiosis between the two areas of study:

- Explaining historical developments with concepts derived from European integration theory. Wolfram Kaiser and Brigitte Leucht analyse the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community by making use of a policy (or political) network approach. They argue that the thus-far prevailing historiographical focus on national governments and administrations precludes an adequate explanation of the first steps towards supranational integration. The authors show that transnational (Christian-democratic and transatlantic) networks were crucial in making the Schuman Plan (May 1950) and its implementation a reality. Ann-Christina Lauring Knudsen and Morten Rasmussen address the period of the 1960s and posit that committee structures (most notably COREPER and the Special Committee for Agriculture) were instrumental in creating a new political system in Europe, dominated by processes of socialisation among officials and administrations, both at the national and supranational level. They observe a development of “creeping” integration, since such a far-going political-administrative merger at the European level had not been anticipated at the moment of drafting the EEC Treaty. Laurent Warloutzet has investigated internal divisions within the European Commission in the mid-1960s, by using neofunctionalist and federalist frameworks of analysis. He compares the conflicting views of Commission president Walter Hallstein and the French commissioner Robert Marjolin: while the former launched a bold federalist offensive in 1964-1965 (aiming at a new institutional “accord”), the latter based his European strategy on (neofunctionalist) economic and technocratic arguments. Warloutzet’s analysis is innovative, especially seen in the light of traditional neofunctionalist preferences attributed to Hallstein, who made no secret of being fascinated by the theoretical concepts of thinkers like Lindberg and Scheingold.⁸
- Analysing political science work on Europe from the viewpoint of an historian. Melissa Pine has made thorough study of the European publications of the -renowned but controversial - liberal intergovernmentalist Andrew Moravcsik. She thereby adds an original historical perspective to an earlier critical

8. ee e.g. J.P.J. WHITE, *Theory Guiding Practice: the Neofunctionalists and the Hallstein EEC Commission*, in: *Journal of European Integration History*, 1(2003), pp.111-132.

political-scientist assessment of Moravcsik's work in the *Journal of Cold War Studies* (2004).⁹ Pine concludes that, although Moravcsik's work is highly problematic for historians working in European integration (mainly because of the latter's impressionistic use of primary source material), it is also a catalyst for further empirical research and for a more explicit assessment of scholarly practice in history.

- (Critically) reviewing the position of historians in the theoretical debate on post-war European integration. Wilfried Loth analyses the conceptual views held by Walter Lipgens and Alan Milward and arrives to the conclusion that neither of the two has been entirely convincing in explaining the start and development of postwar Europe. To remedy this, Loth presents a model of “four driving forces” behind European integration: preserving peace among sovereign states, offering a solution for the German question, meeting the requirements of economic productivity, and self-assertion in the face of new world powers. Making use of these driving forces, one can explain both the timing of new integration initiatives, as well as the choice for a specific type of integration at a specific moment. John Gillingham claims that the field of European integration history suffers from a serious theoretical vacuum. In his view, parochialism still pervades the historical literature. Gillingham blames historians for a lack of objectivity: they tend to stick too close to their sources (including financial ones), while - instead - they should learn to examine their subject more critically. If not, historians will never be able to explain how and why the European integration project currently got itself into trouble, as argues Gillingham.

We started this introduction by illuminating Alan Milward's merits for the development of historical theory on Europe. These merits are still irrefutable, but fortunately this volume also gives ample evidence of a continuing evolution of conceptual analytical thinking on European integration. The historical-theoretical debate on Europe is in a constant flux, which is how it ought to be in a proper academic environment. Another outcome of this volume is the salutary effect of applying theory to historical empirical work. Theory generally teaches us to pose the right questions and often helps us to reinforce the analytical value of academic research. Historians should continue to do what they are good at, but openness towards other disciplines will lead to a better understanding of what the intricate field of European integration is all about.

9. R.H. LIESHOUT, M.L.L. SEGERS, A. Van der VLEUTEN, *De Gaulle, Moravcsik and the Choice for Europe: Soft Sources, Weak Evidence?*, in: *Journal of Cold War Studies* 4(2004). Despite urgent requests on the part of the JCWS editorial board, Moravcsik so far has refrained from defending himself against the vehement criticism on his work by the three authors.

Explaining European Integration: The contribution from Historians

Wilfried LOTH

Normally historians are not expected to develop theories. Their purview is the facts, the details, the particular course of events, the many deviations from the norm. Detractors assert that historians merely have to go into the archives in order to find evidence for the theories of political scientists; this, so they claim, is the appropriate division of labour between the disciplines. If one wants to put it less problematically, one could say that historians are to pursue detailed case studies and upon this foundation the actual social scientists then erect their explanatory theories.¹ Making use of available information on developments and decision-making processes, historians take upon themselves the review of theories, and it is one of the secret pleasures of their profession to cause mighty theoretical edifices to tumble in the face of incontrovertible facts.

At the same time, there are also productive links between historians and theory discussions in a double sense: on the one hand, historians continually work with theories, attempting to search among the full range of facts for the essential ones and establish links between them. The selection of what is essential to consider as well as the reconstruction of links depend on theoretical presuppositions – independently of whether the historian is aware of them or not. Thus, even those historians who are outspokenly opposed to theory in their works are themselves influenced by theory.² Even more important is the fact that the results reached by historians not only disprove theoretical presuppositions but also offer explanations themselves. These explanations focus above all on the individual case being investigated but they can also be generalized, approaching theoretical pronouncements more closely as the subject of the investigation is more fully grasped. The willingness to undertake such comprehensive presentations varies among historians, as does the ability to do so successfully. The tendency of historians' work is toward comprehensive pronouncements, however.³

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1. This is the tendency of the contributions in P.G. LAUREN (ed.), *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy*, Free Press, New York, 1979; and M.G. FRY, *History and International Studies*, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, Washington, DC, 1987. For an organized dialogue between diplomatic historians and political scientists, see C. ELMAN, M.F. ELMAN, *Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory. Respecting Difference and Crossing Boundaries*, in: *International Security*, 1(Summer 1997), pp.5-21; as well as the subsequent contributions to the debate by J.S. LEVY, St.H. HABER, D.M. KENNEDY, St.D. KRASNER, A.L. GEORGE, Ed. INGRAM, P.W. SCHROEDER, and J.L. GADDIS, pp.22-85.
 2. Cf. the articles in: J. KOCKA, Th. NIPPERDEY (eds.), *Theorie und Erzählung in der Geschichte*, Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag, München, 1979.
 3. The history of European integration can be regarded as a part of the field of "international history." On that field, cf. W. LOTH, J. OSTERHAMMEL (eds.), *Internationale Geschichte. Themen - Ergebnisse - Aussichten*, Oldenbourg, München, 2000.

The Development of Integration Historiography

Historians have been dealing with European integration for some time and continue to do so to an increasing extent. The beginnings of European integration historiography reach back to the 1960s. These efforts were strongly characterized by a focus on intellectual history and, to an extent, on universal history as well; the interest focussed on the development from the European idea to the United States of Europe as a new epoch in the history of the old continent after the catastrophes of two world wars. At the end of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, researchers began taking a diplomatic history approach as well with the opening of state archives, which in the member states of the European Union normally occurs after thirty years' time; this thirty-year-rule applies also to EU organs and most other European institutions.⁴ In the analysis of government records, research was primarily directed toward the foreign policy of the individual member states. The interest of historians in the European theme grew to the extent that this national foreign policy evolved towards a European integration policy after the Second World War. Since the late 1980s, there have also been approaches based on social history and the history of mentalities. These contribute to broaden the chronological and perspective frameworks of research emphasized by diplomatic history, and in a certain sense, they link up with the early universal history approaches developed by Geoffrey Barraclough, Rolf Hellmut Foerster, Helmut Gollwitzer and others.⁵

In the process, historical research on integration has become Europeanized and internationalized. Given the national composition of the historians' guild and its close links to national history, this development was by no means an obvious one; for that reason, we need to point out the moderating function of the European Liaison Committee of Historians, which publishes the *Journal of European Integration History*. After preliminary work undertaken by Walter Lipgens as the first professor for integration history at the European University Institute in Florence from 1976 to 1979, this committee was created in 1982 at a conference in

4. Initial overviews of publications of records and archival collections are offered by W. LIPGENS (ed.), *Sources for the History of European Integration (1945-1955). A Guide to Archives in the Countries of the Community*, Springer Verlag Leiden, 1980; and M. PETER, H.-J. SCHRÖDER, *Einführung in das Studium der Zeitgeschichte*, UTB, Paderborn, 1994, pp.205-254. Regarding opportunities to use archives: *Archivführer der Außenministerien der Mitgliedsstaaten und der Institutionen der Europäischen Union*, 2. Auflage, Amt für Veröffentlichungen der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Luxemburg, 1997.

5. See H. DUCHARDT, et al. (eds.), *Europa-Historiker. Ein biographisches Handbuch*, 3 vols., Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 2006-2007. For an overview of the development of integration historiography up to the beginning of the 1990s, see the contributions in: *Lettre d'Information des Historiens de l'Europe Contemporaine*, 1-2(June 1992); and C. WURM, *Early European Integration as a Research Field: Perspectives, Debates, Problems*, in: C. WURM (ed.), *Western Europe and Germany. The Beginnings of European Integration 1945-1960*, Berg Publisher, Oxford and Washington, DC, 1995, pp.9-26; P. GERBET, *La France et l'intégration européenne. Essai d'historiographie*, Peter Lang, Berlin, 1995; A. VARSORI, *La storiografia sull'integrazione europea*, in: *Europa 10*, 1(2001), pp.69-93.

Luxemburg as an association of leading integration historians from the member states of the European Community who worked with the European Commission in Brussels while maintaining their scholarly independence.

The members of this Liaison Committee regard it as their task to coordinate research into the history of European integration, to make the results of research known beyond national borders, to encourage the examination of source materials, to call attention to gaps in research, and to promote exchanges among historians working on integration. To these ends, they regularly hold international conferences gathering and advancing research on a particular time period in integration history. The first conference, which took place in November 1984 in Strasbourg, dealt with the beginnings of European integration from 1948 to 1950;⁶ the tenth conference in October of 2005 in Groningen dealt with the breakthrough towards a “second Europe”, from The Hague Summit in December of 1969 to the Paris Summit Meeting in December of 1974.⁷ At an eleventh conference in Rome in March of 2007, an assessment was made of research on integration history up to the present.⁸

No hegemonic claims are associated with the activity of the Liaison Committee. Its composition is pluralistic and seeks to be as representative as possible of the historians dealing with integration history. Its members have included Walter Lipgens as well as scholars such as René Girault, Hans-Peter Schwarz, and Raymond Poidevin. The number of members has grown as the European Union has grown; there are currently fourteen historians on the committee.

The activities of the Liaison Committee are supplemented by a series of other networks. Especially worthy to be mentioned is the research group “European Identity in the Twentieth Century”, initiated in 1988 by René Girault and currently led by Robert Frank, who holds the chair in the history of international relations at the University of Paris I. This organization links together a large number of historians who examine the development of the mentalities of Europeans in the twentieth century. No fewer than 180 historians have so far participated in work

6. Cf. R. POIDEVIN (ed.), *Histoire des débuts de la construction européenne (mars 1948-mai 1950)*, Bruylant/Nomos, Bruxelles/Baden-Baden, 1986.

7. Cf. J. VAN DER HARST (ed.), *Beyond the Customs Union. The European Community's Quest for Completion, Deepening and Enlargement, 1969-1975*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2007. Further conference volumes are K. SCHWABE (ed.), *Die Anfänge des Schuman-Plans 1950/51*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1988; E. SERRA (ed.), *Il rilancio dell'Europa e i trattati di Roma*, Giuffrè, Milano, 1989; G. TRAUSCH (ed.), *Die Europäische Integration vom Schuman-Plan bis zu den Verträgen von Rom*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1993; M. DUMOULIN (ed.), *Plans des temps de guerre pour l'Europe d'après-guerre 1940-1947*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1995; G. TRAUSCH (ed.), *Le rôle et la place des petits pays en Europe au XX^e siècle*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2005; A. DEIGHTON, A.S. MILWARD (eds.), *Widening, Deepening and Acceleration: The European Economic Community 1957-1963*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1999; W. LOTH (ed.), *Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963-1969*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2000; M.-Th. BISCH, G. BOSSUAT (eds.), *L'Europe unie et l'Afrique. De l'idée d'Eurafrique à la Convention de Lomé I*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2005; A. VARSORI (ed.), *Inside the European Community. Actors and Policies in European integration, 1957-1972*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2006.

8. Work is currently underway on the publication of the papers of this colloquium.

groups and international colloquia in order to share their research on the development of Europeans' mentalities and perceptions.⁹ Additionally, the integration history research seminar at the European University Institute in Florence has been and continues to be important for the formation of a "European" school of integration historians. This seminar has at various times been led by Walter Lipgens, Richard Griffith, Alan Milward, and Pascaline Winand. Lastly, doctoral candidates dealing with the history of European integration have come together in their own networks: the History of European Integration Research Society (HEIRS) and the Réseau International des jeunes Chercheurs en Histoire de l'Intégration Européenne (RICHIE).¹⁰ Most historians are linked together by several of these networks.

Thus, historical research has become "European" in its study of the history of integration - at least in the sense that there is cooperation beyond national borders and that there are no distinct "national" schools of historical writing on Europe. Due to language barriers, mutual familiarity with research in various countries still fails to come up to expectations; the discussions are, however, carried on internationally with the inclusion of some American specialists but centred on a British-French-German triangle. There are signs too that people are learning from one another with regard to methods and the framing of questions. Thus, cooperation among historians of Europe has had effects on the field of history in general. It plays a key role in the Europeanization of contemporary history and contributes to the rise of a "Europe of historians".¹¹

Paradigms and Controversies

When seeking paradigms which have developed into integration research, the works of Lipgens and of Milward are usually contrasted.¹² Walter Lipgens, my teacher, along with Pierre Gerbet, the Nestors of historical writing on Europe so to speak,¹³ viewed European unification as a world historical process stemming from

9. An overview of the results of the first phase of the project is given by R. GIRAULT (ed.), *Identité et conscience européennes au XX^e siècle*, Hachette, Paris, 1994. For the second phase, cf. R. FRANK (ed.), *Les identités européennes au XX^e siècle*, Ed de la Sorbonne, Paris, 2004.

10. The contributions to the gatherings in Paris and Copenhagen are found in: L. WARLOUZET, K. RÜCKER (eds.), *Quelle Europe? / Which Europe?: Nouvelles Approches en Histoire de l'Intégration Européenne*, Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2006; M. RASMUSSEN, A.-Ch. KNUDSEN, J. POULSEN (eds.), *The Road to a United Europe - Interpretations of the Process of European Integration*, Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2007.

11. Cf. R. GIRAULT, *Das Europa der Historiker*, in: R. HUDEMANN, H. KAELEBLE, K. SCHWABE (eds.), *Europa im Blick der Historiker (Historische Zeitschrift, Beiheft 21)*, Oldenbourg, München, 1995, pp.55-90.

12. See, for example, the presentation in: C. WURM, op.cit.

13. After some contemporary analyses, the latter published a comprehensive history of European unification in 1983, which is now in its fourth edition: Pierre Gerbet, *La construction de l'Europe*, Armand Colin, Paris, 2007.

the weaknesses of the nation-state and the catastrophes they had unleashed, a process which was to lead to a new home “for the European cultural realm”,¹⁴ presuming the Europeans realized what was called for and acted accordingly. Lipgens saw “the magnitude of technical and political power having grown beyond units the size of European nation-states”¹⁵ with a generally expanding nationalism having accelerated the “demise of Europe” still further. People became especially aware of this demise during and after the catastrophes of both the First and Second World Wars and complementarily to this growing awareness the first European institutions were created.

Lipgens thus started from a universal history perspective in his engagement with ideas and concepts. He sought to depict the “consciousness” of the Europeans in the crisis of the nation-state, its extent, and also its boundaries. This led him to detect European unification plans in the most diverse political movements, among publicists and men and women of great insight, economic leaders and politicians since the First World War, to trace plans for Europe in the resistance movement against the National Socialist *imperium* in Europe, which he regarded as very significant, to investigate the early history of European pressure groups, especially the federalists, and, lastly, to the discussion of “European” convictions among the “founding fathers” of the European Communities.¹⁶ It remained somewhat unclear, however, how political reality had emerged from all these plans and ideas. Lipgens conceived the European institutions as having resulted from a confrontation between the political will for unification and forces of persistence in the nation-states but did not go any further into the question of how the power relations between the one and the other had developed.¹⁷

In contrast, Alan Milward presented the European integration policies of the 1940s and 1950s in a consciously provocative manner as European policies of nation-states and national governments. “The founding of the European Communities”, he asserts, was “the work of nation-states, that expressly created them in order to preserve and strengthen themselves”.¹⁸ European integration policy was an “integral part of the reassertion of the nation-state as an

14. W. LIPGENS, *Der Zusammenschluß Westeuropas. Leitlinien für den historischen Unterricht*, in: *Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*, 34(1983), pp.345-372, here p.347.

15. W. LIPGENS, *Die Anfänge der europäischen Einigungspolitik 1945-1950*, Bd.I: 1945-1947, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, 1977, p.2.

16. Along with his incomplete major work (W. LIPGENS, *Die Anfänge der europäischen Einigungspolitik ...*, op.cit.; English edition under the title *A History of European Integration*, vol.1: 1945-1947, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982), see also idem. (ed.), *Europa-Föderationspläne der Widerstandsbewegungen 1940-1945*, Oldenbourg, München, 1968; idem. (ed.), *Documents on the History of European Integration*, vol.1: *Continental Plans for European Union 1939-1945*, De Gruyter, Berlin/New York, 1985; vol.2: *Plans for European Union in Great Britain and in Exile, 1939-1945*, de Gruyter, Berlin/New York, 1986; idem. (ed.), *45 Jahre Ringen um die Europäische Verfassung. Dokumente 1939-1984*, Europa Union Verlag, Bonn, 1986.

17. On the categorizing of Walter Lipgens cf. W. LOTH, *Walter Lipgens (1925-1984)*, in: H. DUCH-ARDT, et al. (eds.), *Europa-Historiker ...*, op.cit., vol.1, pp.317-336.

18. A.S. MILWARD, *Der historische Revisionismus zur Einigungsgeschichte Westeuropas. Neue historische Erkenntnisse statt überholter Schulweisheiten*, in: *Integration*, 10(1987), pp.100-106.

organizational concept".¹⁹ European integration constituted "a new form of agreed international framework created by the nation-states to advance particular sets of national domestic policies which could not be pursued, or not be pursued successfully, through the already existing international framework of cooperation between interdependent states, or by renouncing international interdependence".²⁰ After the collapse of the European nation-states from 1929 to 1945, economic prosperity and the expansion of the social welfare state could only be achieved by means of integration; they secured new legitimacy and citizen loyalty for the nation-state after the shock of the Great Depression, National Socialist expansion, and wartime destruction. Hence, the European Communities were and remain the "buttress" of the nation-state, "an indispensable part of the nation-state's postwar construction".²¹

Given this position, Milward is often understood as being anti-Lipgens, as a demythologizer who detects tangible national interests behind the alleged European idealism and who destroys the fond dreams of a united Europe by pointing to the continued reality of the nation-states. Especially adherents of the "realist" school of foreign policy analysts like to hear this message eagerly and embrace it - figures such as Andrew Moravcsik, whose collection of case studies from the origins of the Treaties of Rome to the Maastricht Treaty is subsumed under the thesis that European integration is based on "a series of rational choices by national leaders" who "responded to constraints and opportunities stemming from the economic interests of powerful domestic constituents, relative power of each state in the international system, and the role of international institutions in bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments".²²

Diplomatic historians who have traditionally stood close to the "realist" school have scoured national archives in search of national interests in the formulation of European policy. Given that policy within national institutions must always be articulated in terms of the nation, evidence can be found. Hence, we now have a whole series of studies describing European integration policy as national interest policy. Along with economic interests and the expansion of the social welfare state emphasized by Milward, foreign policy and defence policy considerations have also become objects of investigation. Thus, for example, Raymond Poidevin highlights the French interest in defence against Germany,²³ while Hans-Peter Schwarz points to the desire of the young Federal Republic to regain its

19. A.S. MILWARD, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, Routledge, London, 1992, p.3.

20. A.S. MILWARD, F.M.B. LYNCH, R. RANIERI, F. ROMERO, V. SØRENSEN, *The Frontier of National Sovereignty. History and Theory 1945-1992*, Routledge, London, 1993, p.182.

21. A.S. MILWARD, *The European Rescue ...*, op.cit., p.3. Cf. also idem., *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51*, Routledge, London, 1984; idem., *Allegiance. The Past and the Future*, in: *Journal of European Integration History*, 1(1995), pp.7-20.

22. A. MORAVCSIK, *The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, UCL Press Taylor & Francis Group, London, 1999, p.18. See also M. PINE's contribution in this issue.

23. R. POIDEVIN, *Robert Schuman - homme d'Etat 1886-1993*, Imp. nationale, Paris, 1986.

sovereignty,²⁴ and Georges-Henri Soutou emphasized the national goals of de Gaulle's European policy.²⁵

Such works neglect the fact that the definition of national interests can also be based on "European" insights. Likewise, they do not take into account the structural change in the international system which occurred along with integration. Gains in explaining the success of specific European solutions by emphasizing national interests in the actions of politicians are exchanged for a distortion of the process as a whole. European integration policy appears as a slightly adapted resumption of the showdown between sovereign nation-states in a new way.

Milward was not completely innocent of this "national" and static interpretation of his approach because he represented himself as a critic of Lipgens' conception. On closer examination, however, it can be seen that the two views were not so far apart after all. Milward too saw functional deficits in the nation-state unleashed by technological development; he even spoke of a genuine "collapse" of the nation-states in the Second World War.²⁶ Integration was necessary in order to overcome this situation. Without integration, the nation-state would not have been able to offer its citizens the amount of security and affluence which would make its survival possible. Likewise, Milward saw that integration implied the reduction of national sovereignty and that this went hand in hand with the development of a second loyalty, that of the citizen toward the European Community. And in his most recent works, he also stresses that this process of transferring sovereignty and legitimacy can go further - if the nature of national political decisions allows it:

"There is an inherent force within the developed modern nation-state which can tend to integration [...]. But whether that force does actually tend in that direction depends absolutely on the nature of domestic policy choices and thus on national politics".²⁷

The contrast between Lipgens and Milward is thereby reduced to the nature of the description: whereas Milward speaks abstractly of states reacting to the needs of their citizens, Lipgens focuses on the citizens acting themselves having made the same kind of experience in the respective nation-states and their institutions. The process described by both scholars is identical in structure: functional deficits of European nation-states in the age of modern industrial societies led to the establishment of international structures. Lipgens and Milward also agree in regarding the outcome of this process as essentially open: what the former considers to be necessary insight into what historically is called for - something that can also fail - is referred to by the other as a "political choice". If it is lacking, then the process stagnates or even moves backwards.

24. H.-P. SCHWARZ, *Adenauer und Europa*, in: *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 27(1979), pp.472-523; idem., *Adenauer. Der Aufstieg: 1876-1952*, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1986; idem., *Adenauer. Der Staatsmann: 1952-1967*, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1991.

25. G.-H. SOUTOU, *L'alliance incertaine. Les rapports politico-stratégiques franco-allemands*, 1954-1996, Fayard, Paris, 1996.

26. A.S. MILWARD, *The European Rescue ...*, op.cit., p.4.

27. Ibid., p.447.

The opposition between the two views appears greater than it actually is essentially because of specific weaknesses in each of them: in Lipgens' work, there is no differentiation among various conceptions of European unity and no investigation of the various special motivations, so that the unification movement seems essentially stronger, more unified, and more effective than it actually was. For his part, Milward reduces the spectrum of possible motivations for unification to the economic sphere and does not formulate things clearly in that realm either, so that it remains uncertain why states with similar economic and social interests react differently to the issue of integration (one may think, for example, of the contrast between Belgium and Denmark or between France and Great Britain). Beyond this, Milward on occasion posits a persistence of the nation-state that contradicts his own theoretical construct; there is no discussion of how change, statehood, governance, and the international system are experienced in integration.

In addition, there are also differences in the subject matter examined by the concrete historical research of each scholar: Lipgens emphasized work in archives of the European associations in the first post-war years; moreover, his early death in 1984 prevented him from working with government sources. Conversely, Milward and his adherents have from the beginning concentrated on government actions, which gained greater relevance with the implementation of the Marshall Plan in 1947-48. The development of public opinion is not taken into account. The exchange of arguments between the two authors was unable to advance beyond its beginnings due to the death of Lipgens. In reality, the two scholars' findings reinforce one another more than they contradict one another.²⁸

The Model of the Four Driving Forces

In my own work²⁹ I have gradually developed a concept which seeks to overcome the weaknesses of the approaches taken by Lipgens and Milward.³⁰ It is

28. Likewise G. THIEMEYER, *Vom "Pool Vert" zur Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft. Europäische Integration, Kalter Krieg und die Anfänge der Gemeinsamen Europäischen Agrarpolitik 1950-1957*, Oldenbourg, München, 1999, p.7.

29. Cf. W. LOTH, *Sozialismus und Internationalismus. Die französischen Sozialisten und die Nachkriegsordnung Europas 1940-1950*, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1977; W. LIPGENS and W. LOTH (eds.), *Documents on the History of European Integration*, vol.3: *The Struggle for European Union by Political Parties and Pressure Groups in Western European Countries, 1945-1950*, De Gruyter, Berlin/New York, 1988; vol.4: *Transnational Organizations of Political Parties and Pressure Groups in the Struggle for European Union, 1945-1950*, De Gruyter, Berlin/New York, 1990; W. LOTH, *Der Weg nach Europa. Geschichte der europäischen Integration 1939-1957*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1990, 3rd ed.: 1996.

30. Formulated for the first time in: W. LOTH, *Der Prozeß der europäischen Integration: Antriebskräfte, Entscheidungen, Perspektiven*, in: *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte*, 46(1995), pp.703-714; an updated version in: *Jahrbuch für europäische Geschichte*, 1(2000), pp.17-30. Cf. idem., *Identity and Statehood in the Process of European Integration*, in: *Journal of European Integration History*, 1(2000), pp.19-31.

characterized by the view that regarding the functional deficit of nation-states which have led to the steps toward integration, there are several problem areas to be distinguished, which, firstly, can be of different degrees of urgency and, secondly, can also call for different solutions. It seems sensible to me to distinguish among four types of problems from which there result driving forces for European integration. Two of them are old and have acquired new urgency due to technological development in the twentieth century; the other two emerge directly from this development.

The first problem is that of preserving peace among sovereign states - or in other words, the problem of overcoming anarchy among states. This constitutes the essential motive of the European unification plans of earlier centuries, from Dante to Immanuel Kant and Victor Hugo. The urgency of this problem has grown dramatically due to the development of modern military technology in the twentieth century. The vast increase in the number of casualties, the amount of human suffering, and economic destruction has strengthened calls for institutions capable of securing peace, especially during and after the catastrophes of the two world wars. Thereafter, the danger of nuclear destruction and self destruction and the emergence of new nationalisms after the end of the East-West Bloc structure have accentuated this problem in new ways.

Secondly, the German question must be seen as a special aspect of the preservation of peace. This problem too is older than the twentieth century but has become more pressing with the development of industrial society in Europe. For reasons of population and economic power, a German nation-state in the centre of Europe constituted and constitutes a latent threat to the independence of its neighbours. This resulted in a vicious circle of encirclement and expansion, which could only be broken by integrating the Germans together with their neighbours into a larger community. To have understood this after two calamitous turns of that vicious circle is undoubtedly one of the great achievements of the Europeans in the second half of the twentieth century.

Economics in a narrower sense can be characterized as the third functional deficit: it became increasingly clear that the national markets in Europe were too small for rational production methods. Their mutual walling-off was only sensible on a temporary basis and depending on the specific production sector; in the long term, this threatened to result in a loss of productivity and consequently also a loss of the state's legitimacy.

This was linked, fourthly, to a loss of power and competitiveness vis-à-vis larger state units, as the US in economic and political terms, and as the Soviet Union in military terms. Thus, self-assertion in the face of the new world powers became an additional motive of European unification policies. Depending on one's perception, it was either defence against American hegemony or against Soviet expansion that stood in the foreground. It was often the case that both were pursued simultaneously: the preservation of the Europeans' freedom of action in an alliance with the US.

These four motives have not always been equally strong, and they have not always worked in the same direction. Hence, it was the case that the need for self-assertion and the unresolved German question made an association of Western Europe after the Second World War seem quite appropriate; regarding the goal of preserving peace, however, it became problematic. The common necessity for unification stood against very different sensitivities and needs of the participating states, the overarching interest in a common market contrasted the very different economic needs of individual states as well as different interests of individual production sectors. European policy thus could not be a unified policy; it always was embedded and continues to be embedded in conflicts among different conceptions of order and interests at the European level.

Thus my model is complex to a certain extent. It does, however, also have the advantage of being able to explain an integration process which is also complex. From the development of these driving forces, we can explain both the timing of specific integration initiatives as well as the decision for specific types of integration, which are themselves at the same time always decisions not to proceed with other conceivable forms of integration.

Steps towards Integration and their Consequences

The German question in the context of the Cold War reveals itself as decisive for the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the core of supranational community building in Europe in 1950-51. This motive was augmented by a certain amount of self-assertion and reinsurance towards the US as the leading power - both in the context of the growing significance of economic potential for one's international power position, which Guido Thiemeier has also pointed out in his study of the beginnings of European agricultural policy.³¹ After worries about a split between East and West had initially prevented many Europeans from promoting unification plans restricted to the Western hemisphere, such plans seemed to be an indispensable prerequisite for winning back freedom of action after the Soviets rejected the Marshall aid in the summer of 1947. At the same time, a framework was needed for the long-term inclusion of the West Germans, who became indispensable allies now. The French initiative in the summer of 1948 that led to the founding of the Council of Europe intended indeed such a structure. This was clearly not successful due to British hesitancy, and so a second attempt became necessary. What was actually new in Robert Schuman's proposal of 9th May 1950 for a coal and steel union was his willingness to begin

31. Likewise G. THIEMEIER, *op.cit.*

supranational unification without the participation of Great Britain; he thereby secured the success of the second French attempt at pursuing European policy.³²

The European Defence Community (EDC), another integration project which was proposed even before the end of the negotiations over the coal and steel union, failed due to the impossibility of reconciling the respective goals of the participants. The Netherlands wanted the creation of a common market as a condition for the initiative, but the French said themselves unprepared for that. Thus, the idea of giving the EDC a strong supranational framework - the European Political Community - disintegrated; the French public thereby saw itself confronted with an amount of German resurgence, which was very difficult to accept. The integration framework as a means of controlling the German contribution to defence then gave way to the American presence in Europe and the prospect of a French nuclear force; integration into NATO took the place of a projected European integration.³³

Given this background, the Treaties of Rome signed on 25th March 1957 constituted an attempt to salvage what was possible of the European project after the debacle of the European Defence Community - by means of concentrating on a compromise acceptable to all participants *in extremis*. It rested on France's acceptance of the economic community demanded by the Netherlands - admittedly, only in the distant future and to be achieved in numerous stages - while France's European partners swallowed the idea of creating a European nuclear community, a prospect which no one besides French technocrats found attractive. Decisive for the founding of the European Economic Community (EEC) was the lasting conviction that there was a need to integrate the Germans better and to have greater autonomy vis-à-vis the Americans. This led Guy Mollet on the French side and Konrad Adenauer on the German side to make compromises which in the light of their respective economic interests could hardly be justified. The European Economic Community was thus primarily a political construction, even if that was hardly ever stated publicly.³⁴

32. Cf. W. LOTH, *Sozialismus und Internationalismus* ..., op.cit.; R. POIDEVIN (ed.), *Histoire des débuts* ..., op.cit.; idem., *Robert Schuman* ..., op.cit.; K. SCHWABE (ed.), *Die Anfänge* ..., op.cit.; U. LAPPENKÜPER, *Der Schuman-Plan. Mühsamer Durchbruch zur deutsch-französischen Verständigung*, in: *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 42(1994), pp.403-445; A. WILKENS (ed.), *Le Plan Schuman dans l'Histoire. Intérêts nationaux et projet européen*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2004. On Jean Monnet as "father of the Schuman Plan", see E. ROUSSEL, *Jean Monnet*, Fayard, Paris, 1996; and G. BOSSUAT, A. WILKENS (eds.), *Jean Monnet, l'Europe et les chemins de la Paix*, Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris, 1999.

33. G. TRAUSCH, *Europäische Integration* ..., op.cit.; W. LOTH, *Die EVG und das Projekt der Europäischen Politischen Gemeinschaft*, in: R. HUDEMANN, H. KAEUBLE, K. SCHWABE (eds.), *Europa im Blick* ..., op.cit., pp.191-201; R. MAGAGNOLI, *Italien und die Europäische Verteidigungsgemeinschaft. Zwischen europäischem Credo und nationaler Machtpolitik*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 1999; D. PREDA, *Alcide De Gasperi, federalista europeo*, Mulino, Bologna, 2004.

34. E. SERRA (ed.), *Il rilancio* ..., op.cit.; W. LOTH, *Deutsche und französische Interessen auf dem Weg zu EWG und Euratom*, in: A. WILKENS (ed.), *Die deutsch-französischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen 1945-1960*, Thorbecke, Sigmaringen, 1991, pp.178-187; G. THIEMEYER, op.cit.

The fact that the Community of the Six was able to prove itself and expand is therefore largely due to its growing economic attractiveness. Even in its rudimentary beginnings with the Six, the Common Market demonstrated that it was an instrument of socially acceptable increase of productivity, something, which soon seemed indispensable and which became attractive for an increasing number of candidates for membership. It was economics more than the interest in European self-assertion that compelled Great Britain to enter; approval of its accession after long resistance was the price France had to pay for the completion of the agricultural market and the prospect of deepening the Community.³⁵ With the entry of Britain, Ireland, and Denmark in 1973, the Common Market further increased in economic significance and weight. At the same time, more and more domains of economic activity wound up in the realm of common regulation. Even if one may not speak of a direct and irreversible development toward ever stronger integration - as the functionalist theory of integration would like to suggest - it is a fact that more and more political and social actors have made use of the European dimension to pursue their various goals.

This process was disrupted by a lack of agreement on the political goals that lay behind the development of the Community. With regard to the role that the European Community was to play within the Western Alliance, views diverged greatly; only a few were prepared to accept Charles de Gaulle's conception of a European defence community armed with nuclear weapons within the framework of the Western Alliance.³⁶ Severe crises resulted from this, which could only be overcome with great effort.³⁷ Divergent political interests and waning awareness of the political dimension of European construction finished by reducing the willingness to compromise on contentious economic issues as well. The search for compromise thereby became an arduous business, and the Community repeatedly failed to develop into a world political actor. The political artistry of a Willy Brandt and a Georges Pompidou was sufficient to get the "Europe of the Nine" underway; the ability to act in the political realm was not achieved, however - essentially due to French mistrust of German efforts toward reunification.³⁸ Valéry Giscard

35. Cf. N.P. LUDLOW, *The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s. Negotiating the Gaullist Challenge*, Routledge, London and New York, 2006.

36. Along with G.-H. SOUTOU, *L'alliance incertaine ...*, op.cit., cf. also W. LOTH, *De Gaulle und Europa. Eine Revision*, in: *Historische Zeitschrift* 253(1991), pp.629-660; M. VAÏSSE, *La grandeur. Politique étrangère du général de Gaulle 1958-1969*, Fayard, Paris, 1998.

37. Cf. A. DEIGHTON, A.S. MILWARD, *Widening ...*, op.cit.; W. LOTH, *Crises ...*, op.cit.; M. KOOPMANN, *Das schwierige Bündnis. Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen und die Außenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1958-1965*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2000. On the "empty chair crisis" of 1965, see also W. LOTH, W. WALLACE, W. WESSELS (eds.), *Walter Hallstein: The Forgotten European? Europa Union*, London/New York, 1998; J.-M. PALAYRET, H. WALLACE, P. WINAND (eds.), *Visions, Votes and Vetoes. The Empty Chair Crisis and the Luxembourg Compromise Forty Years on*, Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2006; N.P. LUDLOW, *The European Community ...*, op.cit., pp.40-124.

38. Cf. C. HIEPEL, *Willy Brandt – Georges Pompidou et la gouvernance européenne*, in: W. LOTH (ed.), *La gouvernance supranationale dans la construction européenne*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2005, pp.163-183.

d'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt had to content themselves with pragmatic steps toward further development of the Community.³⁹

Behind the impetus toward integration initiated in 1985-86 by the Single European Act (SEA), there stood - as far as François Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl were concerned - the old political goals which had brought together Schuman and Adenauer: integration of the Germans and self-assertion in world politics.⁴⁰ The idea of constructing a political Community was clearly still very foreign to the newcomers of 1973, Britain, Denmark, and Ireland; they only signed the compromise because they hoped to improve the performance of the European economies in the face of Japanese competition. Additionally, Margaret Thatcher aspired to overcome vested rights in the social welfare state which could not be directly eliminated at the national level⁴¹ through deregulation on the European level.

The European Community was nevertheless relatively well equipped when new tasks fell to it in the wake of the end of the East-West conflict and the collapse of the Soviet empire. It was able to - or had to - take over functions to ensure order on the European continent that had previously been the purview of the superpowers and their blocs. Among these were intensified efforts to bind the Germans after Germany had been reunified and the Four-Power responsibilities for the country had ended. There was also the fact that the Community suddenly became partly responsible for the restructuring of the former Eastern Bloc countries. At the same time, the political barriers which had formerly kept the neutral countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) from joining a body more effective for the pursuit of economic modernization now faded away.

The new tasks can explain why, with the end of the Cold War, the Community not only did not break apart - as was feared by many who had too one-sidedly identified the Soviet threat as the main reason for the association's existence - but instead actually took further significant steps towards integration. The spillover effect played only a limited role in the completion of the internal market, the introduction of the common currency, and the commitment to enter new political realms; decisive in each case for the implementation of all this was insight into the whole political context. The acceptance of new integrative steps was made easier because, with the end of the East-West division, the ambivalence of the European project regarding the peace question disappeared.⁴²

39. Cf. E. GUASCONI, *L'Europa tra continuità e cambiamento: Il vertice dell'Aja del 1969 e il rilancio della costruzione europea*, Edizioni Polistampa, Firenze, 2004; F. KNIPPING, M. SCHÖNWALD (eds.), *Aufbruch zum Europa der zweiten Generation. Die europäische Einigung 1969-1984*, Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, Trier, 2004; M. WEINACHER, *Valéry Giscard d'Estaing et l'Allemagne. Le double rêve inachevé*, Harmattan, Paris, 2004.

40. Cf. E. GADDUM, *Die deutsche Europapolitik in den 80er Jahren. Interessen, Konflikte und Entscheidungen der Regierung Kohl*, Schöningh, Paderborn, 1994; G. SAUNIER, *Le tandem François Mitterrand – Helmut Kohl. Une gouvernance franco-allemande symbolique?*, in: W. LOTH, *Gouvernance ...*, op.cit., pp.239-254.

41. Cf. H. YOUNG, *One of Us. A Biography of Margaret Thatcher*, Macmillan, London, 1989; idem., *The Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe From Churchill to Blair*, Humanities Press, London, 1998.

The Way to a European Society

Reference to the different driving forces of European integration also explains why certain methods of integration have been successful whereas others did not work. In the light of the different ways to consider a united Europe, there was always a broad majority amongst the member states of the Community of the Six for a fundamental commitment to a united Europe; at the same time, however, there was never unambiguous support for any form of European unification which was actually feasible. A similar situation may well apply to the larger European Union; in any event, this must be more fully investigated. The discrepancy between what is desired and what is actually achievable in European integration explains first of all the outstanding significance of individual personalities in the European integration policy decision process, from Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer to Jacques Delors and Helmut Kohl. Given the ambivalence of public opinion, strong leaders could set the course, bypass the routine of the bureaucratic apparatus via a direct contact with partners, and commit majorities to their projects. Secondly, these figures explain why with the coal and steel union and the Treaties of Rome, a form of integration could succeed that put little value on citizen participation and withdrew integrated political spheres from public discussion. Only by allowing the implications to remain unclear was it possible to avoid having negative coalitions derail the always controversial steps on integration.

Thirdly, it becomes clear in this context why the so-called democratic deficit has in the meantime emerged as the most pressing problem of the European Community: in the light of the expansion of the Community's competence and the resulting increase in regulation, majority decisions in the twilight of various ministerial council formations, negotiations within Coreper, and the low democratic legitimacy of the Commission are no longer acceptable in the eyes of citizens, independently of the pronouncements of constitutional jurists on the subject who refer to the nation-state model. The technocratic detour to Europe, first embarked upon by Jean Monnet in 1950 and successfully continued over many years, most recently once again in the launching of the Maastricht programme, doesn't work any longer, as the fierce public debates about the Maastricht Treaty and the difficulties at the moment of its ratification have made clear. With the

42. Historians have not systematically investigated developments since 1989-90, however. For initial analyses upon which I base my theses here, cf. W. KOWALSKY, *Projekt Europa. Die Zukunft der europäischen Integration*, Leske & Budrich, Opladen, 1997; D. ROMETSCH, *Die Rolle und Funktionsweise der Europäischen Kommission in der Ära Delors*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 1999; K. DYSON, *The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999; W. WOYKE, *Deutsch-französische Beziehungen seit der Wiedervereinigung. Das Tandem faßt wieder Tritt*, Leske & Budrich, Opladen, 2000; P. LUDLOW, *The Making of the New Europe: the European Councils in Brussels and Copenhagen 2002*, Eurocomment, Brussels, 2005; M. RAMBOUR, *Les réformes institutionnelles dans l'Union Européenne avant et après Nice*, in: W. LOTH, *Gouvernance ...*, op.cit., pp.283-308.

blocking of the treaty on a European constitution, this has become completely evident.⁴³

The findings on the societal dimension of European integration are supported by the observations on the European social structure compiled by Hartmut Kaelble. According to Kaelble, European societies in the twentieth century feature many commonalities “in which they differentiate themselves very clearly from American, Japanese, and Soviet society”.⁴⁴ Among these factors are family structure, employment structure, company structure, social mobility, social inequality, urban development, social security, and regulation of work conflicts. In all these spheres, European societies have become increasingly similar, especially since the Second World War and also beyond the crisis years of the European Community. At the same time, a “gradual reorientation of the Western Europeans” has taken place: “away from exclusively national perspectives toward more consciousness of the whole European situation and identity”.⁴⁵

Recently, Kaelble has extended his observations to the subjective dimension of social integration in Europe. He reports on a discourse about European civilization developed since the late eighteenth century and which since the 1960s has been characterized by a new European self-confidence that lacks the earlier claims of superiority. At the same time, he outlines the gradual development – or better, structural change – of a European public sphere. He differentiates between three phases: the classical era of the public sphere that consisted of small intellectual and liberal circles in the age of Enlightenment, which included lively exchanges among intellectuals and scholars across national borders; the era of a national mass public sphere accompanied by exchanges among experts at international congresses and by international political movements; and lastly, since the Second World War, the period of changes ushered in by mass media, supranational institutions, an intensified debate about European themes since the 1980s, as well as the gradual strengthening of the European Parliament and European civil rights.⁴⁶

43. Cf. Wilfried LOTH, “Mise en perspective historique de la constitution européenne”, in: idem., *Gouvernance* (fn. 38), pp. 339-371; idem., “Die Verfassung für Europa in historischer Perspektive,” in: idem. (ed.), *Europäische Gesellschaft. Grundlagen und Perspektiven*, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2005, pp.244-264.

44. H. KAEUBLE, *Auf dem Weg zu einer europäischen Gesellschaft. Eine Sozialgeschichte Westeuropas 1880-1980*, C.H. Beck, München, 1987, p.149.

45. Ibid., p.157. Cf. too the detailed findings on the Franco-German relationship in: H. KAEUBLE, *Nachbarn am Rhein. Entfremdung und Annäherung der französischen und deutschen Gesellschaft seit 1880*, C.H. Beck, München, 1991; idem., *Europäische Vielfalt und der Weg zu einer europäischen Gesellschaft*, in: S. HRADIL, S. IMMERFALL (eds.), *Die westeuropäischen Gesellschaften im Vergleich*, Leske & Budrich, Opladen, 1997, pp.27-68; idem., *Sozialgeschichte Europas*, C.H. Beck, München, 2007.

46. H. KAEUBLE, *Europäer über Europa. Die Entstehung des modernen europäischen Selbstverständnisses im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Campus, Frankfurt am Main/New York, 2001; idem., *Transnationale Öffentlichkeiten und Identitäten im 20. Jahrhundert*, Campus, Frankfurt am Main/New York, 2002.

Studies under the auspices of the identity project led by René Girault and Robert Frank signal a strengthening of the consensus regarding Europeans' conception of political values. Since the middle of the 1980s, the European Community has been understood more and more as a community of values committed to pluralism and democratic freedoms, the rule of law, human rights, and the protection of minorities. To that extent, a common constitutional inheritance has arisen from the discussions of recent decades and has resulted in a constitutional patriotism at the European level.⁴⁷ This European patriotism, which is based on a commitment to a system of values rather than on an emotional affinity, is compatible with national patriotism. In times of dynamic change, it even contributes to the stabilizing of national patriotisms, informed as they are by different historical experiences, different languages, and different cultures. In this regard, one can certainly speak of European identity in the singular. This is certainly not a particularistic conception of identity but instead a universal one which respects national identities and national achievements.⁴⁸

The results of research on the history of mentalities and social history correspond very well with the implicit consensus which I see in research on political history. It must be acknowledged, however, that the work done thus far on social integration and the development of European identity is not more than a preliminary sketch, having developed into a substantial picture only at a few points.⁴⁹ Research on European integration policy and "la construction européenne", as my French colleagues aptly term it, based on archival evidence has progressed in detail only up to the mid-1970s. We know only very little about decision-making processes since that time; we can only speculate as to how they fit with the societal and mental shifts mentioned above.

Prospects for Integration Research

Indications as to where the emphasis in future historical research will lie are beginning to become clearer. In my view, special attention should be paid to the

47. See V. CONSTANINESCO, *Le rôle du Conseil européen dans la formation d'une identité européenne*, in: M.-Th. BITSCH, W. LOTH, R. POIDEVIN (eds.), *Institutions européennes et identités européennes*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1998, pp.435-447; J. GERKRATH, *La Cour de Justice des Communautés européennes, la constitutionnalisation du traité de Rome et son impact sur l'émergence d'une identité européenne*, *ibid.*, pp.451-474; *idem.*, *L'émergence d'un droit constitutionnel dans l'Europe. Modes de formation et sources d'inspiration des Communautés et de l'Union européenne*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1997.

48. Cf. W. LOTH, *Nationale Interessen, Supranationalität und europäische Identität in historischer Perspektive*, in: Ch. GAITANIDES, S. KADELBACH, and G.C. RODRIGUEZ IGLESIAS (eds.), *Europa und seine Verfassung. Festschrift für Martin Zuleeg*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2005, pp.59-71.

49. Cf. M.-Th. BITSCH, W. LOTH, Ch. BARTHEL (eds.), *Cultures politiques, opinions publiques et intégration européenne*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2007.

role of personalities, not only of the founding fathers but also of the many figures who have not been at the centre of public interest up to this point: Sicco Mansholt, Maurice Faure,⁵⁰ Guy Mollet,⁵¹ Walter Hallstein, Edward Heath, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Helmut Schmidt, and François Mitterrand⁵² to name just a few.⁵³ Likewise, we need a more systematic examination of the various conceptions of Europe, their respective weights, and their development, especially beyond the original core Community.⁵⁴ Then there is also the necessity to analyze the effects of the actual existing Community on conceptions of Europe and Europe policy — not in the sense of a functionalist spillover, for which there is only limited historical evidence, but rather in regard to changes in the conceptualization of problems resulting from those effects. The public sphere, identities, and methods of government have changed with the expansion of the European Union; all that must be systematically examined as well. It is my hope that the model of the four driving forces can be made dynamic in this way and thus also become somewhat more systematized.

What do I expect from other disciplines?⁵⁵ First of all, I would like to advise political science and jurisprudence to free themselves from all static models of integration. Neither the presumably realist emphasis on the nation-state nor the focus on the technocratic phase of the European Community observable in the regime and governance discussion are able to come to terms with the actual process of change in European statehood accompanying integration. Historiography contributes to describing and explaining it and clearly needs efforts toward making constantly changing relations more conceptually precise. Thus, historiography expects from political science and from jurisprudence that change, the dynamic element, be kept in focus in systematic analyses — an avowedly difficult undertaking, which perhaps can be accomplished in dialogue between the disciplines.

With regard to sociology, it seems to me that what is needed is cooperation rather than dialogue. The transitions are fluid between analyses of historical and contemporary social structures, likewise those between the history of ideas and contemporary sociology of culture. Perhaps social historians and historians of

50. Cf. B. RIONDEL, *Itinéraire d'un fédéraliste: Maurice Faure*, in: *Journal of European Integration History*, 2(1997), pp.69-82.

51. Cf. F. LAFON, *Guy Mollet. Itinéraire d'un socialiste controversé (1905-1975)*, Fayard, Paris, 2006.

52. Cf. Frédéric BOZO, *Mitterrand, la fin de la guerre froide et l'unification allemande. De Yalta à Maastricht*, Odile Jacob, Paris, 2005.

53. Important contributions to integration history are to be found in the biography of Paul-Henri Spaak: M. DUMOULIN, *Spaak*, Ed. Racine, Bruxelles, 1999.

54. As a research program for this, H. KAEUBLE, *Europabewußtsein, Gesellschaft und Geschichte. Forschungsstand und Forschungschancen*, in: R. HUDEMANN, H. KAEUBLE, K. SCHWABE (eds.), *Europa im Blick ...*, op.cit., pp.1-29.

55. On the European discussion in other disciplines, see W. LOTH and W. WESSELS (eds.), *Theorien europäischer Integration*, Leske & Budrich, Opladen, 2001; A. WIENER, Th. DIEZ (eds.), *Theories of European Integration: Past, Present and Future*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004.

culture could be supported by sociologists in the sharpening of their concepts, and sociologists strengthened in their historical thinking by historians. With their analyses, historians always contribute to make clear what differentiates the present from the past. To that extent, the analysis of contemporary circumstances becomes more exact the more it consciously takes into account the most recent transformations. The development of identities and the transformation of societal structures under conditions of globalization present themes which perforce affect historians and sociologists alike.

What I would expect from economics above all is pronouncements as to how the choice of certain management instruments has influenced economic activity. They would be prerequisite for determining the effects of the actual existing European Community and a central source for comprehending its legitimization more precisely. The economic history of the European Communities – not the history of its economic policies, which after the work of Gerold Ambrosius and others is known in its basic outlines⁵⁶ – still has largely to be written; to do so, one would need to incorporate the continually produced short-term analyses by economists. Key concepts for understanding the integration process are productivity and social acceptability, thoroughly viewed as being in latent tension with one another. Besides, the process of harmonizing or restructuring economic relations in the member states of the Community is important too.

From the findings of the historians, the relationship between democratic legitimacy and efficiency in political decision-making will be in my opinion the central issue for future integration research. What possibility is there to democratize the European Union more thoroughly without simultaneously hindering its ability to act? The future of the European Union will depend to a decisive degree on whether that looming dilemma can be successfully resolved.⁵⁷ This question concerns primarily jurists and political scientists. In formulating answers, however, they should consider that things are in constant flux, that nothing remains as it was, and therefore the possible is not only that which has so far been possible. This could at the same time be called the core of the message which historians can contribute to the theoretical discussion of European integration. If it is not taken into account, then European integration may become in the long term a topic studied only by historians. Certainly, no one would want that.

56. G. AMBROSIUS, *Wirtschaftsraum Europa. Vom Ende der Nationalökonomien*, Fischer, Frankfurt am Main, 1996.

57. Cf. W. Merkel, *Die Europäische Integration und das Elend der Theorie*, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, 25(1999), pp.302-338.

A Theoretical Vacuum: European Integration and Historical Research Today

John R. GILLINGHAM

In the lead article of this journal's inaugural issue, "Allegiance. The Past and the Future", which was published over a decade ago, Alan S. Milward, a giant in the study of the political economy of Europe since 1945, proclaimed the intellectual liberation of historical integration research from bondage to American social science and, at the same time, heralded "the beginning of a new period [...] where history has its own theories and a research agenda which derives from them". Nothing of real importance has, sadly, ever come of this bold initiative. Now, as then, most historians of European integration resemble, in Milward's harsh judgment, "children on a crowded beach, building separate small sand castles", lacking theoretical foundations or structural support, "all of which look very vulnerable to the incoming tide".¹

Integration history, a quasi-official field of study, remains bound by a conventional wisdom that posits the inevitable development of the EU into a federal European state, an end which – as now abundantly evident – is neither likely or desirable. Without a new historical theory of integration, it will be impossible to determine how the integration process has advanced, or failed to do so, and where it has gone wrong as well as right. In the absence of theory, historical literature on the subject will either drift off into irrelevance or be swept away in a tidal wave of change by history itself.

Historical integration theory still remains, in the words of the British Marxist Perry Anderson, "under the sign of the interim". Because it has not driven, or even much influenced, the research agenda, the relevant literature continues to be dominated, according to Johnny Laursen, by "*histoire événementielle*, closely related to its near cousin, diplomatic history".² Research remains in its infancy. The existing literature deals chiefly with origins and neglects institutions; few descriptions of how they actually function, either alone or together, are to be found. Historians have also largely left the economics of integration to others. The study of the last thirty years – surely the most consequential in the EU's history – has furthermore barely begun, and the significance these crucial decades for the interpretation of earlier periods remains unexamined. The Big Questions overhanging the future of the EU are still unaddressed. The stale air of antiquarianism overhangs the historical field.

1. A.S. MILWARD, *Allegiance: The Past and the Future*, in: *Journal of European Integration History*, 1(1995), pp.7-19.

2. P. ANDERSON, *Under the Sign of the Interim*, in: P. GOWAN, P. ANDERSON (eds.), *The Question of Europe*, Verso Books, London, 1997, pp.51-76; J. LAURSEN, *Towards a Supranational History*, in: *Journal of European Integration History*, 1(2002), p.5.

Milward is himself partly to blame for the vacuum of theory. His own take on the matter, presented in the JEIH kick-off article and elaborated upon in his massive work, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, will not withstand serious scrutiny.³ Milward cannot, however, be held solely accountable for the fact that no one from the guild of official integration historians has yet designed a better mousetrap. The guild and its house journal are plagued by parochialism – the predictable product of captive scholarship. What else should one expect when the EU is both sponsor and subject? Should one really expect the JEIH's editorial board of nine Jean Monnet Chairs (of twelve total) to encourage independent, not to mention critical, analysis? Why bite the feeding hand?⁴

The opening words of Milward's inaugural article allude to, but hardly resolve, the *Ur*-problem, which cripples historical research up to the present: the equation of "integration" with the single set of institutions headquartered in Brussels and today known as the European Union.⁵ The assumption of identity strips other trends and tendencies which have contributed to the integration process of their right to historical acknowledgement and lumps them under a single heading; credits the EU undeservedly as the sole source of change; overlooks the importance of context as parameter for policy-making; and, finally, neglects impacts. Thus process and policy are conflated and unintended consequences get ascribed merely to mistakes or oversights of human agents rather than to the operation of factors beyond their control. The result is a one-dimensional historical literature which often confuses official reality with the thing itself, is overspecialized, mistakes the forest for the trees, and has had little impact either outside its own narrow field of scholarship or with either policy-makers or publics. Now that serious criticism is needed to set the EU aright, historians can offer little guidance.

I. Milwardian Integration Theory

Although surely better than nothing, the one major attempt yet made to lend coherence to historical writing in the integration field wrong-footed it and misdirected research. The theoretical claims Milward makes in "Allegiance" are both sweeping and muddled. Although pointing to the need for a synthesis of the four existing approaches to the European integration process, he leaves little doubt that only his own, demonstrably idiosyncratic, position should really count in the overall blend. The first such approach mentioned by Milward actually coincides with the standard, shopworn quasi-diplomatic tack cited by Laursen as the historian's present-day stock-in-trade; it leads nowhere, in Milward's view. The second – which he dismisses as naïve, outmoded, and hagiographical – emphasizes

3. A.S. MILWARD, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, Routledge, London, 1993.

4. Critical annotation by the editorial board of JEIH: Except for the first six issues (three first years), the Journal of European Integration History doesn't receive any funds from Brussels!

5. A.S. MILWARD, *Allegiance* ..., op.cit., p.7.

the importance of altruism as a motive as well as its obverse side, the rejection of traditional national diplomacy, which, purportedly, led to the two world wars. A third approach, a promising one, which he also brushes off, views Europe's integration since World War II as an intermediate step towards the restoration of an open world market. That leaves only the final theory, Milward's very own, which holds "that the process of integration was deliberately conceived and developed to preserve the nation-state by supporting a range of new social and economic policies whose very purpose was the resurrection of the nation-state after its collapse between 1929 and 1945".⁶

This is fanciful. Little evidence of Milward's grand design has ever turned up. And the propositions are simply untenable that "the Union exists because it has been a response by national governments to popular demand" and that it "buttressed the nation-state in the pursuit of income, welfare, family security and employment".⁷ The efficacy of his theory furthermore rests on the assumption that Brussels can, and does, render crucial services more efficiently than possible at the national, or international, level – on so-called output legitimacy. This is easy to posit but hard to demonstrate.

Prior to the Davignon Plan of the late 1970's for the rescue of the steel industry, the only major operational program of the European Economic Community (the forerunner of the EU) was the almost universally condemned Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), an economically wasteful and unnecessary program – though still very much alive – which was originally adopted primarily as a political payoff to France. For its part, EU social policy has always been mainly chatter, and the same was, and remains, true of security policy. A case can be made in the financial field, to be sure, for the seriousness of the Werner Plan for a currency union (1969) but until the monetary regime change of the 1970s, the EU was little more than a paper project; it was hardly, as Milward admitted, "the locus of power and decision-making".⁸ Since then, the EU's record on "output legitimacy" has, at best, been decidedly mixed - the technocratic rationale is barely credible - and that on political responsiveness ("input legitimacy") obviously poor. The democratic deficit is gaping.

Confident in 1995, the year JEIH began publication, that his theory could be proven, Milward set as Item Number One on his future research agenda for integration history the concept of "Allegiance," as indicated in the title of his article. He apparently coined the term as a surrogate for patriotism (a word somewhat hard to swallow) in the expectation that something like it could develop at the EU level. The concept is confusing. On the one hand he compares it to 19th century patriotism, but on the other hand insists on both its qualitative difference and its "secondary" quality. Apparently baffled, he concludes merely with queries:

6. Ibid., pp.11 f.

7. A.S. MILWARD, *The Social Basis of Monetary Union*, in: P. GOWAN, P. ANDERSON (eds.), op.cit., pp.152 and 160.

8. A.S. MILWARD, *Allegiance ...*, op.cit., p.12.

“What is ‘European’ allegiance? Is it primarily cultural, economic, idealistically political, realistically political, or simply born from fear or prejudice? And how has it changed since 1945”?⁹

Better to have asked whether such a phantom ever existed! The two botched constitutional referenda cast serious doubt on the purported popularity of the EU. The current intense, top-level effort to prevent however and wherever possible a rerun of the previous scenario - public rejection of what has now been re-named the “Reform Treaty” - merely increases public suspicion. In a nutshell: the European Union has not developed as envisioned by its ambitious champions, and is indeed badly foundering. The tide, forewarned by Milward, has begun to rush in. Sound theory will be needed to prevent the little sand castles - many of them actually quite nice - from being washed away. How should one begin to build it?

II. A New Integration Theory?

The present European Union grew out of a deep-felt desire to heal the wounds of a nationalistic past, a need to capture economies of scale, a hope for protection from the whims of superpower politics, a wish to run one’s own show, and from a lack of better alternatives as well as the dream of a better future. The main accomplishments of the EU are evident: it has ended the economic division of Europe into national markets, defused conflict between neighbours, promoted democracy and good government, and restored the confidence of Europeans in the values and vitality of their civilization. Yet the days of triumphalism are over. The EU is neither on a one-way track headed for federal union (as professed by its champions) nor something unique in history and therefore not subject to the usual performance criteria (as claimed by its apologists) but an institution which increasingly resembles other international organizations, past and present, and should be compared to them. The relevant model may not be the Holy Roman Empire, as provocatively suggested recently by Jan Zielonka and as echoed by none other than the tin-eared Commission president José Manuel Barroso, but it is also certainly not the Westphalian nation-state writ large implicit in Euro-federalist thinking, the idea which drives and is reflected in most EU scholarship.¹⁰

A viable theory of European integration must first face certain unpleasant realities. The EU is no closer to having its own armed forces today than it was over fifty years ago when the European Defense Community was first proposed. The European Social Model is still mere political rhetoric. The ruinous Common Agricultural Policy cannot be eliminated or even tampered with until 2013. The long list of policy failures must also include the several Frameworks, as well as many targeted acronym programs, for research and development, as well as their

9. *Ibid.*, pp.147 f., 17.

10. J. ZIELONKA, *Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.

high-tech successors, Galileo and the Airbus 380. The grim list should also include “big projects” like the Lisbon Agenda and, almost surely, the ambitious carbon emissions scheme. The gains of recent years – competition and internal market policy and enlargement – have also been stopped in their tracks, are slipping away, or being reversed by so-called economic patriotism. Administrative reform appears to be all but impossible, red tape has become asphyxiating, and representative and responsive governance seems increasingly remote. The EU is powerless in the face of a resurgent Russia and unequipped to deal with the challenges of large-scale labour mobility. European institutions vitiate national democracy and slow economic growth.

Far from being upward and steady, the EU’s growth trajectory has been a succession of zigs, zags – and lags. The pattern reflects the chronic tension between two quite different conceptions of what European integration is and should become; it is manifest in ideas, policies, and institutions. The first of these poles is, of course, the familiar Monnetist/Delors view that its goal is a political and economic union and its method the exercise of political and administrative authority from the top down through powerful, centralized institutions. This is the only approach to integration with which most guild historians are familiar.

The second of these poles, less well-known but no less important in the history of the subject, is the view that eliminating marketplace distortions in favour of competition will stimulate growth and result in closer union. Frederick Hayek is the name most closely associated with this approach. On the eve of the Second World War, Hayek explained in a seminal article how, once heterogeneous populations join together in an interstate federation, the absence of trade barriers would prevent an identification of economic interests between nations and peoples, thereby limiting opportunities for market-distorting policies. The spontaneous order of the market could thus eventually develop unimpeded. Although Ludwig Erhard, and his economic team, introduced Hayekian approaches into the integration process, only after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system – which had buffered the mixed economy welfare states of Europe from the influence of world markets – did the process of spontaneous order really begin to take hold and make itself felt in the integration process.

Change, it soon became clear, took place more easily by means of “negative” integration – that is, by applying “thou-shalt-not rules” to economic activity rather than “positive integration” – the creation of new institutions to overcome “market failure”. While “state-builders” and agents of “positive integration” like Jean Monnet and Jacques Delors still occupy centre stage in integration discourse, “marketeers” of the Hayekian persuasion produce more solid results, as evident not only in EU success stories like the single external tariff and the Single European Act, but in spillovers from the market place, which generate new wealth, fresh ideas, and dynamic social change.¹¹ Historians must learn how to take them into account.

11. J. GILLINGHAM, *European Integration, 1950-2003: Superstate or New Market Economy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York, 2003, pp.xii-xv.

Verdicts on the results naturally vary. In Perry Anderson's critical words,

"[w]hat was originally the least prominent strand in the weave of European integration had become the dominant pattern. Federalism stymied, inter-governmentalism corroded, what had emerged was neither the rudiments of a European democracy controlled by its citizens, nor the formation of a European directory guided by its powers, but a vast zone of increasingly unbound market exchange, much closer to a European 'catallaxy' as Hayek had conceived it".¹²

An alternative interpretation of the process would credit it for stimulating growth, reducing over-centralization, restoring political authority to electorates, eliminating bureaucratic inefficiency, reducing oligopoly and the state-sanctioned entrenchment of political power, and strengthening the judicial system. The EU emerging from such a process would be limited in its exercise of statutory power, confederal as opposed to federal, based on contract, subject to public scrutiny, answerable to the member-states, and empowered only when able to function more efficiently than lower levels of authority.¹³

Regardless of one's judgments on market-driven change or, more broadly, on neo-liberalism, to limit the study of integration to the workings of official policies and institutions is to miss much of what has gone on. Modernization should be the yardstick of integration success, and what sets it in motion ought to be explored nationally and internationally, as well as at the European level. In brief, the integration process must be conceived much more broadly than at present. It can be thought of as the outcome of a three-level interdependence game able to begin or end at any point – national, international, or European. Context is critical to the unfolding of the process, which may well have unintended consequences. Thus by enabling currencies to move more freely against one another then previously, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system set up at the end of World War II to peg exchange rates to the dollar provided the solvent needed to erode the national buffers that shielded the mixed economy welfare state from the exogenous pressures of the international market. Security ceded priority to growth as a policy priority, and economic survival would in the future depend upon competitiveness. The stage was now not only set for the present era of globalization, but for the adoption of the Single European Act. It would transform the EU from what, for the most part, had been a paper project into a power to be reckoned with.¹⁴

Therewith, it also injected the EU, an elitist project, into the public forum. The peoples of Europe would thus inadvertently become players in a game whose rules did not originally include them. The more they learned about Brussels, however, the less they liked what they saw. The EU is better considered a community of interest held together by political deals, than a community of sentiment held together by shared loyalties.

12. P. ANDERSON, *Depicting Europe*, in: *London Review of Books*, 20 September 2007, pp.23-41.

13. J. GILLINGHAM, *Design for a New Europe*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York, 2006, in passim.

14. *Ibid.*, pp.63-70.

A European *demos* will not develop until the central EU institutions cease being dysfunctional. Only then can they also eventually become representative – and not an organizational nightmare. The suggestion that the Brussels *apparat* somehow reflects the checks and balances system of American federalism would set James Madison spinning in his grave. No one knows where power rests, because jurisdiction is divided in weird ways, deal-making is exceptionally difficult, many discordant voices pronounce on policy, and governance, shrouded in secrecy, is virtually opaque. For its part, the pseudo-executive, the Commission, is bureaucratic, corrupt, and resistant to reform. The bloated Parliament is overpaid and under-worked, a talk shop, whose search for relevance produces demagoguery. Real power remains in the hands of the member states, which have generated a parallel bureaucracy, which duplicates the work of the Commission. The costs of over-regulation are prohibitive and weigh heavily on economic growth. Brussels' only real lever of power is European law, something which remains subject to the challenges of national supreme courts.¹⁵

Yet, because the enforcement of Commission directive and regulations rests with the individual member-states, Brussels can do little to curtail non-compliance, the extent of which is vast though also still largely unknown. A conspiracy of silence prevails. So does a powerful undercurrent of public mistrust. Adding to the problem of accountability, the directing board of the European Central Bank, which runs “Euroland” (and therefore is actually more powerful than even the EU), answers to no higher institution or body. It also seriously undercuts fiscal as well as monetary sovereignty, and thereby moreover the authority needed by national governments to come to grips with the two most severe economic problems of the day, the costly welfare state and inflexible labour markets. The ECB's one-size-fits-all approach also stifles economic growth.¹⁶

An historical theory of the origins of this situation would be timely. Just as the Empty Chairs Crisis of the late-1960's discredited “functionalism”, the successive setbacks encountered by the European Union since the Maastricht Conference (1993) have poured cold water on its only real successor, Andrew Moravcsik's “liberal governmentalism”. The theory posits that the integration driver has been successive, increasingly ambitious bargains arrived at by optimally-negotiating member states. It makes no provision for policy failure.¹⁷ Political science also now operates in something of a vacuum.

No single theory can at this point purport to “explain” the history of European integration satisfactorily. A first step in the right direction would be to broaden the research agenda. The “thirty year rule” governing access to most public records should no longer be allowed to pose an insuperable barrier to historical inquiry into the recent past of the EU. Mere mention of the Internet should underscore,

15. J. GILLINGHAM, *Design ...*, op.cit., passim.

16. Ibid., pp. 55-106.

17. A. MORAVCSIK, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1998.

secondly, the existence of a huge untapped treasure trove, which, when mined properly, can provide immense economies in information retrieval. Historians can also no longer afford to overlook the rich and varied literature of Political Science and International Relations, which includes seemingly endless numbers of specialized studies on the workings of EU and EU-related institutions and covers industry, finance, law, and research and development – to name only a few of the many large gaps in the historical literature – as well as theory. Nor should Economics continue to be largely ignored in an institutional tradition inspired by Monnet, who looked to experts, rather than politicians, for ways to reconcile peoples.

Above all, historians should examine what has gone wrong, as well as what has gone right, with the European Union. Drawing comparisons and considering alternatives must figure in future studies. Only then will it be possible to determine what the EU of tomorrow can and should attempt to accomplish. If the history of the EU is not reexamined, the sand castles, once washed away, will be forgotten altogether.

Informal Politics of Integration: Christian Democratic and Transatlantic Networks in the Creation of ECSC core Europe

Wolfram KAISER and Brigitte LEUCHT

The historiography of the origins of the European Union (EU) has two main weaknesses. It is too state-centric and fails to conceptualise the embedded nature of ideas and their role in the creation and evolution of an integrated 'core Europe' after World War II. With the opening up of the archives of national governments and supranational institutions, research on the contemporary history of the EU has steadily moved on into the 1970s. We argue, however, that it is crucial to revisit the early postwar period to develop a more sophisticated notion and historical narrative of the formation of the supranational core Europe of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) of six founding member-states. Sectoral integration in coal and steel did not lead directly to horizontal integration in the customs union of the European Economic Community (EEC). It created important path dependencies concerning some structural characteristics and policy solutions, however, especially the (self-) exclusion of Britain, the functional use of economic integration with long-term political as well as economic objectives, the introduction of the supranational principle and antitrust competition legislation.

Historians have predominately conceived of the formation of the ECSC as the result of interstate bargaining of 'national interests' by governments as cohesive, purposeful actors.¹ Diplomatic historical accounts have been shaped by underlying 'realist' assumptions about the definition of such interests by autonomous foreign and European policy-making elites. In the case of France, such national interests included the control of Germany through integration and securing a dominant political leadership role for France, and in the case of Germany, regaining national sovereignty and achieving the integration of the newly created Federal Republic of Germany in Western Europe and the Atlantic Alliance on the basis of equality. The notion of American 'influence' in the historiography of transatlantic relations after 1945 similarly derives from the assumption of European state actors' interests in the involvement of the United States as 'ultimate arbiter'² in Western European politics.³ In this perspective, the United States primarily had powerful political, economic and military resources to secure for itself a dominant position in the

1. As an introduction to EU historiography see W. KAISER, *From State to Society? The Historiography of European Integration*, in: M. CINI, A.K. BOURNE (eds.), *Palgrave Advances in European Union Studies*, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2006, pp.190-208.
2. G. LUNDESTAD, *The United States and Western Europe since 1945. From 'Empire by Integration' to 'Transatlantic Drift'*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003 [1998].
3. See for example K. SCHWABE, 'Ein Akt konstruktiver Staatskunst' – die USA und die Anfänge des Schuman-Plans, in: Idem. (ed.), *Die Anfänge des Schuman Plans 1950/51*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 1988, pp.211-239.

Atlantic Alliance. In contrast, Alan S. Milward has explained the origins of the ECSC with domestically derived, predominately economic interests of Western European states.⁴ He has emphasized their strategic goal of achieving trade and welfare gains in a larger internal market to sustain national welfare objectives and policies, as he argued in his most influential book, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*.⁵ With its strong focus on bureaucratic policy-making, however, his conceptualisation of early European integration is almost equally state-centric and informed by 'rational choice' assumptions about national governments rationally defining interest-based policy objectives for interstate bargaining. Milward's recent decision to replace the term 'national interests' with 'strategies' merely marks a semantic, not substantive concession.⁶

None of this historical literature acknowledges the significance of ideas in early European integration as an independent variable. This is in part a reaction to the federalist hurrah historiography of early European integration in the tradition of Walter Lipgens, a committed federalist Christian democratic activist,⁷ and its underlying strong normative assumptions about the greater good of supranational institutionalisation.⁸ This literature never succeeded in establishing causal links between the ideas of the resistance and federalist movements in Europe and the actual European policies by governments after 1945. Similarly, much of the research centred around the role of Jean Monnet has overemphasized ideational motives and explained his influence with his role as leader of what appears like a tiny group of French officials who managed to stage a palace coup with the assistance of Foreign minister Robert Schuman as political figurehead.⁹ This literature, too, has largely failed to conceptualise how integration ideas advanced by Monnet and others were socially embedded and more importantly, how these actors actually succeeded in achieving their implementation in intergovernmental bargaining.

Against this background we propose that contemporary historians should look to social science research for approaches to studying the current EU which they can utilize in the first instance as heuristic devices for addressing these and other weaknesses of the under-conceptualised integration history.¹⁰ We argue that the

4. A.S. MILWARD, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-51*, Methuen, London, 1984.

5. A.S. MILWARD, *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, Routledge, London, 1992.

6. A.S. MILWARD, *The Rise and Fall of a National Strategy 1945-1963*, Frank Cass, London 2002, p.6.

7. On Lipgens see W. LOTH, *Walter Lipgens (1925-1984)*, in: W. DUCHARDT et al. (eds.), *Europa-Historiker. Ein biographisches Handbuch*, vol.I, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006, pp.317-336; W. KAISER, "Überzeugter Katholik und CDU-Wähler": Zur Historiographie der Integrationsgeschichte am Beispiel Walter Lipgens, in: *Journal of European Integration History*, 8(2002), pp.119-128.

8. W. LIPGENS, *A History of European Integration*, vol.I: 1945-1947, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982 [German edition 1977].

9. See for example F.J. FRANSEN, *The Supranational Politics of Jean Monnet: Ideas and Origins of the European Community*, Greenwood, Westport 2001, pp.87-113.

10. We also make this point strongly in W. KAISER, B. LEUCHT, M. RASMUSSEN (eds.), *The History of the European Union. Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950-72*, Routledge, London, 2008.

'policy network' approach has great potential for re-conceptualising the complex relations between different sets of actors and their policy ideas and preferences not only after core Europe institutionalisation, but also before the ECSC treaty came into force.¹¹ In the social sciences, policy network analysis largely fed on the governance turn in public policy and international relations.¹² As we have defined it elsewhere, this term denotes 'a shift from centralised 'government' by cohesive state institutions exercising their clearly defined powers in hierarchical forms of decision-making towards decentralised and informal forms of political communication and decision-making by sets of state and non-state actors in less hierarchically structured or even non-hierarchical relationships'.¹³ In domestic political contexts social scientists observed from the 1980s onwards that the boundaries between state- and non-state actors became increasingly blurred and the exchange of resources between them – like expert knowledge and electoral support, for example – highly informal.¹⁴ In these fast changing circumstances of social communication and informal negotiation, policy networks linking different state and non-state actors play a central coordinating role in policy-making. Within the EU they do so within a system of 'multilevel governance' – a term intended to capture the specificity of the supranational polity as the interconnection of different layers of governance – the supranational, national and the regional and local – in a complex web of institutional and social relations.¹⁵

Most social scientists tend to believe that policy networks in or as governance is a recent phenomenon resulting from what they see as the 'hollowing-out' of the nation-state from the 1970s onwards.¹⁶ We contend, however, that Western European states were less cohesive before the 1970s, that national governments were more fragmented and that they were often unable to agree and project cohesive 'interests' in intergovernmental bargaining, than the 'hollowing out' thesis about a decisive shift from 'government' to 'governance' after the oil crisis would make us believe. Indeed, we can relate in this regard to the shared assumption¹⁷ of authors like Lipgens and Milward that the Western European states were essentially weak after 1945 and that pro-integration elites sought to develop a

11. As an introduction to its application to the study of EU politics see A. WARLEIGH, *Conceptual Combinations: Multilevel Governance and Policy Networks*, in: M. CINI, A.K. BOURNE (eds.), *Palgrave Advances ...*, op.cit., pp.77-95.

12. R.A.W. RHODES, *Understanding Governance: Ten Years On*, in: *Organization Studies*, 28(2007), pp.1243-1264.

13. M. GEHLER, W. KAISER, B. LEUCHT, *Networks in Informal European Governance: Diachronic Perspectives of the European Union as a Multi-level Polity*, in: Idem., *Netzwerke im europäischen Mehrebenensystem. Von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart / Networks in European Multilevel Governance. From 1945 to the Present*, Böhlau, Vienna/Cologne/Weimar, 2008 (forthcoming).

14. See also K. HEARD-LAURÉOTE, *Transnational Networks. Informal Governance in the European Political Space*, in: W. KAISER, P. STARIE (eds.), *Transnational European Union: Towards a Common Political Space*, Routledge, London, 2005, pp.36-60.

15. For a recent overview see B. KOHLER-KOCH, B. RITTBERGER, *Review Article: The 'Governance Turn' in EU Studies*, in: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 44(2006), pp.27-49.

16. See for example P. HIRST, *Democracy and Governance*, in: J. PIERRE (ed.), *Debating Governance*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, pp.13-25, here p.19.

new common framework for 'governing'. This political choice was highly contested domestically, however, as was the policy content of the new integration framework. Political parties were internally divided. After Schuman announced the plan for coal and steel integration on 9 May 1950, French socialists argued over whether they should prioritise supranational integration over British participation, for example. At the same time, opponents among the German Christian democrats of the new chancellor Konrad Adenauer feared that his policy of Western integration would make unification impossible. Leading civil servants in foreign and economic ministries were divided, too, for example over the exclusion of Britain or – in the light of the European cartel tradition – the desirability of antitrust legislation. As Matthias Kipping and others have shown,¹⁸ business interests also could not agree on important features of market integration in coal and steel.

Against this background, we aim to analyse and ascertain how pro-integration political and administrative elites sought in this insecure policy environment to utilize mostly informal transnational networking to implement their ideas and preferences for the start of European integration. We do so drawing upon two case studies. We have chosen these case studies to test and bring out the influence of political and expert networks on agenda-setting and interstate negotiations in more narrowly continental European as well as geographically larger transatlantic settings. The first is the transnational political party network of Western European Christian democrats. At the time of the Schuman Plan, the Christian democrats alone formed national governments or were the largest party in coalition governments in all six ECSC founding member-states. Yet their political hegemony did not translate easily into government policy-making and intergovernmental bargaining due to internal divisions, coalition politics and domestic bureaucratic and business pressures. The second example is the transatlantic networks especially of civil servants and academic experts, not politicians, which included Monnet. Whereas the transnational networks of Christian democrats played a crucial role in agenda-setting up to the Schuman Plan including fundamental decisions like the combined supranationalism and exclusion of Britain from core Europe integration, the transatlantic network was more focussed on influencing the policy content of the interstate negotiations leading up to the signing of the ECSC treaty. In analysing these two networks we have to concentrate for the purposes of this article on essential information on their composition and in particular, their functions in the formation of core Europe. In conclusion, we briefly set out how the narrower

17. W. LOTH, *Die Beiträge der Geschichtswissenschaft zur Deutung der Europäischen Integration*, in: W. LOTH, W. WESSELS (eds.), *Theorien europäischer Integration*, Leske & Budrich, Opladen, 2001, pp.87-106, here pp.91-96.

18. M. KIPPING, *Zwischen Kartellen und Konkurrenz. Der Schuman-Plan und die Ursprünge der europäischen Einigung 1944-1952*, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1996; F.M.B. LYNCH, *France and the International Economy. From Vichy to the Treaty of Rome*, Routledge, London, 1997; J. GILL-INGHAM, *Coal, Steel and the Rebirth of Europe, 1945-1955. The Germans and French from Ruhr Conflict to Economic Community*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1991.

social science policy network approach may have to be adjusted for empirically oriented historical narratives of European integration, and what our research suggests for assessing the temporal dimension of networks in multilevel governance in historical perspective.

Christian democratic network: Excluding the ‘hereditary enemy’ Britain

Catholic people’s parties originally formed transnational network-type contacts in interwar Europe.¹⁹ Whereas these loose contacts were dominated by left-Catholics with links to the Christian trade unions and the peace movement and a primary interest in national social policy reform, the new postwar network was largely controlled by liberal-conservative middle class Christian democrats. They organised their cooperation in the *Nouvelles Equipes Internationales* (NEI) created in 1947 which was transformed into the European Union of Christian Democrats (EUCD) in 1965, to be followed by the formation of the European People’s Party (EPP) in 1976, which included only parties from European Communities (EC) states. At the same time, however, leading Christian democrats also met secretly in the so-called Geneva Circle from 1947 onwards. These high-level meetings were mediated by two private citizens, the Frenchman Victor Koutzine, who had close links with Georges Bidault, and the German Johann Jakob Kindt-Kieffer. They were attended by Bidault, Pierre-Henri Teitgen, Pierre Pflimlin, Konrad Adenauer, Josef Müller, Heinrich von Brentano and other leading politicians from the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* (MRP) and the Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) as well as other Western European parties. Their informal network-type collaboration extended to cooperation within the European Movement and the Assembly of the Council of Europe and included direct private contacts, for example between Adenauer and Schuman.

We have identified five main functions of this transnational Christian democratic network in the run-up to the Schuman Plan and during the subsequent interstate negotiations.²⁰ The first is the lasting creation of social trust and political capital. The meetings in the informal private setting of the Geneva Circle with its free-ranging open discussions in particular helped to create normative-emotional bonds between the networked party elites. This was of crucial importance at a time when the general public especially in France was still highly sceptical, if not outright hostile to reconciliation with Germany and its full inclusion in new forms

19. W. KAISER, *Von der Isolation im politischen Katholizismus in die (innere) Emigration. Transnationale Kooperation katholischer Volksparteien in Europa 1925-1933/38*, in: J. MITTAG (ed.), *Politische Parteien und europäische Integration. Entwicklung und Perspektiven transnationaler Parteienkooperation in Europa*, Klartext, Essen, 2006, pp.215-228.

20. For a more detailed source-based analysis see W. KAISER, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, chapter 6.

of institutionalised integration on the basis of equality as foreseen in the Schuman Plan. The Christian democrats could confidentially discuss issues like German rearmament and prepare policy decisions without fear of domestic political recriminations. Their party cooperation allowed them to communicate their congruent political beliefs and preferences, which made their governmental decision-making and diplomacy more mutually reliable. In hazardous political situations as after Schuman's visit to Bonn in January 1950 with the sharp public controversy about the anticipated signing of the Saar Conventions between France and the regional pro-French government in Saarbrücken, the Christian democrats could, and regularly did, activate their informal network contacts to smooth interstate relations.

Secondly, their transnational networking allowed those Christian democrats, who strongly supported the formation of a tightly integrated core Europe, to monopolize external party contacts and marginalize dissent within their own parties. Thus, Adenauer used informal networks to ensure that his views on Franco-German reconciliation and European integration also became known to MRP leaders who did not know him from interwar European politics like Schuman. Once he had secured the position as preferred partner of his French interlocutors by early 1948, he systematically excluded from transnational resources all sceptics of his European policy among disparate groups in his own party from liberal free traders like Ludwig Erhard, to left-Catholic nationalists like Jakob Kaiser and protestant conservatives like Friedrich Holzapfel. Adenauer, the CDU leader in the British zone of occupation, once invited Kaiser to the Geneva Circle during the Berlin blockade in March 1949, who predictably embarrassed himself with his enthusiastic assessment of the prospects of agreeing a deal with Stalin over unification.²¹ Adenauer also made certain that the re-founded left-Catholic Centre Party would not be allowed to partake in party cooperation. Within the MRP, which most nationalist Popular Republicans left in 1947 to form a rival Gaullist party, the minimal dissent against the emerging core Europe agenda was articulated by left-wing politicians like Leo Hamon, who like their German counterparts were not included in party cooperation. Hamon recollected later how the small anti-supranational Left in the MRP became more and more marginalized by what he experienced as the growing 'frenzied European fury'.²² The party network also helped socialise other leading Christian democrats into the emerging core Europe consensus. Thus, the Italian Prime minister Alcide De Gasperi, who was indirectly represented in the Geneva Circle by his confidant Paolo Emilio Taviani, initially adhered to a more Atlanticist foreign policy, but became converted to supranational integration. Bidault's strong support in the Geneva Circle for a core Europe without Britain in turn was a crucial precondition for his backing as Prime minister for the Schuman Plan in the decisive ministerial meeting, despite some misgivings about

21. Archiv für christlich-demokratische Politik (ACDP), 01-009-017, Geneva Circle, 8 March 1949.

22. Cited in J.-C. DELBREIL, *LMP et la construction européenne: résultats, interprétation et conclusion d'une enquête écrite et orale*, in: S. BERSTEIN, J.-M. MAYEUR, P. MILZA (eds.), *Le MRP et la construction européenne*, Éditions Complexe, Paris, 1993, pp.309-363, here p.356.

the foreseen degree of supranationalism. Informal networking also allowed the party elites to co-opt younger Christian democrats into their core Europe consensus like Leo Tindemans, Giulio Andreotti and Hans-August Lückner, who all took part in the NEI congress in Luxembourg in February 1948.

Thirdly, their transnational networking allowed leading Christian democrats to develop and agree common policy objectives. Embedded in similar ideological traditions as well as their Catholic confessional experience, they shared what Markus Jachtenfuchs has called a 'gesellschaftliches Deutungssystem'²³, or social system for interpreting the world. On this basis, their informal cooperation between 1947 and 1950 allowed the Christian democrats to formulate two strong closely related preferences: achieving some degree of supranational integration and provoking the self-exclusion of Britain from new European projects. The protocols of the Geneva Circle meetings demonstrate how deep the antagonism was amongst most transnationally networked Catholic Christian democrats, not only towards the ruling Labour Party, but also Britain with its alien protestant political culture and – as they saw it – its *divide et impera* foreign policy tradition precluding any long-term commitment to politically meaningful integration. In June 1949 Bidault concluded in the Geneva Circle that 'an English Europe [...] means no Europe at all'.²⁴ Later, in January 1955, he and Teitgen over lunch even spoke of Britain as France's 'hereditary enemy'.²⁵ Some British middle-class Catholics initially had weak contacts with the NEI as an extension of Catholic cooperation in exile.²⁶ Catholics played only a marginal role in the leadership of both larger parties, Labour and the Conservatives, however. Moreover, the vast majority of Catholic voters actually supported the Labour Party, which dominated the newly formed Socialist International.²⁷

Their transnational cooperation – fourthly – allowed the Christian democrats to identify suitable political party and societal allies for constructing a sufficiently strong transnational coalition for their supranational core Europe without Britain. It was especially crucial to recruit the French socialists for the Schuman Plan. They were the most important 'Third Force' coalition partner, but had a strong affinity for cooperation with Britain. This political need in turn required a deeper understanding on the part of the German and Italian Christian democrats, who competed with socialist parties for government control, for the diplomacy of inviting the Labour Party to exclude itself, which it duly did with a 'Euro-sceptic'

23. M. JACHTENFUCHS, *Die Konstruktion Europas. Verfassungsideen und institutionelle Entwicklung*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2002, p.262.

24. ACDP, 01-009-017, Geneva Circle, 10 June 1949.

25. ACDP, 01-172-31, Geneva Circle, 31 January 1955, protocol Karl von Spreti.

26. See W. KAISER, *Co-operation of European Catholic Politicians in Exile in Britain and the USA during the Second World War*, in: *Journal of Contemporary History*, 35(2000), pp.439-465.

27. On the religious and confessional dimensions of the marginal societal support in Britain for some kind of 'united Europe' after 1945 see also P.M. COUPLAND, *Britannia, Europa and Christendom. British Christians and European Integration*, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2006.

policy manifesto and negative government decision, as a precondition for the support of the French socialists.

The fifth function was to help construct alliances with leading civil servants in ministries to prevent national administrations from throwing spanners in the wheels of interstate negotiations. While Monnet's integration concept was far too technocratic for the Christian democrats, and he was not close to them politically, they still worked with him and pro-integration civil servants in the Quai d'Orsay to marginalize dangerous internal dissent. After all, the French state administration was initially a stronghold of resistance to the supranational core Europe of integrated markets. The economic ministries were steeped in the tradition of protectionism and the Quai d'Orsay attached to Gaullist ideas of national greatness and power. Thus, René Massigli, the French ambassador to London, cautioned time and again against any German adventure without full British involvement. At times, the Christian democratic network also had to deal with deliberate leaks by hostile civil servants from within French ministries to prevent informal agreements as during one attempt in 1954 to sort out the contentious Saar issue. The Christian democrats also parachuted transnationally networked politicians into key positions as in the case of Taviani, who was appointed state secretary in the Palazzo Chigi and chief Italian ECSC negotiator, and von Brentano who was to chair the Constitutional Committee of the Ad hoc Assembly which drafted the European Political Community treaty in 1953.

All of these functions together greatly facilitated what political scientists with an interest in the role of individuals within policy networks, or more generally in EU politics, have called entrepreneurial leadership.²⁸ Traditional concepts for explaining political leadership like Max Weber's notion of charisma, for example, have little relevance for the emerging multilevel European polity of intergovernmental bargaining and supranational institutionalisation. After the experience of Hitler and Mussolini, all Christian democratic leaders more or less ran – as Bidault once said about Schuman – on petrol of low octane rating. In 1950, moreover, they could neither rely on a permissive consensus on supranational integration nor expect guaranteed electoral benefits from the new policy. Despite American support for Schuman's policy of going it alone without Britain, the domestic and international policy-making environment remained highly insecure. In these adverse circumstances, their informal transnational party cooperation made their European policies mutually reliable and thus also helped reduce domestic political risks in a decisive way to facilitate bold and at times extremely controversial policy choices. Christian democratic politicians could largely exercise crucial political leadership in early European integration in and through networks.

28. See also, albeit in the context of intergovernmental conferences, D. BEACH, C. MAZZUCELLI, *Introduction*, in: idem. (eds.), *Leadership in the Big Bangs of European Integration*, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2007, pp.1-21. For interesting conceptual insights see O.R. YOUNG, *Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society*, in: *International Organization*, 45(1991), pp.281-308.

Transatlantic networks: Promoting a free market economy for an integrated Europe

Informal transatlantic cooperation did not originate in 1945. However, the immediate post-World War II period gave rise to an especially increased density of contacts between American and European actors at a number of levels. Against this backdrop, two transatlantic networks of civil servants and academic experts with mutually relating actors developed at the Schuman Plan conference.²⁹ A network attached to the American embassy in Paris and in part overlapping with the French delegation mainly comprised actors who cooperated in US and European administration agencies in the reconstruction of postwar Western Europe, including the French Planning Commission, the US High Commission for Germany and the European Co-operation Administration (ECA). Jean Monnet and US High commissioner John McCloy, whose friendship went back to the interwar period, facilitated the operation of what we call the 'US embassy working group' to expedite the successful conclusion of the interstate negotiations. Another informal network, the 'transatlantic university network', partly overlapped with the West German delegation and consisted of legal experts with an academic affiliation. This network shared important characteristics of what Peter M. Haas first called an 'epistemic community'.³⁰ Crucial to its formation was the nomination of Walter Hallstein, a law professor at the University of Frankfurt, as head of the West German delegation.

We have identified five main functions of these transatlantic networks in the interstate negotiations on the Schuman Plan. The first is that informal transatlantic networks restricted the policy options available to the delegations and the designated conference working groups of experts. The US embassy working group in particular helped safeguard the compatibility of the ECSC treaty with the US government's policy preference for a supranational, integrated and competitive Western Europe. In accordance with the 'double containment' strategy vis-à-vis Germany and the Soviet Union the Truman administration promoted the integration of a democratic, capitalist and economically restored Germany into Western Europe to limit Soviet expansion. At the same time US postwar foreign policies including the Marshall Plan were informed by a rationale derived from the domestic tradition of US antitrust law, namely that competition provided the key to the dual goal of political stability and economic prosperity. Against this background, the US embassy working group reinforced restraining the policy options of the negotiating parties through assisting the constant flow of information

29. For a source-based description see B. LEUCHT, *Transatlantische Politiknetzwerke: Kulturtransfer und Schuman-Plan 1950/51*, in: *Comparativ*, 16(2006), pp.200-218.

30. P. HAAS, *Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination*, in: *International Organization*, 1(1992), pp.1-35. For an early call to utilize the epistemic community and other policy network approaches cf. R. DWAN, *Un outil puissant: les théories de l'élite et l'étude de la construction européenne*, in: E. du RÉAU (ed.), *Europe des élites? Europe des peuples? La construction de l'espace européen, 1945-1960*, Sorbonne Nouvelle, Paris, 1998, pp.27-38.

between these parties and US State Department and ECA officials and commenting policy papers and draft treaty versions. A case in point is a memorandum that emerged out of a discussion of two US network actors regarding the comprehensive working document that the French delegation presented shortly after the start of the interstate conference: Robert Bowie, a Harvard law professor with a background in antitrust law who as general counsel of the US High commissioner for Germany oversaw the de-cartelisation and de-concentration programme for the German heavy industries and William Tomlinson, the representative of the US Treasury in the US embassy in Paris and director of Financial and Trade Affairs for the ECA mission to France as well as financial advisor to the US ambassador to Paris David Bruce and a confidant of Monnet's. The memorandum examined the proposed institutional structure and criticised those aspects of the working document that appeared to foster cartels and restrictive practices.³¹ Later, it served as the basis for a checklist for the US government to evaluate the progress of the interstate negotiations.³²

Informal transatlantic networks further contributed directly to the draft treaty, which constitutes a second function and perhaps the most apparent form of their influence on the evolution of the ECSC treaty. Crucially, they helped shape what became article 65, banning agreements and practices hampering competition, and article 66, prohibiting market-dominating enterprises.³³ A request to integrate specific antitrust provisions in the treaty was only expressed by Monnet in October 1950 following the start of the Korean War and the subsequent decision of the US government to rearm the Federal Republic. A first antitrust draft presented by the French delegation contained much more comprehensive antitrust provisions than an alternative proposal by the West German delegation and originated in consultations with the US embassy working group. In late November and early December 1950 this network became intimately involved in drafting proposals that then were formally submitted by the French delegation.

Thirdly, transatlantic networks mediated between different socio-economic, political and cultural contexts. In the making of the antitrust provisions, for example, the legal tradition of US antitrust law interacted with German ordoliberalism, an intellectual movement promoting an interdisciplinary approach to integrate economic policy and law that was first developed in the early 1930s to generate a response to the traumatic economic and political experiences of the Weimar Republic. Central to the mediation process in 1950-51 were the separate discussions on the West German de-concentration and the anti-cartel law for the

31. US National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Washington DC, USA, Record Group (RG) 469, Special Representative in Europe, Office of the General Counsel, Subject Files 1948-53, Box 30, Memo Tomlinson to Stokes, 30 June 1950.

32. NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal Files 1950-54, 850.33/7-550, Bruce to Perkins, Check list of first draft of Schuman Proposal Working Document, 5 July 1950.

33. For a detailed analysis see B. LEUCHT, *Transatlantic Policy Networks in the Creation of the First European Anti-Trust Law. Mediating Between American Anti-Trust and German Ordo-liberalism*, in: W. KAISER, B. LEUCHT, M. RASMUSSEN (eds.), op.cit.

Federal Republic which had become intimately tied to the interstate negotiations, not least through mutually relating actors. However, transatlantic networks owed their mediating function not only to the expertise of actors, but also to their biographical experiences as is evidenced by Hallstein who supplemented his longstanding academic interest in foreign legal systems with American socialisation and further in-depth study of US law while a prisoner of war in the US (1944-45) and an exchange professor at Georgetown University (1948-49). Even more Hallstein argued for cooperation between 'diverse legal traditions within the Euro-American cultural sphere' and highlighted the significance of American legal thought for the future of European law.³⁴ In contrast German born Heinrich Kronstein, a law professor at Georgetown University, adopted a more pragmatic approach to mediation by advising US governmental agencies on antitrust policy and cooperating with the West German delegation to the interstate conference.

As a result of the predominant role of academic and other experts, informal transatlantic networks – fourthly – facilitated links to a wider circle of academics that could be co-opted for discussing the Schuman Plan. One pool of experts serving as a resource for the transatlantic university network emanated from an academic exchange programme between the University of Frankfurt and Georgetown University. Previously a participant in the programme, Hermann Mosler, as a legal expert of the West German delegation further invited the established Max-Planck Institute for Public and International Law in Heidelberg to assess the role of the court within the community's institutional system.³⁵

The fifth function of transatlantic networks extends one specific function of the Christian democratic party network identified above, namely constructing transnational alliances to prevent national administrations and interest groups from impeding the interstate negotiations. Crucially this applied to sidelining those French officials and industrialists who subscribed to the French cartel tradition³⁶ when integrating antitrust provisions into the ECSC treaty. At the same time the existence of transatlantic networks provided opportunities for actors whose preference for a competitive framework was marginalized within their respective domestic settings to transfer their policy goals from the national to the European level of the Schuman Plan conference.

Jointly these five functions highlight the complex policy-making processes at the interstate negotiations. Further, they help re-conceptualise the role of such transatlantic entrepreneurs as Monnet and McCloy who functioned as vital mediators between the US embassy working group and officials and politicians. Last, we argue that the involvement of experts in policy formation anticipated the

34. Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Nachlass Walter Hallstein (1266), 1620, Letter Hallstein to the Dean of the Faculty of Law, University of Chicago, 22 May 1945.

35. Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, Berlin, B 15 Sekretariat für Fragen des Schuman Plans, 54, Mosler to Karl Bilfinger, 16 September 1950.

36. On the divergent traditions and mentalities see B. LEUCHT, *Tracing European Mentalities: Free Competition in Post-WW II-Europe*, in: M.-T. BITSCH, W. LOTH, C. BARTHEL (eds.), *Cultures politiques, opinions publiques et intégration européenne*, Bruylant, Brussels, 2007, pp.337-353.

increasing role of expert networks in devising EEC policies as is evidenced for example by the formulation of competition policy in Hans von der Groeben's Directorate General IV.³⁷

Conclusion

Based on the two case studies of Christian democratic and transatlantic networks we argue that policy network analysis from political science can be fruitfully adopted for contemporary historical research on the EU, but with one main methodological caveat and after pragmatic conceptual adjustments. Methodologically, historical research has to rely predominately on written sources. These sources do not provide sufficient relevant data for either quantitative³⁸ or formalized network analysis³⁹ as two main options in the social sciences. Instead, historical research on networks in the integration process utilises a qualitative hermeneutical approach for interpreting sources and developing a sophisticated narrative of the informal politics of integration. At a more practical level, the informality of network exchanges makes their reconstruction more difficult than interstate negotiations that are formalized and more comprehensively documented in well preserved government sources. The resulting over-reliance on government sources by many contemporary historians has clearly solidified the conceptual state-centrism of EU historiography. For our case studies we were fortunately able to retrieve relevant primary sources in a multitude of archives including the protocols of the Geneva Circle,⁴⁰ relevant policy papers and written correspondence in private papers, for example.

Conceptually, we propose a broader approach and somewhat more general definitions for historical research on transnational networks than policy network analysis of EU public policy-making. Firstly, we prefer to speak of political, not policy networks. The term political network denotes a set of actors engaged in communication and cooperation which is geared towards shaping the political organisation of social life, in this case in the emerging, highly institutionalised multilevel European polity. In our view such a broader definition has two main advantages. Firstly, it is not geared exclusively towards understanding policy-making in particular policy fields like the environment, for example, and

37. K. SEIDEL, *DG IV and the Origins of a Supranational Competition Policy. Establishing an Economic Constitution for Europe*, in: W. KAISER, B. LEUCHT, M. RASMUSSEN (eds.), op.cit.

38. See also F. PAPPI, C.H.C.A. HENNING, *Policy Networks: More than a Metaphor?*, in: *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 10(1998), pp.553-575.

39. As an introduction see J. SCOTT, *Social Network Analysis. A Handbook*, 2nd ed., Sage, London, 2000.

40. Excerpts of these protocols are accessible, together with other relevant sources, in M. GEHLER, W. KAISER (eds.), *Transnationale Parteienkooperation der europäischen Christdemokraten. Dokumente 1945-1965 / Coopération transnationale des démocrates-chrétiens en Europe. Documents 1945-1965*, K.G. Saur, Munich, 2004.

measuring the direct policy impact of policy networks which is characteristic of policy network analysis. Transnational political networks have had other important functions, too. Contemporary historians may be as interested in studying internal processes of communication and socialisation within such networks from a more sociologically-informed perspective. At the same time, transnational networks of intellectuals after 1945 may have shaped public discourses and succeeded in ascribing dominant meaning to terms such as 'freedom' and 'Western world'. This in turn may have been a crucial precondition for culturally embedding European integration policies. Moreover, networks of political party elites clearly were not concerned with influencing only one policy field, but also with European constitution-building and supporting interstate relations on European issues. Secondly, the broader term political network also avoids an EU-centric perspective. As the example of the transatlantic networks shows, political networks have operated beyond the boundaries of core Europe and the current EU. They extended to other organisational contexts like the European Free Trade Association formed in 1959-60 and – especially in the first decade after World War II – the North Atlantic political space.

Secondly, we suggest to use the more traditional categories of state and non-state actors for characterizing the institutional identities of network actors. One often used political science distinction between public and private actors focuses on their objectives, that is whether they pursue 'public' (general) interests or 'private' (business) interests. Political scientists have shown, however, that networked business actors have often acted as private citizens and in the belief that their proposals – for example in the case of the European Round Table of Industrialists and the internal market programme in the early 1980s – were in the general European interest.⁴¹ With a distinction between public and private actors, moreover, political parties, although clearly non-state actors, would qualify as public actors just like governments. In our view such a definition not only effectively excludes from the research agenda all political networks that do not include private business actors; potentially, it could also result in normatively loaded debates over legitimate general public and egoistic private interests, which would not be helpful for developing a sophisticated historical narrative of EU politics in historical perspective. In contrast, our preferred definition crucially facilitates capturing the different and overlapping identities of actors. In the case of the Christian democrats, for example, leading politicians sometimes acted in their governmental state and sometimes in their non-state political party roles, without clearly distinguishing between their differentiated institutional identities and functional roles. In the case of the transatlantic networks, officials often acted as private citizens in social networks formed before they assumed official functions in national ministries or government agencies which also resulted in overlapping identities. We believe that this grey zone of blurred institutional identities and

41. See for example M.G. COWLES, *Setting the Agenda for a New Europe: the ERT and EC 1992*, in: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 33(1995), pp.501-526.

functional roles is especially crucial for understanding networks in early European integration.

With these methodological caveats and conceptual modifications we argue that in conjunction with ‘institutionalist’ approaches utilized in the article by Ann-Christina Knudsen and Morten Rasmussen in this issue, the theoretically informed empirical analysis of political networks has great heuristic potential for re-conceptualising the origins and evolution of the EU in historical perspective. Firstly, it can decisively help overcome the prevailing state-centrism of EU historiography in a new multi-actor perspective on EU politics and policy-making. Secondly, the study of networks allows us to capture the informality of political processes in the EU as a culturally diverse space, which is a crucial dimension of its identity as a supranational polity. Thirdly, it enables us to re-conceptualise in a radically different manner from traditional diplomatic history accounts, national EU policy-making as highly fragmented and influenced by transnationally networked political and administrative elites. Fourthly, the role of networks can help us understand better the exercise of political leadership under conditions of supranational integration, nationally and at the European level, as such networks provide state- and non-state actors with crucial resources for developing common agendas and pursuing their political goals – in our case studies, the formation of a supranational core Europe without Britain and a new legal framework for guaranteeing free competition in integrated European markets. Finally, the historical analysis of transnational political networks in conjunction with sociological institutional approaches, which emphasize the role of norms, values and ideas in policy-making, also offers an avenue for better understanding integration ideas as embedded in social networks. These networks strive to make such ideas hegemonic and to implement them in European constitutional designs and legislation. Such an approach avoids at the same time the naïve conceptualisation of ideational motivations for European policy-making as European idealism as in Walter Lipgens’ early research and its sarcastic criticism as celebration of the so-called ‘founding fathers’ as European ‘saints’ by Alan S. Milward.⁴²

Once contemporary historians of the EU have begun to utilize the potential of the network concept and approach for understanding how multiple actors have related to each other within the emerging European multilevel polity and how their interaction has impacted on constitution-building, agenda-setting and decision-making, they could potentially also make a major interdisciplinary contribution to discussing networks in or as governance in a longer term temporal perspective. We hypothesize that networks played a crucial role in the evolution of institutional patterns and Community policies in the 1960s, especially in the two core fields of the Common Agricultural Policy and competition policy. They probably also influenced in important ways the development of new policy initiatives such as environmental protection and the internal market in the 1970s.

42. As in A.S. MILWARD, *The Rescue ...*, op.cit., chapter 6.

These transnational political networks may have consisted chiefly of member state actors, the new supranational institutions and more traditional non-state actors like political parties as well as academic experts. It appears that the farmers' organisations at national and EEC level were the only major business interest that was fully engaged from the beginning in policy formulation at the EEC level. Nonetheless, member state actors were clearly neither as cohesive and consistent in their preference formation before the 1970s as much political science research appears to assume, just as they may be not nearly as ineffective after the alleged transformation from 'government' to 'governance' since then. We may well find that what was really novel in EC governance in the 1970s was the beginning sustained involvement of private business actors in EC politics driven by a fear of economic decline in comparison to the United States and Japan, and the activation of non-traditional new social movement societal actors, which was instigated and cultivated by the European Commission. These remain unanswered research questions for an exciting new research agenda within an innovative pluralistic EU historiography which should aim at greater interdisciplinary competence and cooperation.⁴³

43. For further suggestions for interdisciplinary collaboration between contemporary history and political science research on the EU see W. KAISER, *History meets Politics: Overcoming Interdisciplinary Volapük in Research on the EU*, in: *Journal of European Public Policy*, 15(2008), pp.300-313; Idem., *Bringing People and Ideas Back in. Historical Research on the European Union*, in: D. PHINNEMORE, A. WARLEIGH (eds.), *Reflections on European Integration*, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2008 (forthcoming).

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A European Political System in the Making 1958-1970: The Relevance of Emerging Committee Structures

Ann-Christina L. KNUDSEN and Morten RASMUSSEN

Most observers of Europe today would without much hesitation characterise the European Union (EU) as a political system, in spite of the fact that it lacks features of classical statehood such as a single government, a coherent foreign policy and a standing army.¹ The notion of a (European) political system is a descriptive category, not a teleological prediction of the development of the European integration process. Hence, it makes no statements about the possible obsolescence of the member states, a question that was at the core of the original debate between neofunctionalists and intergovernmentalists in the 1960s.² Even today, the member states continue to wield a dominant influence on the European political system. For example, the EU still relies primarily on the member states for implementing legislation and administering coercion. At the same time, the European political system constrains member state power and has in a number of ways been transforming the European nation-state. Some scholars even argue that the post-war European integration project constitutes a new phase in the development of the system of European states.³ The European Union institutions regularly interact with citizens and social groups. Supranational legislation affects everyday lives in Europe in a wide range of areas; from labour market rules to commodity standards to food safety, and also influences the distribution of economic resources throughout the Union. Crucially, the development of the European political system has gone hand in hand with the emergence of significant elements of transnational European society, in which national political and economic elites have participated at multiple levels, thus greatly extending the political, economic, social and legal space available to the citizens.⁴

It is typically suggested that the European political system came into being in earnest around the early or mid 1980s.⁵ This has been identified through developments such as the '1992-programme', the Single European Act (SEA), the

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1. A seminal article: S. HIX, *The Study of the European Community: The Challenge to Comparative Politics*, in: *West European Politics*, (1)1994, pp.1-30 was the first to propose the use of comparative politics analytical tools to treat the EU as a domestic arena. A more comprehensive account was later provided in S. HIX, *The Political System of the European Union*, Macmillan, London, 1999.
 2. E.B. HAAS, *The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957*, Stevens & Sons Limited, London, 1958; L.N. LINDBERG, *The Political Dynamics of European Integration*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1963; S. HOFFMAN, *Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe*, in: *Daedalus*, (4)1966, pp.862-915.
 3. S. BARTOLINI, *Restructuring Europe. Center Formation, System Building, and Political Structuring between the Nation-State and the European Union*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005. See also, S. ROKKAN, P. FLORA, S. KUHLE, D.D. URWIN, *State Formation, Nation-Building, and Mass Politics in Europe: the Theory of Stein Rokkan*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999.

extension of the powers of the European Parliament (EP) as well as a further coding and extension of the so-called comitology committees.⁶ Moreover, there had been several enlargements, numerous instances of judicial activism by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), increasing activities among EP political party groups as well as a strong growth in the number of interest groups attracted to set up shop in Brussels. While these developments certainly contributed to strengthening the contours of the European political system, we find the starting date presented in this literature somewhat arbitrary. Instead, we argue that significant cornerstones of the emerging European political system were laid already in the early 1960s.⁷

Unfortunately, historiography of the European integration process has largely ignored the historical origins of the European political system. Rather, it tends to be steeped in a neo-realist state-centric paradigm, where the European policy appears merely as a foreign policy matter, and bargaining is conceived in terms of rigid two-level games. This, we contend, is a major reason why the historiography of European integration is somewhat isolated from mainstream historical research in post-war European history⁸ and used mainly by other scholars as a useful collection of dates, facts, and figures about the past, rather than as a stepping stone to conceptualise or theorise fundamental questions about the nature of political, economic and social structures of contemporary Europe.⁹ In this article, we therefore wish to address how a connection can be established between the traditional state-centric approach to European integration history and the conceptualisation of the European Communities (EC) as it developed as an emerging European political system in the 1960s.

The empirical case study presented in this article is an examination of an area of fundamental importance to identifying the emerging European political system, namely the establishment of various committee structures that furthered what some

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4. Consult W. KAISER, B. LEUCHT in this volume for the argument that transnational networks were important in the early phases of European integration history; for a general treatment, see W. KAISER, P. STARIE (eds.), *Transnational European Union. Towards a Common Political Space*, Routledge, London, 2005.
 5. E.g. L. HOOGHE and G. MARKS, *Multi-Level Governance and European Integration*, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Lanham MD., 2001; W. SANDHOLTZ, J. ZYSMAN, 1992: *Recasting the European Bargain*, in: *World Politics*, (42)1992, pp.95-128.
 6. E.g. T. CHRISTIANSEN, E.J. KIRCHNER (eds.), *Committee Governance in the European Union*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2000.
 7. This argument is also launched much more comprehensively in W. KAISER, B. LEUCHT, M. RASMUSSEN (eds.), *The History of the European Union. Origins of a Trans- and Supranational polity*, Routledge, London, 2008, (forthcoming).
 8. The same is the case with prominent sociologists of the longer-term post-war developments such as Colin Crouch and Gøsta Esping-Andersen, who have practically ignored European integration history.
 9. Examples of this trend: B. RITTBERGER, *Building Europe's Parliament. Democratic Representation beyond the Nation-State*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004; C. PARSON, *A Certain Idea of Europe*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca/London, 2003; E. MAHANT, *Birthmarks of Europe. The Origins of the European Community Reconsidered*, Ashgate, Burlington, 2004.

scholars have termed the politico-administrative “fusion” between national and European administrative levels.¹⁰ We have examined the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and the Special Committee for Agriculture (SCA), which is placed under the Council of ministers, as well as the management and advisory committees under the Commission – later codified as comitology committees – in the field of agriculture. Only the COREPER was vaguely mentioned in the founding treaties, yet all were established during the very early years of the Communities, namely between 1958 and 1962. Subsequently, they obtained a crucial role in the preparation, passing, and implementation of EC legislation. We examine the decisions to establish these committees, their functions, and the consequences they had over time. Quite a rigid line is often drawn between the preparatory committees of the Council and those involved in advising and implementation under the Commission. However, we have chosen to conceive of these committees as all being involved in the same political process. Crucially, the historical literature has only marginally dealt with the origins, role and consequences of these committees, and the emerging literature focuses above all on the role of the COREPER.¹¹ While the tendencies traced in this article are based extensively, although by no means exclusively, on the experiences of agriculture, thus reflecting the facts that this field saw the development of a European policy early on and caused the majority of European legislation in the 1960s, we claim that they eventually would apply across the policy fields of EC.

This article is structured as follows: Firstly, we discuss how the historiography of European integration has been circling around the conceptualisation of the emerging European political system rather than addressing it directly. Secondly, we discuss how social science theories can be made relevant to this type of historical research. We give the example of how recent institutionalist theories provide a useful starting point, but also discuss why they should not be taken as stringent predictors of the outcome of a historical analysis. We present our empirical study along with a discussion of the limitations of the notion of member state control when confronted with the virtual explosion of committees that took place already in the early 1960s. Following the case studies, we point to new areas where historical research may provide highly relevant inputs to the interdisciplinary debate on the emergence of the European political system. This, we argue, lies as a logical extension of the larger historical questions outlined above.

10. W. WESSELS, *An Ever Closer Fusion? A Dynamic Macropolitical View on Integration Processes*, in: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, (35)1997, pp.267-299.

11. N.P. LUDLOW, *Mieux que six ambassadeurs. L'émergence du COREPER durant les premières années de la CEE*, in: L. BADEL, S. JEANNESSON, N.P. LUDLOW (eds.), *Les administrations nationales et la construction européenne. Une approche historique (1919-1975)*, P.I.E. Peter Lang, Brussels, 2005, pp.337-356; N.P. LUDLOW, *A Controlled Experiment: The European Commission and the Rise of COREPER*, in: W. KAISER, B. LEUCHT, M. RASMUSSEN (eds.), *The History of the European Union ...*, op.cit.

A historiography buried under facts and figures?

The historiography of the post-war European integration process is largely confined to periods where archives are open, though new inroads are being made with newer methods such as oral history.¹² The historiography is still overwhelmingly state-centric, and to some extent caught in the double bind that characterised the professional discipline of history as it emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century to legitimise the establishment of the various European nation-states.¹³ Thus, as they have been 'snow-ploughing' their way through state archives, historians have portrayed European integration as an endless series of inter-state negotiations, treaties, economic preferences and national interests.¹⁴ From this perspective European integration history is largely conceived of as a two-level game with very little attention given to formal and informal political structures that may cut across or go beyond these two-level games. Even the more conceptually sophisticated and innovative contributions seem to circle around the issue of a political system beyond the nation-state rather than addressing it directly.

The pioneering work of Alan S. Milward certainly helped to contextualise governments, diplomats and political elites within broader socio-economic and political interests. Yet, he maintained the focus on the nation-state, explaining the foundation of the EC in 1958 as the 'European rescue of the nation-state'.¹⁵ The quest for a true supranational history has been advanced most forcefully by N. Piers Ludlow's rich political history of the EC from 1963 to 1969.¹⁶ While this work successfully avoids placing nation-states alone at the centre of the EC, the analysis still leaves supranational actors such as the ECJ, the EP, as well as changing administrative and political organisational patterns, relatively unexplored. The late 1990s and early 2000s have witnessed several new contributions dealing

12. Oral history has been used extensively as an important supplement to archival sources in the new comprehensive history of the European Commission from 1958 to 1972: M. DUMOULIN, *The European Commission, 1958-1972, History and Memories*, Office des publications officielles de l'UE, Luxembourg, 2007.
13. G. IGGER, *Historiography in the Twentieth Century. From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge*, Wesleyan University Press, Hanover/London, 1997.
14. The snow-plough metaphor used by N.P. Ludlow at the conference, 'L'expérience européenne: 50 ans de construction de l'Europe 1957-2007' in Rome, 22-24 March 2007 referring above all to the series of the *Groupe de Liaison* beginning with R. POIDEVIN (ed.), *Histoire des débuts de la construction européenne (mars 1948-mai 1950)*, Bruylant, Brussels, 1986. The most recent volume is J. VAN DER HARST (ed.), *Beyond the Customs Union: The European Community's Quest for Deepening, Widening and Completion, 1969-1975*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2007. The only exception to this general rule is A. VARSORI (ed.), *Inside the European Community. Actors and Policies in the European Integration 1957-1972*, Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2006 that deals explicitly with transnational networks and European institutions.
15. A.S. MILWARD, *The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945-1961*, Methuen, London, 1984; Idem., *The European Rescue of the Nation-State*, Routledge, London, 1992; Idem. et al., *The Frontier of National Sovereignty. History and theory 1945-1992*, Routledge, London, 1993.
16. N.P. LUDLOW, *The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist Challenge*, Routledge, London, 2006.

with various European institutions.¹⁷ Many of these contributions have offered valuable empirical studies of for example the European Commission and the Economic and Social Committee.¹⁸ However, this new literature remains conceptually and theoretically rudimentary and crucially does not systematically contextualise the European institutions in the broader framework of an emerging European political system.¹⁹ With *Orchestrating Europe*, Keith Middlemass attempted to do exactly that, but in his otherwise major contribution, he maintained the fundamental logic of member state control, leaving no independent causal effects for institutional dynamics.²⁰

As a result, from the point of view of the historical origins of the European political system, current historiography still contributes very little. Crucially, it remains conceptually underdeveloped with regard to the highly pertinent larger question of how the nature of the nation-states as social organisations adapted and changed in this period, with respect to developments at the European level. It is thus symptomatic that most of the literature still entertains an uncritical approach to notions of sovereignty and member state control over the European integration process.²¹ We do not propose the abandonment of the study of national history and policy-making as a central dimension of historiography of European integration. Understanding the domestic socio-economic and political dynamics that shape national European policies are fundamental to any analysis of EU history, but national histories do not add up to the history of the emerging European political system. It is thus high time that historians begin to write the early history of the present day European political system, using conceptualisations that are widely available and used for studies of modern political systems. Such a shift in the research agenda of European integration historiography is all the more relevant if historical research wishes to open up and thus further the interdisciplinary dialogue with social scientists, which in turn is necessary if historians of European integration want to abandon the relative intellectual isolation within which they find themselves.

17. Antonio Varsori has been the leading promoter of this research agenda. See A. VARSORI, *Lo storiografia sull'integrazione europea*, in: *Europa Europe*, (1)2001, pp.60-93.

18. See respectively M. DUMOULIN, *The European Commission* ..., op.cit., and A.VARSORI (ed.), *Il Comitato Economico e Sociale nella costruzione europea*, Marsilio, Venezia, 2000. See also the various contributions in A. VARSORI (ed.), *Inside the European Community* ..., op.cit., and W. LOTH (ed.), *La gouvernance supranationale dans la construction européenne*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2005.

19. This is most evidently the case with W. LOTH (ed.), *La gouvernance supranationale* ..., op.cit., while in particular A.VARSORI (ed.), *Il Comitato Economico e Sociale* ..., op.cit., goes relatively far in exploring among other issues the relationships between the Economic and Social Committee and other European institutions.

20. K. MIDDLEMAS, *Orchestrating Europe. The Informal Politics of European Union 1973-1995*, FontanaPress, London, 1995, pp.686-698.

21. A useful and systematic contribution to the discussion of post-war sovereignty: L.H. RASMUSSEN, *De Overstatslige Dannelsers Tid. En Makrohistorisk Undersøgelse af Dansk Suverænitet og Internationalt Samarbejde 1945-2002 med særligt Henblik på EF/EU-Medlemsskabet*, Dissertation, Aarhus University, Århus, 2008.

Bringing in a conceptual point of departure

Social science theories and conceptualisations of institutional change provide a good starting point for interpreting the kind of empirical data generated through research in political archives. In particular, this body of literature offers much more refined theories and conceptualisations of the relationship between the member states and the European institutions than current historiography. We do not recommend a wholesale adoption of social science methodology, however. Social science conceptualisations and theories should function as the starting point for historical research to systematise and filter the maze of information of the empirical world. Hence, theories should not be used as check-lists in empirical historical research, but should be seen for what they are, namely simplified models of the world. We contend that ultimately, carefully researched historical narratives can provide unique new insights that will challenge theoretical models, as they adopt multicausal explanations of historical processes, rephrase classical ontological dichotomies (such as agent versus structure or ideational versus material factors) as empirical questions to which concrete answers can be given and offer empirically grounded indications of the limits to meaningful generalisation.²²

If we wish to explain the emergence of committees in international organisations - the example given in this article - a suitable theoretical in-road could be recent institutionalist theories from the social sciences. Arguably, the most prominent approach is the so-called principal-agent model from the rational institutionalist school, which has been conceptually refined within studies of the American congress. The principal-agent model has been widely used for the study of international organisations, and thus also the European Union.²³ The basic assumptions are that principals (the member states) delegate authority to agents (the European institutions) in order to lower the costs associated with international cooperation, to increase the efficiency of cooperation, and to make their commitment credible. The theory assumes that all political actors act within a certain bounded rationality. Accordingly, ideas, ideologies and personalities, for example, are considered as only secondary. The theory assumes that agents such as committees or the Commission will systematically try to widen their own competences, and thereby try to make their own imprint on policy outcomes.²⁴

22. For a precise and poignant defence of the historical narrative consult: J.L. GADDIS, *The Landscape of History. How Historians Map the Past*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002. The relationship between history and the social sciences is discussed in the provocative: J.L. GADDIS, *History, Science, and the Study of International Relations*, in: N. WOODS (ed.), *Explaining International Relations since 1945*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, pp.32-48.

23. A. MORAVCSIK, *The Choice for Europe. Social Purposes & State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca/New York, 1998; M.A. POLLACK, *The Engines of European Integration – Delegation, Agency, and Agenda Setting in the EU*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003; G. MAJONE, *Dilemmas of European Integration – The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005.

24. M.A. POLLACK, *The Engines of European Integration ...*, op.cit., pp.19-56.

Therefore governments in response set up administrative procedures to define the scope of activities of agents and oversight procedures to be able to sanction errant agents. In the context of the EU, the COREPER, the SCA and comitology are examples of such administrative and oversight procedures, rational institutionalist scholars have argued, because they in different ways enable the member states to control and steer Commission behaviour.

The principal-agency model, in short, provides a useful and simple model for thinking about the hierarchies established within the EC/EU. It does not, however, claim to be an accurate description of them.²⁵ That is rather an empirical question, and the answer should not be limited by the claims of this theory alone. Delegation-agency theory, however, works with a relatively static view of time. A second institutionalist school, historical institutionalism has argued that the introduction of the temporal dimension into the principal-agent theory clearly demonstrates that member states cannot control the consequences of delegation. The establishment and gradual development of European institutions and policies create path dependent processes and unintended consequences that over time slowly reshape the context within which European politics play out. Hence, governments cannot easily control or correct the processes set in motion because they would incur high costs.²⁶ A final strand of institutionalist literature to be brought out here is that inspired by sociological theory. This is shown for instance in the work of social scientists Christian Joerges and Jürgen Neyer who, on the basis of studies of EU foodstuff regulation, have shown that the nature of the negotiations in the Council and Commission committees is often deliberative. They explain this with the overlapping membership of national experts, where long-term socialisation in European level committees undermines the notion of strict member state control.²⁷

Beyond member state control? Tracing an administrative mutation

From 1958 to 1962, the EC witnessed a political and administrative mutation that reconfigured the policy process in comparison to the formal set-up in the founding treaties. Article 151 in the treaty of the European Economic Community (EEC) did

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25. M.A. POLLACK, *The New Institutionalisms and European Integration*, in: A. WIENER, T. DIEZ (eds.), *European Integration Theory*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004, pp.137-158, here pp.142-146.
 26. P. PIERSON, *The Path to European Integration: A Historical Institutional Analysis*, in: *Comparative Political Studies*, (2)1996, pp.123-163; P. PIERSON, *Politics in Time. History, Institutions, and Social Analysis*, Princeton University Press, Princeton/Oxford, 2004.
 27. C. JOERGES, J. NEYER, *Transforming Strategic Interaction into Deliberative Political Process: European Comitology in the Foodstuffs Sector*, in: *Journal of European Public Policy*, (4)1997, pp.609-625; C. JOERGES, J. NEYER, *From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Process: The Constitutionalization of Comitology*, in: *European Law Journal*, (3)1997, pp.273-299.

offer the Council the option to set up a committee of national representatives as part of the internal procedural rules.²⁸ However, few observers were able to predict the size of the new committee structure that would eventually emerge under the formal leadership of the Council and work in parallel with the so-called expert groups of the Commission, which experienced a similar dramatic increase in numbers. Likewise, no one really anticipated the extent to which experts and officials from national ministries would participate in this new dual committee structure. Leon Lindberg, an early scholar of European integration, calculated that already by 1960 there were 127 expert groups under the Commission and more than 30 working groups under the COREPER. Lindberg's qualified guess was that as many as 17,540 national officials participated annually in the new committee structure, though there was probably a large degree of duplication in terms of the people involved.²⁹ We will now examine the participation of national experts and officials more closely.

The COREPER was established on 24 January 1958 with the purpose of organising the work of the Council of general affairs, in particular to set up and lead the various working groups that would prepare European legislation.³⁰ However, already in May 1960, the Council of general affairs decided to delegate the preparatory work further and created the SCA that would function in the area of agriculture, but in parallel with the COREPER. The SCA was expected to prepare the ground for the forthcoming negotiations on the CAP and to report almost exclusively to the Council of Agriculture ministers, which was the first new constellation of the Council.³¹ Considering that around 90% of all Community legislation between 1958 and 1965 was related to the CAP, the importance of the SCA functioning in parallel to the COREPER can hardly be underestimated. Other parallel committees were also established under the Council during the first half of the 1960s. Among these was the Special committee for Article 111, which supervised the Commission in commercial negotiations³², as well as various committees dealing with macro-economic and monetary policies. These committees would not all report to the Council of general affairs; for example, the various committees on economic and monetary policies would report to the newly

28. Already in 1953 the ECSC Council established a Coordinating Committee (COCOR) with task similar to the COREPER. Important differences were that the COCOR did not meet regularly and that members were not permanently based in Luxembourg.

29. L.N. LINDBERG, *The Political Dynamics ...*, op.cit., pp.55-58.

30. P.-H.J.M. HOUBEN, *Les conseil des communautés européennes*, A.W. Sythoff, Leyde, 1964, p.141; M. DUMOULIN, *The European Commission ...*, op.cit., p.46.

31. For the legal circumstances, see F. HAYES-RENSHAW, H. WALLACE, *The Council of Ministers*, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2006, 2nd ed., p.94. For the political circumstances, see A.-C.L. KNUDSEN, *Defining the Policies of the Common Agricultural Policy. A Historical Study*, Dissertation, European University Institute, Florence, 2001, pp.215 ff.

32. L. COPPOLARO, *Trade and Politics Across the Atlantic. The European Economic Community (EEC) and the United States of America in the GATT Negotiations of the Kennedy Round (1962-1967)*, Dissertation, European University Institute, Florence, 2006, pp.123-125.

formed Council of Finance ministers.³³ On top of this, each committee would set up ad hoc working groups to deal with specific issues.³⁴

A similar development took place in the Commission, where a large number of expert groups were established in various policy fields, composed of Commission officials and their colleagues from the national administrations, as well as members recruited from major social partners in the field. This committee structure became particularly pronounced in the area of agriculture. Hence, with the first major CAP regulations in January 1962 came the formation of the management and advisory committees under the Commission, which were involved in the monitoring and implementation of Community legislation related to the CAP. The management committees involved representatives from the Commission and high-level officials from the national Agriculture ministries, and the advisory committees drew in the main social partners in the area of agriculture, who until then had only been marginally included in the policy process through the Economic and Social Committee.

The standard explanation by principal-agency theory of the emergence of the new committee structure under the Council, and of the establishment of the management and advisory committees in the field of implementation, is that they represented an attempt by the member states to shape, oversee and control the activities of the Commission. New historical research by N. Piers Ludlow on the COREPER has shown that this committee held multiple functions that went beyond merely controlling the Commission. In spite of this observation Ludlow concludes that although the COREPER's functions went beyond the narrow claims of principal-agent theory, the emergence of the new committee structures constituted a successful attempt by the member states to control and steer the EC as it developed during the 1960s. With important public policies such as the CAP at stake at the European level, it may be argued that this was a logical and rational step by the member states in their quest to control the European executive. Moreover, it could be argued that the establishment of the committees with national representatives under the Council constituted an attempt to establish the governments' own source of information regarding developments in European politics and policies, as they may have been seen as a more independent source of technical expertise compared to that provided by the Commission.³⁵ Recent historical research on the EEC of the 1960s has also found numerous examples of how the member state governments with varying degree of success attempted to use the committees to censure and control the Commission.³⁶ Apparently, these

33. É. NOEL, H. ÉTIENNE, *The Permanent Representatives Committee and the 'Deepening of the Communities*, in: G. IONESCU (ed.), *The New Politics of European Integration*, MacMillan, London, 1973, pp.98-123.

34. L.N. LINDBERG, *The Political Dynamics ...*, op.cit., pp.59-60.

35. N.P. LUDLOW, *Mieux que six ambassadeurs ...*, op.cit., pp.351-354; N.P. LUDLOW, *A Controlled Experiment ...*, op.cit.

36. Idem. for some striking examples of member state censoring of the Commission.

examples confirm the intergovernmentalist story line ultimately promoted in the conclusions by supranationalist historians such as Ludlow.

We agree that it is certainly plausible that an implicit or explicit wish for control drove member state governments to establish the various committee structures. At the same time, however, we find the overall interpretation along intergovernmentalist lines deeply problematic. As has been pointed out in other scholarship on delegation-agency models, an implicit normativity is easily developed, namely the expectation that governments *should* want to or *should* be able to control their agents.³⁷ Instead, we will outline below how the new committee structures in the Council and Commission over time actually created a functional division of tasks in Community affairs that fundamentally blurred some of the different political levels in the policy process. Committees came to function as a very broad and diverse interface between the European administration and the national administrations. This fundamentally changed the nature of European politics from foreign affairs to domestic affairs and created a ‘fusion’ – as identified by Wolfgang Wessels – between the national and European levels of administration and policy-making. This, we argue, was not expressedly a result of member states wanting to ‘control’ the European integration process. While the ‘domestication’ of European affairs has been pointed out before, hardly any historical analyses have so far tried to identify how, when or why these crucial changes occurred. We argue that the sum of new committee structures was crucial in the structural changes or mutations of interstate relations in the EEC in the 1960s. While this reduced the extent to which member states could function as unitary actors and essentially lessened their ‘control’ over the ongoing integration process, it also resulted in a somewhat less confrontational and more deliberative nature of communication between these states than the eternal focus on bargaining, projected by intergovernmentalist models of European integration history, would lead us to believe.

A functional division of labour immediately became present with the establishment of specialised compositions of the Council. The first to emerge was the Council of Agriculture ministers, which began as an informal framework, but became more prominent when it began to discuss the Commission’s grand proposal for the CAP around the summer of 1960. This specialisation became even more institutionalised with the creation of the SCA in May 1960, which came to function as a preparatory committee for Council of agriculture meetings, and thus became the agricultural counterpart to the COREPER. Rather than framing them in terms of direct member state control, these functional divisions within the Council could also be seen as the consent by the member state governments of the fact that Community policy-making was so demanding and complex that it was impossible for them to act with a single voice, even towards their own highest decision-making setting. As the internal coordination of government policy positions towards the

37. R.B. ANDEWEG, *On Studying Governments*, in: J. HAYWARD, A. MENON (eds.), *Governing Europe*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003, pp.39-60, here pp.52-53.

Community varied strongly, there were important differences between the extent to which governments were able to perform total control over the presentation of 'national' positions.³⁸

The functional division of tasks was accompanied by a blurring of the *de facto* and *de jure* decision-making in the Council. In January 1962 a new procedure for Council agendas was introduced, aiming at making matters run more smoothly in light of the rapid increase in the volume of Community legislation.³⁹ Council agendas subsequently became divided into A- and B-items. 'B-items' were issues considered so politically important that only the ministers could close the *dossier*. 'A-items', however, could automatically be adopted by the two main preparatory committees of the Council, i.e. the COREPER and the SCA. This division of labour was drawn from French administrative practice, where politically minor and 'technical' issues could be treated and practically finalised at the level of politically nominated officials.⁴⁰ Legally speaking, the COREPER and the SCA could not close A-item cases, but if agreement were reached in substance, the Council would typically simply pass A-items on the agenda automatically. Thus, the COREPER and the SCA became *de facto* legislators on A-item decisions, apart from the relatively few cases where the Commission demanded that a question should be examined by the Council.⁴¹

The so-called 'A-item procedure' became from then on perhaps the most significant function of the COREPER and the SCA in their preparation of the Council's work. Already in 1964, during its second year, this procedure constituted 138 out of 192 Council decisions.⁴² Studies of decision-making in the Council of agriculture during later periods have indicated that around 65% of Council agenda items were in fact listed as A-items, which the ministers consequently did not discuss in their meetings. Moreover, the same studies showed that only 13% of the B-items on the Council agenda required decisions of a legally binding nature by the ministers.⁴³ While there most likely were significant fluctuations of how this work was organised between A- and B-items, depending on the country of presidency, this still indicates the significance of the practice that had developed since the early 1960s of moving the bulk of decision-making one step down the hierarchy, from ministers to high-level officials and permanent representatives in the COREPER as well as the SCA.

38. In A.-C.L. KNUDSEN, *Creating the Common Agricultural Policy. Story of Cereal Prices*, in: W. LOTH, (ed.), *Crises and Compromises: The European Project 1963-1969*, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, 2001, pp.131-156, this is exemplified with regard to Germany in the field of agricultural policies.

39. É. NOEL, H. ÉTIENNE, *The Permanent Representatives ...*, op.cit., pp.108-109.

40. N.P. LUDLOW, *Mieux que six ambassadeurs ...*, op.cit., p.339.

41. For the case of the SCA, see M.P.C.M. van SCHENDELEN, 'The Council Decides': *Does the Council Decide?*, in: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, (4)1996, pp.331-348.

42. N.P. LUDLOW, *Mieux que six ambassadeurs ...*, op.cit., p.339.

43. M.P.C.M. van SCHENDELEN, 'The Council Decides' ..., op.cit., p.540.

It is often argued that the practice of A- and B-items did not represent a loss in political control over Community decision-making on the part of the governments. The large majority of A-items were, according to this view, purely technical questions that had to be removed from the Council table for the politicians to be able to address more pertinent political questions. Moreover, this practice is claimed to be comparable to the development of similar administrative routines in Western European democratic states in the post-war period.⁴⁴ This view, we would suggest, underestimates the true nature of the decision-making process that developed. To begin with, the Council of ministers cannot be compared to a government with a cabinet, and there was no single principal in the Council that controlled the preparation of legislation, negotiated the final draft legislation and overviewed implementation in the Community. Instead, these tasks were partly delegated to the Commission, partly maintained within the competences of the Council. The establishment of the committee structures of the EC and the functional division of labour, combined with the establishment of the new decision-making procedures, meant that it in fact became extremely difficult even for the Commission or the COREPER to maintain an overview of the full range of activities of the Communities.

The picture is further complicated by the fact that the preparatory committees under the Council soon began to create a long series of sub-committees and working groups. In a fairly short space of time, the COREPER and the SCA each established around thirty technical working groups that covered most aspects of Community activities. In addition, each common market organisation of the CAP was equipped with both a management and an advisory committee, so that by the end of the decade there were around two dozen of each type of these committees. Both the Council and the Commission committee structures drew their membership from a mixture of Commission officials, officials from the national permanent representations and a wide spectrum of high- and middle-ranking national officials and experts. Commission officials took part in Council committee meetings, and representatives from national administrations largely populated the committee structures under the Commission. Most of these people came from levels below political officials or permanent representatives.⁴⁵ Exact studies of the workings of these committees during the first decades do not yet exist, and therefore we do not know exactly what this meant in terms of member state control or bargaining. However, estimates exist for later periods, suggesting that nearly eighty percent of all differences in the positions of national governments were resolved already at the level of the working groups beneath the Council's preparatory committees, and that as much as ninety percent of the final Council texts were already produced in substance at this sub-committee level.⁴⁶ This meant that the number of cases that

44. N.P. LUDLOW, *Mieux que six ambassadeurs ...*, op.cit., p.339. See also for a much more critical view: D. DINAN, *Ever Closer Union. An Introduction to European Integration*, Palgrave, London, 2005, p.251.

45. P.-H.J.M. HOUBEN, *Les conseil des communautés européennes ...*, op.cit., p.149.

46. M.P.C.M. van SCHENDELEN, *The Council Decides' ...*, op.cit., p.535.

had to be negotiated in the Council was significantly reduced. It also means that there is good reason to question whether the mythical statement that “the Council decides” was in fact an adequate way of describing decision-making in the EC.

In addition to this, the Commission’s management committees that were engaged with the implementation of the CAP’s agricultural market and price regimes took a large workload off the Council and the SCA, as practically all such technical issues had actually been discussed and often modified in talks involving the Commission and the relevant national administrations. Thus, by the end of the 1970s, it was observed that these committees served to “relieve the Council of involvement in the myriad details of the approximately 2000 regulations issued each year by the Community in order to administer the CAP”.⁴⁷ Considering just how many committees had become involved in the ongoing process of deliberation and the pervasiveness of consensus culture, it was becoming ever more difficult to point to exactly who had ownership over Community legislation.

The consequence of the emerging committee structures was that an increasing stream of national officials from various administrative branches began to travel frequently to meetings in the various committee structures under the Council and the Commission. With them, information and communication became highly dispersed, and the number of contact points between the national and European administrations increased considerably. Most notably is perhaps the estimate by the then secretary-general of the Commission, Émile Noël, that the Commission alone by the mid 1960s was in a position to draw on the expertise of as many as 14-15,000 national experts.⁴⁸ This figure suggests a further increase in numbers from 1960 to the middle of the decade, compared with the number cited above by Lindberg that covered both Commission and Council committee structures.

The Council made several attempts to control these flows. Already in 1961, for instance, it was decided that the steady stream of information produced by the Commission should be channelled to the national administrations through the COREPER.⁴⁹ By the mid-1960s, certain member governments began to demand that the Commission’s invitations of national officials should go through the COREPER and tightened the control of expenditures related to these invitations. This was re-confirmed in relation to the Luxembourg compromise in 1966, so that pre-consultations between the Commission and the member states would now have to be organised by the COREPER.⁵⁰ This did not, however, actually prevent contact of a more informal nature from evolving between the Commission and national officials and experts as the multiple layers of committee structures under the Commission as well as under the COREPER and the SCA continued to expand.

47. W.J. FELD, *Implementation of the European Communities’ Common Agricultural Policy: Expectations, Fears, Failures*, in: *International Organization*, 3(1979), pp.335-363, here p.346.

48. N.P. LUDLOW, *A Controlled Experiment ...*, op.cit.

49. J. SALMON, *Les représentants et missions permanents auprès de la CEE et de l’Euratom*, in: M. VIRALLY, P. GERBET, J. SALMON, (eds.), *Les missions permanentes auprès des organisations internationales*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 1971, p.634.

50. N.P. LUDLOW, *Mieux que six ambassadeurs ...*, op.cit., pp.344-346.

Indeed, already during the first decade observers pointed out that for the area of agriculture alone “dozens, if not hundreds, of civil servants regularly commute from their national capitals to Brussels to serve this committee structure”.⁵¹ Prior to the 2004 enlargement, it was estimated that more than a thousand people travelled to Brussels on a daily basis for similar purposes.⁵²

The consequences of these committees over time were multiple. Firstly, a politico-administrative “fusion” took place between the member state and European administrative systems.⁵³ This soon became evident in the field of agriculture that we have mainly surveyed here, but it was a development that spread to all other areas that the EC was involved in. Thus, at the level of officials, an increasing institutional and personal overlap occurred between the national agriculture ministries, the SCA, and the agricultural management committees under the Commission. Together with the agricultural advisory committees, these have sometimes been characterised negatively as the ‘agricultural circuit’, or as “reinforcing the closed shop that ha[d] been largely achieved by the ministers and their civil servants in all CAP matters”.⁵⁴ It has thus been argued that this relatively closed, sectoral policy loop meant that new ideas had difficulties penetrating CAP policy-making, making reform difficult, even once it became apparent towards the end of the 1960s that the original policy principles of the CAP had a series of unintended consequences. Yet it is also important to realise that the CAP actually integrated some of the most conservative and entrenched branches of governments, injecting them with high doses of European administration and regulation in their day-to-day practices. In the light of this, it seems plausible to suggest that had these nationally situated actors not been enticed to accept the CAP, they would have been in a position to make the running of the CAP very complicated. Instead, during the 1960s the administrative fusion of agricultural politics led to a much larger political space that went beyond the classical two-level games that the Community of the 1960s has still largely been conceptualised as. The emergence of the committee structures founded between 1960 and 1962 was crucial in this regard.

A second major process that the committees set in motion was that of furthering the socialisation of the actors involved. Institutions, thus also committees, constitute social environments, and social scientists have pointed out that participation can lead to the socialisation of actors. It is thus argued that institutions can affect the most basic preferences of the individual actors. The extent to which socialisation happens, what beliefs people may get socialised into, and what it means for the outcome of the process can be extremely difficult to gauge even for contemporary research.⁵⁵ There

51. A. SWINBANK, *The British Interest and the Green Pound*, Reading: Center for Agricultural Strategy, University of Reading, Reading, 1978, p.67.

52. S. HIX, *The Political System ...*, op.cit.

53. W. WESSELS, *An Ever Closer Fusion? ...*, op.cit.

54. E. NEVILLE-ROLFE, *The Politics of Agriculture in the European Community*, Institute for Policy Studies, London, 1984, p.208.

55. J.T. CHECKEL, *Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change*, in: *International Organization*, 3(2001), pp.553-588.

are therefore good reasons to be careful about making generalisations about socialisation for historical periods. Yet, rather than rejecting it, we believe that the key theoretical insights about socialisation are worth taking into consideration, to the extent that this is possible. Sources are available from oral histories, (auto)-biographies, interviews, and personal archives. There is no reason to believe that a 'national' official is not affected by his or her institutional environment. Thus, basic contexts such as when leading national officials began to meet on a frequent basis both with their colleagues from around the Community and with Commission officials in the various committees, they often realised that they had more in common than with their domestic colleagues in other branches of national administration. We know that this was often the case in the agricultural sector.⁵⁶ It has also been shown that as the permanent representatives began to spend more time with each other than they did together with their nationally located colleagues, their beliefs began to align. This reduced many potential tensions and made compromises easier.⁵⁷ In short, it is important to keep an open mind with regard to the possible forms of socialisation that may have taken place. Even though we cannot prove exactly how or to what degree this occurred, we can at least try to understand the mechanisms that followed from the 'fusion' that resulted when thousands of nationally paid officials began participating in the committees.

All of this has important consequences for notions of control by the member states. The political process of the EC became much more blurred than the formal description of institutional competences in the founding treaties, or than theoretical notions of member state control, would lead us to believe. Certainly the member states were still there, but rather than being unitary actors in any way, they became increasingly represented by a myriad of national officials who may not always have acted 'nationally'. The ministers in the Council often did not represent governments as unitary actors, as even the work in the Council was functionally divided. This was a development towards a European political system that began in earnest within a few years of the EEC treaty's entering into force, and which was already firmly in place at the time when scholars studying more contemporary political developments began to identify this. We expect that further historical scholarship will confirm this.

56. C. DAUGBJERG, F. JUST, *Internationaliseringen af landbrugsforvaltningen og nationale magtkonstellationer*, in: M. MARCUSSEN, K. RONIT (eds.), *Internationaliseringen af den offentlige forvaltning i Danmark – Forandring og kontinuitet*, Århus Universitetsforlag, Århus, 2003, pp.128-155.

57. J. BATORA, *Does the European Union Transform the Institution of Diplomacy?*, in: *Journal of European Public Policy*, 12(2005), pp.44-66.

Conclusion

In this article we argued in favour of a new research agenda in the historiography of European integration, a call also made by Wolfram Kaiser and Brigitte Leucht in this volume. We surveyed the emergence and early development of the Community committee structures that represented a cornerstone in the emergence of a European political system. The new committee structures played a central role in the fusion of national administrations with the European ones in the areas of common policies. It seems unlikely that it would otherwise have been feasible to formulate, adopt, implement and eventually run such a comprehensive and central public policy as for example the CAP. In combination with the establishment of a strong supranational legal system, as was promoted by the European Court of Justice with the *Van Gend en Loos* (1963) and *Costa v. Enel* (1964) rulings,⁵⁸ this new administrative fusion was also quite simply a precondition for the success and stability of the EC in the longer run.

Analysing the committee structures over time, we demonstrated several significant features and consequences. Firstly, there was the very deliberate separation of the functioning of the Council(s) that emerged, which also divided the work between the COREPER and the SCA as the primary preparatory committees. If member state governments wished to assure a unified voice here, they would have to have a very well-developed coordination of their EC policy representation. A few member states certainly did, but it does not merit the conclusion of member state control. Secondly, the committee structures created a very broad interface between the EC and national administrations and brought in many actors who would not normally have been involved in foreign policy. The consequence of this was a very dispersed flow of information and communication, and the opening of multiple entry points for influencing the EC policy process. Thirdly, systematic institutional overlaps between the Commission, the Council and representatives of national administrations in the preparation and passing of legislation led to a blurring of the decision-making process. It simply became more difficult to identify exactly whose decision it was. Finally, potential processes of socialisation are likely to have caused a degree of convergence between the outlook of national and European officials, especially in the areas of common policies and cooperation, and thus reduced potential conflicts in the European political system.

Taken together, these features and consequences of the committee structures undermine the notion of member states acting in a unitary manner in relation to the EC policy processes. They also fundamentally question the notion of member state 'control', as well as that of 'national interests', that are so often applied in the literature. We can certainly find numerous individual examples of member states censoring the Commission or providing tight negotiation mandates for their

58. M. RASMUSSEN, *From Costa v. ENEL to the Treaties of Rome – A brief history of a legal revolution*, in: M. P. MADURO, L. AZOULAI (eds.), *The Future of European Law - Revisiting the Classics in the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty*, Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2008, (forthcoming).

representatives, which can be matched with final policy outcomes. Nonetheless, we argue that such examples should be seen in the context of the overall myriad of political and 'expert' actors who had access and opportunity to mould the policy process through participation in the committee structures. In this manner, historians of European integration need to try and grasp the larger historical picture.

While we admittedly drew extensively on the experiences of agricultural policy making, these tendencies were of a general nature and applied to various degrees to different kinds of European policy making.⁵⁹ This has most recently been confirmed in Laurent Warlouzet's analysis of French European policy towards the industrial Common Market during the formative period of the EC from 1958 to 1969 that reaches similar conclusions.⁶⁰ Indeed, it is argued that not only did the committee system undermine the coherence of national positions, resulting in gains in influence of the Commission; French economic civil servants were also gradually europeanised. Considering how Gaullist France is generally portrayed in the historical literature as the epitome of a unitary state actor, pursuing national interests relentlessly, we find our argument here confirmed by the case least likely.

To represent the history of the European Union and the member states in terms of a *sui generis* model or zero-sum logic is about as ahistorical as claiming that social organisations do not change or adapt. Historians can certainly still write the histories of the member states, but they need to abandon the rather unfruitful assumptions of unitary member state behaviour vis-à-vis the Community, and thus the notion of member state 'control'. National and supranational histories alike need a much more subtle conceptualisation of the multifaceted nature of the social processes at stake in the face of the creation of the European Communities. We have here suggested an opening by applying concepts used in the new institutionalism literature, which has in fact also been used by historians of modern states in earlier periods. These challenges must be met if the historiography of the European integration process is to become more relevant to other disciplines.

59. On the changing nature of foreign offices, the Council and diplomatic practices: J. BATORA, *Does the European Union ...*, op.cit.; also, H. WALLACE, F. HAYES-RENSHAW, *The Council of Ministers*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2006, 2nd ed.; D. SPENCE, B. HOCKING (eds.), *Foreign Ministries and the European Union. Integrating Diplomats*, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2005. On the so-called Europeanisation of national administrations, e.g.: J.P. OLSEN, *The Many Faces of Europeanization*, in: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 5(2002), pp.921-952; C. KNILL, *The Europeanisation of National Administrations. Patterns of Institutional Change and Persistence*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001.

60. See the dissertation defended in December 2007: L. WARLOUZET, *Quelle Europe économique pour la France? La France et le Marché commun industriel, 1956-1969*, Dissertation, Université Paris IV-Sorbonne, Paris, 2007.

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
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Relancer la CEE avant la Chaise vide: Néo-fonctionnalistes vs. fédéralistes au sein de la Commission européenne (1964-1965)

Laurent WARLOUZET

Les études historiques et de science politique sur l'intégration européenne cherchent de plus en plus à embrasser la complexité et les contradictions du système institutionnel communautaire, et tendent à remettre en cause certains schémas simplificateurs anciens.¹ Ainsi, l'unicité de l'acteur étatique a été remise en cause par de nombreux politistes, y compris ceux qui mettent les États-membres au centre du processus de décision comme les intergouvernementalistes libéraux.² De même certains historiens ont souligné les oppositions existantes au sein d'un même gouvernement ou entre deux administrations.³ Pourtant, dans le cas d'un acteur essentiel, la Commission européenne, les divisions doctrinales existant en son sein ont été rarement étudiées.⁴ Les commissaires européens sont en général considérés soit comme des européistes militants unis par un projet commun, soit comme de simple relais de leurs gouvernement national.

Grâce au recours aux théories de la science politique, il est pourtant possible de différencier plusieurs lignes de pensée au sein de la Commission européenne. La science politique permet en effet de dépasser la simple accumulation de faits de l'histoire-récit pour interpréter une série d'attitudes en les associant à une stratégie institutionnelle de promotion de l'intégration européenne. Tous les partisans de l'intégration européenne en poste au sein de la Commission européenne ne défendent pas le même programme pour la CEE. Le recours aux théories des sciences politiques permet en particulier de mieux comprendre le déclenchement de la crise de la Chaise vide, qui a déjà été étudié abondamment mais principalement du point de vue des États.⁵ Or, entre la fin 1964 et le début de 1965, juste avant la crise de la Chaise vide, l'approche néo-fonctionnaliste du

1. Cet article s'appuie sur des recherches menées dans le cadre d'un doctorat soutenu en 2007 et dirigé par le professeur Éric Bussière (Paris IV-Sorbonne) sur: *Quelle Europe économique pour la France (1956-1969)?*

L'auteur remercie les professeurs Jan van der Harst et Wolfram Kaiser pour leurs remarques sur des versions antérieures.

2. A. MORAVCSIK, *The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, UCL Press, Londres, 1999, p.22.

3. Voir par exemple l'étude de cas de la seconde candidature britannique dirigée par O. DADDOW (éd.), *Harold Wilson and European Integration. Britain's Second Application to join the EEC*, Frank Cass, Londres, 2003 ou le colloque sur les cultures européennes des différentes administrations (L. BADEL, S. JEANNESSON, P. LUDLOW (dir.), *Les administrations nationales et la construction européenne. Une approche historique (1919-1975)*, PIE-Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2005).

4. On trouve quelques allusions à ces divisions dans M. DUMOULIN (dir.), *Histoire de la Commission européenne, 1958-1974, Histoire et Mémoires d'une Institution*, Office des Publications officielles des Communautés Européennes, Luxembourg, 2007.

commissaire européen français Robert Marjolin s'est opposée frontalement à la stratégie fédéraliste du président de la Commission européenne Walter Hallstein. Marjolin et Hallstein ont des perceptions différentes de la dynamique l'intégration européenne. Elles reposent à la fois sur des conceptions théoriques définies chez eux depuis l'immédiat après-guerre, mais aussi sur une analyse des rapports de force des années 1964-1965. Ils développent donc des stratégies politiques différentes pour promouvoir leur objectif commun de progrès dans l'unité européenne.

Selon la littérature de sciences-politiques, il est possible d'opposer les deux dynamiques, néo-fonctionnaliste et fédéraliste, sur un certain nombre de points, même si la doctrine fédérale est assez diverse.⁶ Les fédéralistes adoptent une démarche institutionnelle de nature juridique et politique: ils souhaitent faire progresser l'intégration européenne par des traités internationaux spectaculaires, qui manifestent clairement et publiquement un transfert de souveraineté.⁷ La dimension populaire est importante: le peuple doit être consulté et associé à la démarche. Le recours au droit et aux institutions est indispensable pour empêcher l'homme de sombrer de nouveau dans ses pulsions destructrices et assurer la paix.

Au contraire les néo-fonctionnalistes, tels qu'ils se définissent au début des années 1960,⁸ sont guidés par un certain optimisme rationalisateur. Comme les fonctionnalistes, ils insistent sur la nécessité de gérer certaines prérogatives à une échelle supérieure à celle des États-nations, dont l'efficacité est limitée. Les néo-fonctionnalistes plaident par ailleurs pour la création d'institutions supranationales qui sont nécessaires pour créer et orienter le «spill-over», cette

5. Les études par pays les plus récentes se trouvent principalement dans deux recueils de contributions: W. LOTH (éd.), *Crisis and Compromises: The European project, 1963-1969*, Bruylant-Nomos Verlag, Bruxelles-Baden-Baden, 2001; J.-M. PALAYRET, H. WALLACE, P. WINAND (éd.), *Visions, Votes and Vetoes. The Empty Chair Crisis and the Luxembourg Compromise. Forty Years On*, PIE-Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2006.

L'étude multinationale de Piers Ludlow inclut la perspective de la Commission européenne mais sans étudier les différentes lignes qui s'affrontent en son sein: P. LUDLOW, *The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s. Negotiating the Gaullist Challenge*, Routledge, Londres-New-York, 2006, chapitre II, pp.40-70.

Enfin, une thèse d'histoire sur «La crise de la Chaise vide, 1965-66» conduite par Philip Bajon (Paris IV-Duisburg/Essen) depuis 2003 à partir d'archives françaises, allemandes et communautaires est en cours d'achèvement. Elle a donné lieu à un article: P. BAJON, *The Empty Chair Crisis, 1965-1966*, in: M. RAMUSSEN, A.-C. KNUDSEN, J.R. POULSEN (éd.), *The Road to a United Europe. Interpretations of the Process of European Integration*, PIE-Peter Lang, Bruxelles, à paraître en 2008.

6. B. ROSAMOND, *Theories of European Integration*, Palgrave, Hampshire, 2002, pp.23, 24 et 27; M. FORSYTH, *The Political Theory of Federalism: The Relevance of Classical Approaches*, in: J. HESSE, V. WRIGHT (éd.), *Federalizing Europe? The Costs, Benefits and Preconditions of Federal Political Systems*, Oxford UP, Oxford, 1996, pp.33-35.

7. Le fédéralisme (est entendu dans son sens le plus ambitieux et pas sous la forme dite "gradualiste", R. SCHWOK, *Théories de l'intégration européenne*, Montchrétien, Paris, 2005, p.31.

8. E.B. HAAS, *The Uniting of Europe. Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-1957*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1958; L.N. LINDBERG, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration*, Stanford UP, Stanford, 1963.

dynamique qui étend progressivement les délégations de souveraineté d'un secteur à l'autre. L'idée consiste à mettre en commun des compétences dans un domaine technique, puis de proche en proche, de parvenir aux domaines les plus politiques. Le volontarisme d'une élite d'acteurs supranationaux est donc fondamental pour encourager ce mouvement.

Deux différences majeures émergent entre les néo-fonctionnalistes et les fédéralistes au sens strict. D'une part, les néo-fonctionnalistes sont plus prudents. Ils défendent une approche de l'intégration européenne fondée sur la délégation progressive de souveraineté dans des domaines économiques où l'échelle de coopération européenne s'impose objectivement par son efficacité supérieure. D'autre part, la démarche néo-fonctionnaliste est élitiste et technocratique. Le but est de convaincre les décideurs nationaux de la nécessité de raisonner en termes européens, et pas d'obtenir des mobilisations populaires sanctionnant l'émergence *ex-nihilo* d'un peuple européen.

Il est possible d'appliquer cette opposition à l'attitude de deux personnages majeurs au sein de la Commission européenne, son président Walter Hallstein et son vice-président Robert Marjolin. Ce dernier a été peu étudié par l'historiographie.⁹ Sa position prudente pendant la Chaise vide est en général expliquée implicitement par sa nationalité française, et pas par la spécificité de son projet européen, généralement ignoré. Walter Hallstein de son côté a fait l'objet d'études plus nombreuses et très documentées. Cependant, elles sont parfois contradictoires car cet homme secret ne se laisse pas facilement percer. Ainsi, Matthias Schönwald estime qu'Hallstein a été très influencé par la doctrine fédérale allemande qui a guidé son action en 1965 et 1966.¹⁰ Au contraire Jonathan White souligne la force des liens existants entre l'école néo-fonctionnaliste et Walter Hallstein. S'appuyant sur les papiers Hallstein et le témoignage de l'un de ses collaborateurs, il montre que le président de la Commission connaissait manifestement ces doctrines en 1965.¹¹ Cet article ne vise pas à trancher ce débat historiographique, ni à étudier les liens entre les commissaires européens et les théoriciens, mais à montrer qu'Hallstein a agi au premier semestre 1965 de manière nettement fédéraliste, provoquant l'hostilité de Marjolin, resté fidèle à une méthode qui peut être qualifiée de néo-fonctionnaliste.

L'étude du projet néo-fonctionnaliste de Robert Marjolin puis celle des ambitions fédéralistes d'Hallstein et de son célèbre projet du 24 mars 1965

9. Gérard Bossuat a effectué une étude reposant sur des sources d'archives variées, mais elle a été malheureusement publiée dans un volume ne comprenant pas de notes de bas de page: G. BOSSUAT, *Robert Marjolin dans la tourmente de la Chaise vide*, in: Institut de France, *Robert Marjolin*, Palais de l'Institut, Paris, 2004, pp.66-82.

10. M. SCHÖNWALD, *Walter Hallstein and the «Empty Chair» Crisis 1965/66*, in: W. LOTH (éd.), *Crisis and Compromises ...*, op.cit., pp.157-171. Des éléments également dans G.Th. MOLLIN, *La «Commission Hallstein» 1958-1967: aux frontières d'un «gouvernement supranational»*, in: W. LOTH (dir.), *La gouvernance supranationale dans la construction européenne*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2005, pp.58-61.

11. J.P.J. WHITE, *Theory Guiding Practice: the Neofunctionalists and the Hallstein EEC Commission*, in: *Revue d'histoire de l'intégration européenne*, 1(2003), pp.111-131.

permettra de comprendre l'opposition entre les deux doctrines au sein de la Commission juste avant la crise de la Chaise vide.

Le projet néo-fonctionnaliste de Robert Marjolin

Le vice-président de la Commission européenne chargé des affaires économiques et financières, Robert Marjolin est un professeur d'économie. Socialiste, ancien membre des réseaux planistes français dans les années 1930¹² et ancien commissaire général-adjoint au Plan français (1946-1948), il défend une vision volontariste de l'action de l'État sur l'économie, tout en défendant la libération des échanges. C'est d'ailleurs son réalisme en matière économique qui lui a permis de devenir un personnage important dans les milieux européens. Ancien secrétaire général de l'OECE de 1948 à 1955, il met en œuvre la libération des échanges intra-européennes puis défend l'adoption du Traité de Rome par la France comme membre du cabinet du ministre des Affaires étrangères en 1956-57.¹³ Il arrive à la Commission européenne avec une grande autorité morale et une réflexion personnelle sur les affaires économiques européennes.

À partir de 1962, il cherche à mettre en place un processus de planification européenne. Il s'agit de reproduire à l'échelle européenne le processus de planification indicative mené en France, et qui jouissait d'un grand prestige international dans les années 1960.¹⁴

Dénommé «programmation européenne», puis «politique économique à moyen terme», ce projet est lancé par Marjolin dans une communication de la Commission au Conseil du 25 juillet 1963.¹⁵ Elle propose de créer un comité de politique économique à moyen terme constitué de représentants des États et de la Commission qui devra établir des «programmes» de politique économique pour les Six et la CEE à cinq ans. Ce «programme» que le comité doit établir est à la fois vague et ambitieux. Il doit constituer un «cadre d'ensemble de politique économique à moyen terme [5 ans] dans lequel s'insérerait l'action des gouvernements et des institutions européennes» (point 9). Le point 26 précise que

«l'objet essentiel des projections à moyen terme est de provoquer une discussion continue des objectifs et des mesures de politique économique. Il importe donc que les

12. S. CLOUET, *De la rénovation à l'utopie socialiste. Révolution constructive, un groupe d'intellectuels socialistes des années 1930*, Presses Universitaires de Nancy, Nancy, 1991, chapitre 4.

13. G. BOSSUAT, *L'Europe des Français, 1943-1959. La IV^e République aux sources de l'Europe communautaire*, Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris, 1996, p.294 et pp.324-325.

14. G. DENTON, M. FORSYTH, M. MACLENNAN, *Economic Planning and Policies in Britain, France and Germany*, George Allen, Londres, 1968, p.80. Le Labour britannique était particulièrement séduit par ce concept.

15. AHUE (Archives historiques de l'UE), procès-verbal normal de la 237^e session de la Commission européenne, séance du 25 juillet 1963, doc II/COM(63)271 final du 25 juillet 1963, recommandation de la Commission au Conseil, «Politique économique à moyen terme de la Communauté».

responsables gouvernementaux et les institutions européennes décident en commun, sur la base de ces perspectives, quelles sont les politiques qui doivent être suivies».

Dès lors, selon la vision de Marjolin, le Comité pourrait disposer d'un pouvoir considérable de coordination des politiques économiques suivies par les États-membres et la Commission européenne. Il pourrait en effet obliger un État-membre dont la politique s'écarte du programme à venir se justifier devant ses partenaires des Six et devant la Commission européenne. Une inconnue majeure réside cependant dans l'interprétation politique et institutionnelle qui sera donnée à ces dispositions. La doctrine du projet de Marjolin traduit un fort volontarisme technocratique. Elle repose sur la conviction qu'il est possible pour les responsables administratifs d'orienter l'économie, grâce aux progrès de la science économique.¹⁶

Or, pour appliquer un programme si ambitieux, Marjolin propose seulement de créer un Comité de politique économique à moyen terme (CPEMT) qui devra réunir des haut-fonctionnaires en charge de la planification et de la prévision pour qu'ils coordonnent leur travaux. Cette institution paraît bien faible pour agir sur les orientations globales de politique économique et inciter les gouvernements à suivre un programme quinquennal. Cette faiblesse des institutions proposées s'explique par deux raisons évidentes. D'une part, Marjolin ne pouvait pas proposer un changement institutionnel majeur car il n'avait pas l'appui politique nécessaire au sein de la Commission et des États-membres. D'autre part, Marjolin développe une méthode prudente et inspirée de la planification française. Elle est fondée sur la mise en place d'une véritable gouvernance, c'est-à-dire d'un système de gestion plus horizontal que vertical et hiérarchique.¹⁷ Le CPEMT n'a en effet pas de pouvoir coercitif car il n'est qu'un organe consultatif. Ses membres sont des hauts-fonctionnaires dotés de larges responsabilités; le commissaire français espère ainsi que la discussion régulière entre les hauts-fonctionnaires nationaux de la planification et de la prévision les amènera à européaniser progressivement leurs réflexions.

En 1964, Marjolin obtient quelques réussites dans la mise en œuvre de ce projet. Le 15 avril 1964, le Conseil accepte la création du CPEMT.¹⁸ Cet organe consultatif se met en place rapidement en décembre 1964,¹⁹ et multiplie les travaux lors du premier semestre 1965.²⁰ Par ailleurs, Marjolin obtient également du Conseil, en avril 1964, la création du Comité de politique budgétaire et du Comité

16. Ibid. Voir le point 11 de cette communication.

17. L. WARLOUZET, *Du Plan français à la politique économique de la CEE. La mise en place du Comité de politique économique à moyen terme, 1962-1964*, in: M. DUMOULIN (éd.), *Socio Economic Governance and European Identity*, Fundacion Academia Europea de Yuste, Yuste, 2005, pp.46-47.

18. AHUE, BAC 62/1980, vol.7, décision du Conseil du 15 avril 1964 créant un comité de politique économique à moyen terme, 16 avril 1964, doc. du Conseil CEE n°554/64.

19. AHUE, BAC 27/1985, vol.1, compte-rendu de la première réunion du comité de politique économique à moyen terme du 11 décembre 1964.

20. AHUE, BAC 27/1985, vol.2, compte-rendu de la 2^e réunion du CPEMT du 29 janvier 1965. Des groupes de travail sont mis en place dans de nombreux domaines. Dès le mois de mars 1965, le groupe d'études rend un premier rapport: AHUE, BAC 27/1985, vol.4, rapport intérimaire à la Commission sur les perspectives de développement économique dans la CEE jusqu'en 1970, mars 1965.

des gouverneurs des Banques centrales qui doivent compléter l'action du comité de politique économique à moyen terme. Ils fonctionnent sur le même principe de réunions périodiques de hauts-fonctionnaires sous l'égide de la Commission européenne.²¹ Enfin, le commissaire français obtient des États-membres une déclaration acceptant une consultation préalable en cas de changement de parité de leur monnaie, selon des procédures non contraignantes à définir.²² Progressivement, Marjolin met en place des structures de coordination des politiques économiques et monétaires nationales à tous les niveaux. Il développe une méthode prudente, fondée sur l'eupéanisation progressive des fonctionnaires nationaux.

En janvier 1965, dans un discours au Parlement européen, le commissaire français explicite et justifie sa méthode:

«Les plus hauts fonctionnaires des États, en matière économique, financière et monétaire, se réunissent maintenant régulièrement avec les représentants de la Commission et, avec une efficacité que nous n'aurions pas osé espérer il y a quelques mois, analysent, comparent, confrontent, opposent leurs expériences, en même temps que les décisions, législations, réglementations, pratiques administratives des différents États. Inévitablement, dès maintenant, alors que nous sommes dans une période de clair-obscur entre la souveraineté encore étendue des États et celle naissante de l'Europe unie, il résulte de ces discussions prolongées une certaine coordination des politiques économiques nationales».²³

En matière monétaire également, Marjolin adopte la même méthode. Envisageant, en janvier 1965, la création progressive d'une union monétaire des Six, il affirme: «Une union monétaire, plus qu'une construction réalisable par décret, doit reposer sur un processus évolutif complexe».²⁴ Les travaux entamés par sa direction générale reposent sur cette idée de progressivité et de refus de réformes institutionnelles brutales.²⁵ La monnaie unique en particulier est refusée car ce qui compte est le transfert de la souveraineté monétaire à l'échelle des Six,²⁶ qui peut se faire sans une unification des symboles politiques les plus forts.

La priorité reste la convergence progressive des décideurs nationaux des Six entre eux et avec les institutions communautaires, dans le cadre des comités de hauts fonctionnaires coordonnés par les services de Marjolin (la DG II chargée des affaires économiques et financières). La démarche est clairement néo-fonctionnaliste pour trois raisons. Tout d'abord, la cible est élitiste et

21. AMINEFI (Archives du ministère français des Finances), B 17.687, Télex Boegner du 15 avril 1964.

22. AFJM (Archives de la Fondation Jean Monnet à Lausanne), ARM 23/3, Avis du Comité monétaire sur les consultations préalables au changement de parité, 14 décembre 1964, transmis par le Secrétariat Exécutif le 22 janvier 1965.

23. AHUE, collection de discours de Robert Marjolin, discours devant le Parlement Européen le 19 janvier 1965, pp.34-35.

24. AFJM, ARM 32/1, «Monnaie, intégration et CEE», note de Frédéric Boyer de la Giroday (DG II B1), 9 janvier 1965, annotations manuscrites de Robert Marjolin à la fin du document.

25. Ibid., note de Frédéric Boyer de la Giroday (DG II B1), 9 janvier 1965.

26. Ibid., note de Frédéric Boyer de la Giroday (DG II B1), 9 janvier 1965, point 11.

technocratique. Ce sont les hauts-fonctionnaires qui sont visés plus que les hommes politiques ou la population. Ensuite, le vecteur du transfert de souveraineté est un domaine technique en évitant le plus possible les domaines politiques à forte valeur symbolique. La méthode est très prudente. La convergence progressive des esprits des décideurs permettra insensiblement de parvenir à une communautarisation des politiques économiques et monétaires nationales. Enfin, si la méthode est prudente, les ambitions pour l'Europe restent très fortes: un projet aussi abouti ne peut se développer que dans une communauté restreinte. Le projet de programmation européenne de Marjolin est donc inséparable du régionalisme économique européen et fondamentalement différent des démarches universalistes, qui considéraient les efforts d'unité européenne comme une simple étape vers une régulation mondiale. Marjolin avait d'ailleurs déjà défendu à l'OECE un projet de coordination étroite des politiques économiques sans succès,²⁷ ce qui montre la permanence de ses ambitions pour l'Europe.

Pendant cette démarche néo-fonctionnaliste consensuelle se heurte aux tensions croissantes de la période et notamment au projet fédéraliste développé au sein même de la Commission européenne par le président Walter Hallstein.

Les ambitions fédéralistes d'Hallstein (fin 1964-début 1965)

Le président allemand de la Commission européenne développe des projets de nature fédéraliste pour l'Europe depuis l'après-guerre. Il est nourri de l'exemple de la structure fédérale de la RFA,²⁸ et des réflexions de nature fédéraliste largement développées dans les réseaux transnationaux chrétiens-démocrates auxquels il participe.²⁹ Il développe cette ambition fédéraliste depuis un certain nombre d'années mais il commence à la mettre en œuvre par une méthode plus ambitieuse à partir du projet de l'Initiative 1964 en raison d'un contexte à la fois menaçant et stimulant.

Professeur de droit, Hallstein a développé ses réflexions théoriques sur l'intégration européenne dans de nombreux articles mais aussi dans des déclarations au sein du collège des commissaires. Peu après le premier rejet de la candidature britannique par exemple, Hallstein affirme la nécessité de relancer la CEE par l'intégration économique non pas pour elle même mais parce que: «L'union économique rend en quelque sorte inévitable un progrès vers l'union

27. G. BOSSUAT, *La France, l'aide américaine et la construction européenne, 1944-1954*, CHEFF, Paris, t.II, p.643.

28. M. SCHÖNWALD, op.cit., pp.159-160.

29. W. KAISER, *Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union*, Cambridge UP, Cambridge, 2007, p. 321.

politique».³⁰ Ainsi, Hallstein développe des projets très ambitieux, de nature fédéraliste, mais reste prudent dans la méthode. Il adopte la logique néo-fonctionnaliste: l'intégration économique mènera naturellement à l'intégration politique par l'effet de spill-over, c'est-à-dire le transfert progressif à l'échelle européenne, par effet de contagion, d'un nombre croissant de dossiers économiques, et *in fine* politiques.

À partir de 1964, Hallstein estime nécessaire d'être plus offensif comme en témoigne l'introduction du document «Initiative 1964» du 30 septembre 1964,³¹ issu du président Hallstein lui-même.³² Ce document est public et a été transmis aux États-membres comme un mémorandum annonçant le plan de travail de la Commission pour les mois à venir.

L'introduction du document expose clairement la doctrine de Walter Hallstein dès le point 1:

«Les Communautés "économiques" [...] constituent déjà un début de réalisation et pas seulement une préparation de l'"union politique". [...] Nul ne peut mettre en doute le fait que le chemin vers la fédération européenne passe par les Communautés existantes».

Au point 2, il est précisé que l'union politique doit passer par «l'amélioration de la structure institutionnelle», c'est-à-dire la fusion des Exécutifs et des Communautés, mais aussi et surtout le renforcement du Parlement européen. Dans ce domaine, il faudra notamment se prononcer sur des projets évoqués depuis longtemps comme l'élection des députés européens au suffrage universel, la participation à la procédure législative, «et surtout la procédure budgétaire de la Communauté». Il semble qu'Hallstein ne veuille pas se contenter du programme fixé par les États à l'occasion de la fusion des Exécutifs, qui se limite pour l'essentiel à une opération de rationalisation administrative plus que de renforcement des institutions de la CEE.

On retrouve dans l'introduction du mémorandum «Initiative 1964» de nombreuses propositions qui annoncent celles de la Commission en mars 1965. La grande différence tient dans la prudence de la méthode:

«La Commission a donc appuyé de son mieux toutes les initiatives justifiées pour progresser vers l' « union politique. [...] Tout en agissant avec énergie, elle n'en a

30. AHUE, procès-verbaux de la Commission, 1963, 223^e session, procès-verbal spécial, 26 mars 1963, Point 3^e: présentation du discours de Hallstein à l'Assemblée parlementaire européenne sur la candidature britannique. Il a développé cette idée dans un article célèbre: W. HALLSTEIN, *Wirtschaftliche Integration als Faktor politischer Einigung*, in: F.W. MEYER, F. GREISS (éd.), *Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft und Kultur: Festgabe für Alfred Müller-Armack*, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1961, pp.267-278.

31. AHUE, procès-verbaux de la Commission, 1964, 287^e session, procès-verbal spécial, 30 septembre 1964, doc. Initiative 1964 COM(64)400.

32. AHUE, procès-verbaux de la Commission, 1964, 286^e session, procès-verbal spécial, 23 septembre 1964, point 6^e.: le document «Initiative 1964» est issu de la présidence de la Commission. La forte implication personnelle d'Hallstein est confirmée par des indiscretions britanniques: PRO (Public Record Office à Londres), T 312/1890/24, Lettre de la délégation britannique auprès des Communautés européennes, N.J. Barrington, du 11 décembre 1964, à R.S. Symons (Treasury).

pas moins souligné avec insistance l'absence de logique qu'il y aurait à ériger en préalable certaines exigences pour toute nouvelle progression dans l'intégration économique. Toute tactique de "préalable" est mauvaise».

Cette formule désigne clairement la volonté de la Commission de ne pas poser de conditions en matière politique pour faire avancer l'intégration économique. Cette tactique offensive de «préalable» aurait pu être utilisée pour obliger les États-membres intéressés par l'intégration économique à faire des concessions politiques. La Commission s'y refuse ce qui peut apparaître prudent mais poser cette alternative, même pour la refuser, marque cependant un tournant: la Commission semble considérer la tactique du «préalable» politique comme inopportune mais pas impensable, d'autant plus qu'elle est pratiquée couramment entre les États-membres depuis 1962.

Le contexte de la fin de 1964 et du début de 1965 explique la radicalisation progressive des ambitions du président de la Commission européenne. La période est à la fois pleine d'opportunités et de menaces pour la Commission européenne.

Dans le domaine proprement économique tout d'abord, les succès obtenus le sont au prix de négociations toujours plus intenses et éprouvantes. La PAC en particulier cristallise les tensions. Pourtant si ces discussions suscitent de fortes oppositions, elles sont à l'origine de l'un des plus grands succès de la CEE avec la mise en place d'une véritable politique commune aux Six. L'ambivalence de la PAC, source de tensions et pilier de la dynamique communautaire, ressort nettement en 1965: un accord financier sur la PAC doit être conclu avant la premier juillet 1965 pour la compléter. La tentation est donc grande de faire pression sur ceux qui ont le plus grand intérêt à cette politique pour obtenir d'eux des concessions avant que la PAC ne soit définitivement mise sur les rails.³³ C'est le calcul qui est envisagé par Karl-Heinz Narjes, chef de cabinet d'Hallstein, dans une note à ce dernier du 2 mars 1965.³⁴ Dans un entretien avec Maurice Couve de Murville, il a clairement fait valoir que le succès de la négociation financière dépendait de concessions françaises en terme de renforcement des institutions communautaires.³⁵ Il fait suivre cette remarque de considérations rassurantes sur les possibilités d'accord dans ce domaine.³⁶ Peut-être les informations régulières en provenance de l'Auswärtiges Amt dont bénéficiait Hallstein entretenaient-elles un certain optimisme au cabinet du président de la Commission.³⁷ Le contexte général semble également favorable à une pression sur la France en raison de la perspective de l'élection présidentielle de la fin 1965 qui pourrait limiter la marge de manœuvre de Charles de Gaulle.

33. W. LOTH, *Hallstein and de Gaulle: the Disastrous Confrontation*, in: W. LOTH, W. WALLACE, W. WESSELS, *Walter Hallstein. The Forgotten European?*, St Martin's Press, Londres, 1998, p.141.

34. AHUE, Papiers Hallstein, 1119, note de Narjes à Hallstein, 2 mars 1965.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. AHUE, Papiers Hallstein, 1186, télégramme de l'Auswärtiges Amt depuis l'ambassade allemande aux Pays-Bas, signé Berger, 5 avril 1965, «de Gaulles' Europäische Politik».

Dans le domaine politico-institutionnel ensuite, les négociations sur le traité de fusion (finalement signé le 8 avril 1965) ont montré que cinq des six États-membres, étaient très hostiles à la délégation de nouvelles compétences aux institutions européennes.³⁸ De même les projets d'Europe politique lancés en 1964 notamment par l'Allemagne démontrent que la France n'est pas le seul pays à vouloir développer la coopération politique européenne en dehors de la CEE.³⁹ Les projets d'Europe politique et les réalisations en matière de fusion des Exécutifs témoignent tout à la fois du dynamisme de la coopération européenne et du risque de marginalisation de la Commission européenne dans ce processus. Cette inquiétude se perçoit dans de nombreux discours d'Hallstein de la fin 1964 qui affirment la nécessité de voir la défense, la culture et la politique étrangère devenir des compétences des institutions communautaires,⁴⁰ alors que de nombreux projets d'Europe politique prévoyait d'attribuer ces compétences à de nouvelles institutions intergouvernementales distinctes de la Commission. Cela se perçoit également dans la volonté d'Hallstein de relancer des dossiers institutionnels anciens comme l'élection du Parlement européen au suffrage universel ou l'autonomie budgétaire de la Communauté, que la Commission avait déjà essayé de promouvoir à plusieurs reprises depuis la première candidature britannique.⁴¹

En terme de dynamique politique, le fort investissement des États-membres dans la construction européenne n'est plus forcément un bon signe. Piers Ludlow a montré comment, au cours du premier semestre 1965, chacun des trois grands pays, France, RFA et Italie, a cherché à promouvoir ses intérêts nationaux de manière parfois très offensive.⁴² Face à ce retour en force de logiques intergouvernementales, la Commission se doit de réagir pour Hallstein comme le montrent ses discours du début de 1965. Dans un discours prononcé le 25 mars 1965 à Londres, Hallstein, contrairement à ses discours précédents plus prudents sur ce point, centre sa démonstration sur l'institution qu'il préside.⁴³ Le discours est intitulé : «La Commission, nouvel élément dans la vie internationale». Il s'y livre à

38. P. LUDLOW, *The European Community and the Crisis* ..., op.cit., p.46.

39. Carine Germond souligne que la RFA était hostile à tout accroissement des prérogatives de la Commission européenne à cette date. C. GERMOND, *Le couple France-Allemagne et la «crise de la Chaise vide»*, in: K. RÜCKER, L. WARLOUZET (éd.), *Quelle(s) Europe(s)? Nouvelles approches en histoire de l'intégration européenne*, PIE-Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2006, p.83.

40. AHUE, collection des discours de Walter Hallstein, discours prononcé devant le centre universitaire d'étude des Communautés européennes le 19 novembre 1964, «La Communauté européenne, nouvel ordre juridique», p.10; discours prononcé devant le Royal Institute of International Affairs (Londres) le 4 décembre 1964, «Quelques-uns de nos "faux problèmes"», p.12.

41. P. LUDLOW, *A Supranational Icarus? Hallstein, the early Commission and the search for an independent role*, in: A. VARSORI (éd.), *Inside the European Community. Actors and Policies in the European Integration, 1957-1972*, Nomos Verlag/Bruylant, Baden-Baden/Bruxelles, 2006, p.48.

42. P. LUDLOW, *The European Community and the Crisis* ..., op.cit., p.68.

43. AHUE, collection de discours Walter Hallstein, discours du 25 mars 1965 prononcé devant le British Institute of International and Comparative Law, «La Commission, nouvel élément dans la vie internationale».

un plaidoyer en faveur de la Commission européenne, dont le rôle est fondamental pas seulement pour des raisons institutionnelles mais aussi pour des raisons «psychologiques»: les longues consultations menées par la Commission

«permettent aussi aux personnes consultées d'apprendre à connaître et à comprendre les problèmes du voisin. Elles aboutissent à une intégration "psychologique", qui est au moins aussi importante que l'intégration des systèmes juridiques».

La Commission paraît ainsi être à la source de l'éclosion d'une véritable conscience européenne.

Cette promotion de la Commission paraît justifiée par un renforcement progressif, et semble-t-il irrépressible, des compétences communautaires. Le 19 février 1965 à Kiel, Hallstein avait souligné l'importance de la naissance d'un véritable droit communautaire, différent d'un simple droit international.⁴⁴ En effet les règlements pris par le Conseil sur proposition de la Commission sont directement applicables par les États-membres, sans transposition parlementaire, à la différence des autres décisions internationales. De plus, cet ordre juridique communautaire a été considérablement renforcé en 1963 et 1964 par les arrêts Van Gend & Loos (5 février 1963) et Costa/Enel (15 juillet 1964) qui établirent respectivement l'effet direct du droit communautaire et sa suprématie sur le droit national.⁴⁵ Professeur de droit, Hallstein est particulièrement conscient de la réussite de l'intégration juridique communautaire, exemple du succès de la dynamique néo-fonctionnaliste.⁴⁶ Enfin en terme de relations extérieures, c'est justement à partir de la fin 1964 et du début de 1965 que la Commission acquiert un mandat du Conseil pour représenter les Six dans la négociation du Kennedy Round.⁴⁷

Fort du succès de la dynamique néo-fonctionnaliste et face à ce contexte à la fois stimulant et menaçant, Hallstein passe à l'offensive fédéraliste en mars 1965.

44. AHUE, collection de discours Walter Hallstein, discours prononcé à l'Institut d'économie mondiale de l'Université de Kiel le 19 février 1965, «Les véritables problèmes de l'intégration européenne».

45. J.H.H. WEILER, *The Transformation of Europe*, in: *The Yale Law Journal*, 100(1991), pp.2413-2414.

46. A. VAUCHEZ, *Judge-made law. Aux origines du "modèle" politique communautaire (retour sur Van Gend & Loos et Costa c. ENEL)*, in: O. COSTA, P. MAGNETTE, *Une Europe des élites? Réflexions sur la fracture démocratique de l'Union européenne*, Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 2007, pp.158-160. Plus généralement, voir: A.-M. BURLEY, W. MATTIL, *Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration*, in: *International Organization*, 1(1993), pp.41-76.

47. L. COPPOLARO, *The Empty Chair Crisis and the Kennedy Round of GATT Negotiations (1962-1967)*, in: J.-M. PALAYRET, H. WALLACE, P. WINAND (éd.), op.cit., p.224.

Les propositions du 24 mars 1965

Le 24 mars 1965, Walter Hallstein présente devant le Parlement européen ses célèbres propositions pour résoudre le problème du financement de la PAC, qui furent transmises au Conseil seulement une semaine plus tard, le 31 mars 1965. Ce triptyque repose sur trois éléments imbriqués. Tout d'abord, le financement de la PAC devra être garanti par la création de «ressources propres» à la Communauté provenant des droits prélevés sur les produits agricoles et industriels à la l'entrée de la CEE. Comme ces ressources devraient rapidement dépasser les seuls besoins de la PAC, la Commission devrait en disposer seule pour développer les autres politiques communautaires. Fort logiquement, ce pouvoir supplémentaire accordé à la Commission au détriment des parlements nationaux, dont le vote du budget est l'une des principales prérogatives, devrait faire l'objet d'un contrôle. Le pouvoir du Parlement européen en matière budgétaire devrait alors être considérablement renforcé. Il acquerrait un pouvoir d'amendement qui lui permettrait d'adopter le budget amendé à la majorité simple si la Commission et seulement deux États-membres l'acceptent. Le Conseil perdrait donc son monopole et même sa prééminence en matière budgétaire.

Les célèbres propositions de la Commission de mars 1965 reprennent les ambitions de l'introduction du mémorandum «Initiative 1964» en les concrétisant, et en mettant à exécution la menace de subordonner l'intégration économique à l'intégration politique. Le plan d'Hallstein vise en effet clairement à obliger la France à des concessions de nature politique pour obtenir des satisfactions économiques.

Ces propositions marquent le passage d'Hallstein à une offensive fédéraliste. Certes, Jonathan White a souligné combien le plan d'Hallstein devait à la logique néo-fonctionnaliste.⁴⁸ Le plan du président de la Commission repose effectivement sur le passage de l'intégration économique – la PAC – à l'intégration politique – l'accroissement des pouvoirs du Parlement européen – par le biais d'une question technique, le financement et le pouvoir budgétaire. Il matérialise donc clairement l'effet de spill-over à la base de la logique néo-fonctionnaliste. Pourtant, il est possible de souligner que ce plan marque moins l'apogée du néo-fonctionnalisme d'Hallstein que son passage à une stratégie fédéraliste affirmée. Cela se perçoit tant sur le plan des objectifs que de la méthode.

En termes d'objectifs tout d'abord, Hallstein cherche à transformer l'équilibre institutionnel de la CEE. Ses discours contenaient des références de plus en plus fréquentes au caractère «fédéral» des institutions communautaires, y compris le Conseil des ministres,⁴⁹ et au développement du droit communautaire. Surtout,

48. J.P.J. WHITE, *op.cit.*, pp.111-131, notamment pp.116-117.

49. Dans son discours de Kiel, il affirme: «Le Conseil des ministres est un organe fédéral [...] les États membres [...] n'y représentent pas simplement leurs intérêts nationaux. Au contraire, ils parlent pour la Communauté dans son ensemble». AHUE, collection de discours Walter Hallstein, discours prononcé à l'Institut d'économie mondiale de l'Université de Kiel le 19 février 1965, «Les véritables problèmes de l'intégration européenne».

au-delà des discours, l'étude du plan du 24 mars 1965 dénote clairement des objectifs fédéralistes:⁵⁰ le Parlement européen devrait acquérir un véritable statut de représentant du peuple européen moyennant l'onction du suffrage universel et des pouvoirs supplémentaires. En retour la Commission européenne, soumise à la sanction de cette incarnation du peuple européen, constituerait un véritable gouvernement européen avec un pouvoir budgétaire propre. Dans la nouvelle procédure budgétaire proposée, la Commission deviendrait un arbitre entre le Parlement et le Conseil, ce dernier étant ainsi ravalé au rang de seconde chambre, comparable à un Sénat européen. Les incertitudes sur l'interprétation du Traité de Rome seraient ainsi définitivement levées et le caractère fédéral de la CEE serait clairement affirmé.

Si l'objectif est fédéral, la méthode l'est également. En effet, Hallstein veut obtenir le changement non pas par des transformations progressives, mais par un accord décisif au plus haut niveau, dicté par les circonstances (la négociation sur la PAC), et qui nécessitera une modification du Traité de Rome suivie d'une ratification parlementaire.⁵¹ Bref, toutes les caractéristiques d'une initiative éminemment fédérale seraient réunies. Hallstein présente d'ailleurs son plan devant le Parlement européen, c'est-à-dire, dans son esprit aux représentants du peuple européen. De plus, une fois ce plan dévoilé, il refuse tout compromis. Il maintient l'intégralité de son plan jusqu'au matin du 1^{er} juillet 1965.⁵² Cette tactique montre clairement qu'Hallstein ne se considérait pas comme partie à une négociation classique de règlement communautaire, qui donne lieu à des adaptations par la Commission de sa proposition initiale en fonction des réactions du Conseil ou d'autres acteurs. Dans le cas des propositions du 24 mars 1965, la Commission n'est plus l'arbitre à la recherche d'un consensus, mais un acteur politique doté d'une légitimité supérieure aux autres qui indique la voie à suivre et qui initie un nouvel accord politique de relance de la dynamique européenne.

Entre la démarche progressive et néo-fonctionnaliste de Marjolin et l'ambitieux projet fédéraliste d'Hallstein, l'opposition est frontale au sein de la Commission européenne.

L'opposition de stratégie à partir de la fin 1964 jusqu'à la Chaise vide

En 1964, Marjolin fixe son attention sur son projet de rapprochement des politiques économiques et monétaires des Six. Une note de janvier 1964 révèle qu'il semble hostile à toute initiative politique, car la situation semble toujours bloquée du fait que de Gaulle campe sur ses positions.⁵³ Pourtant, au même moment, Hallstein

50. Cela avait été déjà souligné par Wilfried Loth. Cf. W. LOTH, *Hallstein and de Gaulle ...*, op.cit., p.136.

51. P. GERBET, *La construction de l'Europe*, Imprimerie Nationale, Paris, 1994, p.275.

52. P. BAJON, *La crise de la Chaise vide, 1965-66*, thèse en cours d'achèvement.

souhaite relancer la dynamique politique européenne pour les raisons évoquées ci-dessus qui le conduisirent au mémorandum «Initiative 1964». Or, des sources concordantes témoignent de la réticence de Marjolin envers «Initiative 1964». En juillet 1964, le cabinet d'Hallstein écrit ainsi à Franco Bobba, le directeur de la DG II, pour lui demander un plan de mise en commun des réserves des Six («einen Fonds für die Devisenreserven der Mitgliedstaaten») destiné à être inclus dans un plan d'ensemble («Gesamtpackage») ⁵⁴ à l'origine de l'«Initiative 1964». Rien de tel n'est pourtant inclus dans ce mémorandum. Ce dernier ne contient, dans le domaine monétaire, que la répétition de passages entiers d'un mémorandum antérieur de la Commission – le programme d'action de 1962 – ainsi que l'assurance de la présentation, par la Commission, de propositions dans ce domaine. ⁵⁵ Cette absence n'est pas étonnante, puisque Marjolin n'est guère enthousiasmé par l'idée d'un fonds de réserve. Sa stratégie se fonde sur la coordination interne des politiques économiques grâce à un processus progressif, plutôt que sur une construction institutionnelle spectaculaire (le fonds de réserve) marquant la solidarité des Six face à l'extérieur, idée qui intéressait beaucoup plus Hallstein. Les archives britanniques sont plus parlantes au sujet de la divergence de vues entre Marjolin et Hallstein. Selon la délégation britannique auprès des communautés européennes, Hallstein avait prévu un texte très ambitieux pour la partie monétaire de l'«Initiative 1964»; ⁵⁶ Marjolin l'a obligé à en diminuer radicalement le contenu car il souhaite rester prudent dans ce domaine. Hallstein revient sur la question en janvier 1965 et paraît déçu que Marjolin n'ait rien prévu en termes de fonds de réserve européen. ⁵⁷

De plus, Hallstein cherche à contraindre Marjolin à relancer le dossier monétaire au début de 1965 par une prise de position de la Commission dans le débat sur la réforme du système monétaire international, après la conférence de presse de Charles de Gaulle du 4 février 1965. ⁵⁸ Les notes manuscrites prises par Émile Noël lors des séances de la Commission européenne du 17 février montrent clairement un débat entre Hallstein et Marjolin sur le SMI. ⁵⁹ Hallstein estime important que la Commission «montre sa présence», alors que Marjolin répond simplement que la possibilité existe de consulter le Comité monétaire. Dans une lettre personnelle à Marjolin du 25 février, Jean Rey, le commissaire belge aux

53. AHUE, MK 26, «note rapide sur des conversations à Bruxelles dans la semaine du 6 janvier 1964», 10 janvier 1964.

54. AHUE, Papiers Hallstein, 1247, note de Meyer, cabinet Hallstein à Bobba, 24 juillet 1964.

55. AHUE, procès-verbal spécial de la 287^e séance de la Commission du 30 septembre 1964, annexe, folio 331, doc. «Initiative 1964», communication de la Commission au Conseil.

56. PRO, T 312/1890/24, Lettre de la délégation britannique auprès des communautés européennes, N.J.Barrington, le 11 décembre 1964, à R.S. Symons (Treasury).

57. PRO, T 312/1890/30, Lettre de la délégation britannique auprès des communautés européennes, J.A. Robinson, le 19 janvier 1965, à R.S. Symons (Treasury).

58. Sur le contexte: R. SOLOMON, *Le Système monétaire international*, Economica, Paris, 1979 [1976], pp.45-50.

59. AHUE, EN 779, notes manuscrites d'Émile Noël sur la 306^e réunion de la Commission européenne du 17 février 1965.

relations extérieures, relance lui aussi le commissaire français pour qu'il prenne une position audacieuse au Parlement européen sur la nécessité d'une politique communautaire relative aux problèmes du SMI.⁶⁰ Or Marjolin ne prononce qu'un discours assez modéré sur cette question,⁶¹ craignant sans doute de compromettre le consensus nécessaire à l'application de sa politique par une prise de position dans un dossier aussi controversé.

Rey compte parmi ceux qui avaient soutenu la volonté d'Hallstein de relancer l'offensive dans le dossier de l'Europe politique et ce, dès le mois de juin 1964.⁶² C'est aussi un commissaire qui s'est plaint du rôle trop important joué par Marjolin dans la Commission européenne en 1961.⁶³ Il est soutenu dans sa démarche par son collègue Hans von der Groeben, commissaire à la concurrence.⁶⁴ En outre les conflits doctrinaux entre la DG II de Marjolin et la DG IV de von der Groeben sur la politique de la concurrence et la programmation européenne depuis 1962 n'ont pas contribué à rapprocher les deux hommes.⁶⁵ Or, von der Groeben est un autre grand partisan d'une offensive politique de la Commission européenne en 1965. Selon les notes manuscrites prises lors d'une réunion du 28 janvier 1965 sur les propositions agricoles que la Commission européenne doit préparer, von der Groeben s'oppose à Sicco Mansholt.⁶⁶ Ce dernier prévoit de n'agir que sur les prélèvements agricoles alors que von der Groeben pense utiliser aussi les droits de douanes, formule qui a été finalement adoptée par Hallstein. Mansholt n'y est pas hostile par principe mais hésite pour des raisons tactiques. Marjolin est sur la même ligne. Il estime politiquement imprudent de réclamer tant de réformes en une seule fois⁶⁷ et exprime ses réticences à Mansholt.⁶⁸ C'est le chef de cabinet de von der Groeben, Ernst Albrecht,⁶⁹ qui apparaît particulièrement offensif dans les réunions entre commissaires européens sur ce thème, en raison des fréquentes absences de

60. AFJM, ARM32/1/24/ Lettre de Rey à Marjolin, 25 février 1965.

61. AHUE, collection de discours de Robert Marjolin, discours devant le Parlement Européen le 23 février 1965.

62. AHUE, Papiers Hallstein, note de Rey pour Hallstein, 5 juin 1964.

63. Y. CONRAD, *Evolution de l'organisation administrative de la Commission et de la question du siège. Un long chemin vers la fusion des exécutifs (1960-67)*, in: A. VARSORI (éd.), *Inside the European Community ...*, op.cit., pp.84-85.

64. Ibid., p.85.

65. Un exemple parmi d'autres, les discussions sur la communication du 25 juillet 1963 annonçant les projets de Marjolin: AHUE, procès-verbaux des 236^e et 237^e session de la Commission des 17 et 24-25 juillet 1963, respectivement points 16 et 37. Voir la thèse de doctorat de l'auteur.

66. AFJM, ARM 21/1/10, Note JF, 28 janvier 1965. JF désigne sans doute Jean Flory, chef de cabinet de Marjolin.

67. AFJM, ARM 21/1/15, note de Marjolin sur le financement de la PAC, 22 février 1965.

68. AFJM, ARM 25/1/24, déjeuner avec Mansholt, 18 février 1965.

69. Sur l'importance d'Ernst Albrecht et ses liens avec Hans von der Groeben: K. SEIDEL, *Establishing an Economic Constitution for Europe: DG IV and the Origins of a Supranational Competition Policy*, in: M. RASMUSSEN, B. LEUCHT, W. KAISER (éd.), *European Integration 1945-1972: Supranational and Transnational Perspectives*, à paraître en 2008.

son commissaire pour raisons de santé.⁷⁰ Il défend les propositions de son commissaire face aux réticences de Marjolin,⁷¹ s'appuyant sur des documents relatifs aux ressources propres et préparés par la DG IV elle-même.⁷² Le rôle d'Albrecht dans la radicalisation de la position d'Hallstein est d'ailleurs attesté par de nombreux témoignages français.⁷³ De manière surprenante, ce n'est donc pas Mansholt qui paraît être la figure dominante dans cette discussion sur les propositions de règlement agricoles, mais un groupe d'Allemands chargé de la politique de la concurrence, proches du président de la Commission.

Au début du mois de mars 1965, le commissaire français semble isolé au sein de la Commission face à ses collègues sensibles au «prestige politique» de la proposition Hallstein.⁷⁴ Le futur discours d'Hallstein au Parlement européen est discuté à la Commission européenne lors des séances des 22 et 31 mars 1965. Le procès-verbal officiel témoigne de très longues discussions et du vote négatif de Marjolin et de Henri Rochereau.⁷⁵ Leur attitude est généralement expliquée par leur seule nationalité française. Le compte-rendu manuscrit de Noël est plus éloquent sur cette opposition.⁷⁶ Rochereau n'intervient pratiquement pas dans un débat qui oppose en fait Marjolin et Hallstein. Le premier conseille d'être prudent et d'émettre une proposition qui ne demande pas l'accroissement du pouvoir du Parlement. Le second estime au contraire qu'il faut profiter de la fenêtre ouverte par la négociation agricole. Voici comment s'exprime là-dessus Noël dans ses notes schématiques: «Si on laisse passer cette occasion > calendes grecques!». L'opportunité pourrait donc ne pas se représenter. Cette source témoigne elle aussi de la radicalisation d'Hallstein, qui refuse toute atténuation des propositions de la Commission lors de la réunion du 23 juin 1965 et estime, encore le 29 juin 1965, que «le moment du package deal n'est pas venu».⁷⁷ Il surestime sans doute le soutien qu'il pouvait obtenir des États-membres et notamment du gouvernement allemand.⁷⁸

Une fois la crise déclenchée, Marjolin et son cabinet critiquent très durement l'attitude du président de la Commission en privé. Dans une note de Jean Flory, son

70. AHUE, EN 779, notes manuscrites d'Émile Noël sur la 307^e réunion de la Commission, 24 février 1965. Jusqu'en mai 1965, von der Groeben est fréquemment absent. Il est remplacé par Albrecht lors des réunions de la Commission.

71. AFJM, ARM 21/1/20, notes manuscrites sur une réunion du 25 février 1965.

72. AFJM, ARM 21/1/29, Avant-projet: «Propositions concernant les ressources propres en vertu de l'art 201», DG IV, direction des problèmes fiscaux, doc. 1279/IV/65; ARM 21/2/1, Note DG IV, direction des problèmes fiscaux, «Les finances de la Communauté économique européenne à partir de 1967», 23 avril 1965.

73. Archives orales de la Fondation Charles de Gaulle, Jean-Pierre Brunet, entretien du 13 février 1991; Archives orales du CHEFF, Armand Saclé, cassette 11, entretien du 12 mai 1992.

74. AFJM, ARM 21/1/22, note de Jean Flory du 9 mars 1965.

75. AHUE, procès-verbal spécial de la 312^e session de la Commission du 31 mars 1965, point 4, p.14.

76. AHUE, EN 780, notes manuscrites d'Émile Noël sur la 311^e session de la Commission européenne du 22 mars 1965.

77. AFJM, ARM 21/1/16 et 17, notes manuscrites sur les réunions de la Commission des 23 juin 1965 et 29 juin 1965.

78. W. LOTH, *Hallstein and de Gaulle* ..., op.cit., p.147.

chef de cabinet, Marjolin souligne certains passages d'un document de la Commission qui insistent sur le caractère non communautaire de la démarche d'Hallstein.⁷⁹ Au lieu de régler chaque dossier séparément, le président les a liés entre-eux pour entrer dans une logique de *package-deal* qui s'apparente aux marchandages intergouvernementaux plus qu'à une démarche communautaire.

Conclusion

Le recours à la science politique permet de bien distinguer les deux projets européens qui s'affrontaient au sein de la Commission. Celui de Marjolin reposait sur une démarche néo-fonctionnaliste prudente, technocratique et économique. Elle s'explique par sa volonté de continuer à suivre la stratégie qui semblait avoir si bien réussi dans le domaine des affaires économiques et financières en 1964. Le projet d'Hallstein, élaboré en coopération avec son cabinet et celui de von der Groeben, préconisait au contraire une rupture politique. Un nouvel accord institutionnel de nature fédérale était nécessaire pour relancer l'union politique et enterrer définitivement les projets concurrents en la matière, notamment ceux du gouvernement allemand. Il fallait impérativement profiter de la fenêtre d'opportunité que donnait la négociation de la PAC pour agir. L'opposition entre les deux projets était issue d'une stratégie de progression vers l'unité européenne différente. Elle résultait peut-être également du décalage de perception entre le juriste chrétien-démocrate allemand et le planificateur socialiste français.

La crise de la Chaise vide n'est toutefois pas due à l'affrontement de ces deux projets au sein de la Commission, car il faut tenir compte de l'intensité très forte des affrontements entre les six États-membres,⁸⁰ sans réduire la crise de la Chaise vide à un échec de la seule Commission. Cependant l'étude de cette opposition permet de souligner l'originalité et la force des deux visions d'Hallstein et de Marjolin, et donc leur indépendance par rapport à leurs gouvernements respectifs.

Cette opposition démontre également la rupture provoquée par l'offensive d'Hallstein par rapport à la prudence de la dynamique néo-fonctionnaliste antérieure, et donc la faiblesse de la Commission, divisée sur la stratégie à suivre. Les stratégies fédéralistes et néo-fonctionnalistes en pâtirent. D'un côté, l'échec de Marjolin se reflète dans la remise en cause du néo-fonctionnalisme originel par ses promoteurs,⁸¹ même si certaines des dynamiques d'eupéanisation des décideurs européens en matière économique et monétaire ont pu faciliter la relance des

79. AFJM, ARM 21/3/17, note de Jean Flory du 13 juillet 1965.

80. P. LUDLOW, *De-Commissioning the Empty Chair Crisis: the Community Institutions and the Crisis of 1965-66*, in: J.-M. PALAYRET, H. WALLACE, P. WINAND (éd.), op.cit., pp.79-96, notamment pp.79-80.

81. E.B. HAAS, *The obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory*, Institute of International Studies working paper, Berkeley, 1975.

années 1980-1990,⁸² période qui a d'ailleurs vu une réévaluation de certains apports du néo-fonctionnalisme.⁸³ D'un autre côté, l'échec du fédéralisme a généralement été attribué aux ambitions excessives d'Hallstein, et la renaissance de cette dynamique dans les années 1990 se combine toujours difficilement avec les logiques de nature plus technique et fonctionnelle.⁸⁴

Ce processus d'emballement fédéral d'une dynamique européenne essentiellement néo-fonctionnaliste a déjà eu lieu quinze ans auparavant. En 1950-51, la démarche néo-fonctionnaliste de Jean Monnet a permis de mettre en place une organisation économique, la CECA. En dépit de son caractère technique et même technocratique, cette dernière représentait un grand succès en termes d'intégration européenne, car elle a permis la mise en place d'institutions supranationales et d'un droit communautaire propre. Les mouvements fédéralistes, déçus par la CECA, ont ensuite repris l'ascendant sur les néo-fonctionnalistes et ont relancé la dynamique politico-institutionnelle qui a débouché sur la CED et la CPE. La crise du 30 août 1954, comme celle déclenchée le 1^{er} juillet 1965, ont mis fin à ces deux emballements fédéralistes, mais aussi à la dynamique néo-fonctionnaliste qui la précédait. Associer une logique néo-fonctionnaliste technocratique et une ambition fédéraliste démocratique reste toujours difficile aujourd'hui comme le démontrent le rejet du Traité constitutionnel européen en 2005 et les voies d'une relance plus modeste discutées à l'issue de cet échec.

82. Notamment sur les liens entre le président de la Commission Jacques Delors et les gouverneurs des banques centrales dans le processus qui a conduit au Traité de Maastricht.

83. Par exemple, Wayne Sandholz et Alec Stone Sweet se réfèrent explicitement à Ernst Haas. Cf. W. SANDHOLZ, A.S. SWEET (éd.), *European Integration and supranational Governance*, Oxford UP, Oxford, 1998, pp.5-6.

84. M. FORSYTH, *The Political Theory of Federalism: The Relevance of Classical Approaches*, in: J. HESSE et V. WRIGHT (éd.), *Federalizing Europe? The Costs, Benefits and Preconditions of Federal Political Systems*, Oxford UP, Oxford, 1996. Murray Forsyth évoque le cas du Traité de Maastricht.

European integration: a meeting ground for history and political science?

A historian responds to Andrew Moravcsik

Melissa PINE

European integration has been a fertile subject for research by both historians and political scientists.¹ These different disciplines bring different tools to studying the past, focus on different aspects and find and proclaim different ‘truths’ – or perhaps the impossibility of so doing – as a result. Yet how should we frame and practice our research? Social scientists have been at the forefront of answering this question explicitly and of focusing on methods and practices drawn from the ‘hard’ sciences. As John Lewis Gaddis has recently noted, historians have been less concerned – indeed have positively recoiled from – making the methods that underlie writing history more apparent.² In the study of European integration, partly as a result of this methodological disparity and the discursive gulf that results from it, there remain two distinct groups of scholars, researching the same people and events and often using the same resources, but producing widely (and sometimes wildly) differing scholarship.

This article, written by an historian, focuses on the work of Andrew Moravcsik, a prominent and often controversial political scientist.³ It analyses the development of his theory of European integration through five of his publications. It then moves on to comment on his method of working and use of sources. The article concludes that Moravcsik’s very practice as a social scientist who begins with forming theory and then moves to test it empirically causes problems for historians who seek to engage with his work. His source use is also problematic from the perspective of the historian. However, the challenging and provocative nature of Moravcsik’s work ultimately forces us to be better historians.

1. Evolution of a theory

Over the course of his professional career, Moravcsik has produced a large corpus of work over a wide range of topics.⁴ This section presents an overview of five articles in which he concentrates on European integration. This is not intended to

1. Thanks to Anne Deighton, Anand Menon, Helen Parr and anonymous peer reviewers for their comments on this article.

2. J.L. GADDIS, *The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, p xi.

3. The author is an historian, recovering from two years of formal training in political science.

4. For a full list of publications see Moravcsik’s webpage at <http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/index.html>.

be a comprehensive review article: space does not permit a full analysis of Moravcsik's prolific output. Moreover, the two works perhaps best known to historians have not been included: both his 1998 book 'The Choice for Europe, Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht' and his 2000 two-part article, 'De Gaulle between Grain and Grandeur: The Economic Origins of French EC Policy, 1958-1970' have already received great scrutiny from historians.⁵ Instead, articles less well known in the historical community have been selected, from across the duration of Moravcsik's career so far. For each, the main theoretic claim and assumptions are stated, and these claims and assumptions are explored from an historical perspective, drawing on some of the comments and criticism that Moravcsik's work has engendered.

***Negotiating the Single European Act:
National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community⁶***

Moravcsik first put forward a theory of European integration, then labelled 'intergovernmental institutionalism', in 1991. He begins from a 'modified structural realist' perspective (p.21), starting with the assumptions that states (or rather governments) are rational actors and are the key players in integration, that bargains among them represent lowest common denominator decision-making, and that states will act to protect their sovereignty and national interest, agreeing to integrate only when they do not have a better stand-alone option (pp.25-27). Further, 'modified structural realism' is amended to take account of the fact that states are not unitary actors (p.27). Moravcsik concludes that 'the primary source of integration lies in the states themselves and the relative power each brings to Brussels'. He acknowledges that his explanation is incomplete, and concedes a role to supranational institutions in 'cementing existing interstate bargains' once they are made, but nevertheless contends that state actors play *the* central role in furthering integration, and that it is driven primarily by (economic) policy convergence (p.56 and p.21). The negotiation of the Single European Act, and in particular the 1992 initiative, is explored to test this theory.

5. A. MORAVCSIK, *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, Cornell University Press, New York, 1998 and *De Gaulle between Grain and Grandeur: The Economic Origins of French EC Policy, 1958-1970*, in: *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 1 and 3(2000). For comment, see H. WALLACE, J. CAPORASO, F. SCHARPF, *Review Section Symposium: The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, in: *Journal of European Public Policy*, 1(March 1999); R.H. LIESHOUT et al, *The Choice for Europe: Soft Sources, Weak Evidence?*, in: *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 4(2004); S. HOFFMAN, *Comment on Moravcsik*; J. KEELER, *A response to Andrew Moravcsik*; A.S. MILWARD, *A Comment on the Article by Andrew Moravcsik*; J. GILLINGHAM, *A Test Case of Moravcsik's 'Liberal Intergovernmentalist' approach to European integration*; J. VANKE, *Reconstructing de Gaulle*; M. TRACHTENBERG, *De Gaulle, Moravcsik and Europe*, all in: *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 3(2000).
6. A. MORAVCSIK, *Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community*, in: *International Organisation*, 1(1991), pp.19-56.

Looked at in itself, 'intergovernmental institutionalism' is a neat and compelling theory. However, as Anthony Forster has shown, many of the assumptions that support the theory, in three distinct elements – the formation of preferences, the vision of governments as purposeful actors, and the process of bargaining itself – do not stand up under empirical analysis.⁷ These will be discussed in more detail with reference to the next article, below. More fundamentally, the primary objection to Moravcsik's work in 'Negotiating the Single European Act' is surely the choice of subject matter for empirical testing. Using an intergovernmental conference to prove that governments play the key role in integration suggests a slanted choice of evidence to support a particular point of view. Heads of state and government are by definition the primary actors in an intergovernmental conference: studying an IGC to prove that heads of state and government are key players is teleological. Fritz Scharpf's comments on 'The Choice for Europe' apply equally here:

'Since only intergovernmental negotiations are being considered, why shouldn't the preferences of national governments have shaped the outcomes? Since all case studies have issues of economic integration as their focus, why shouldn't economic concerns have shaped the negotiating positions of governments? And since only decisions requiring unanimous agreement are being analysed, why shouldn't the outcomes be affected by the relative bargaining powers of the governments involved?'.⁸

Ironically, Moravcsik criticises others for this failing, pointing out in 'Preferences and Power' that neo-functionalist writers 'limited their definition of integration almost exclusively to institutional characteristics of the EC' (p.479).

Other claims in this article demand further analysis. For example, Moravcsik argues that individuals with a role in the supranational institutions did not play an important part in the IGC (pp.46-47). He notes later, however, that Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission, was one of four people who made 'key decisions' on European policy in France (p.50). Surely Delors did not have to have a formal role in the IGC deliberations, therefore, to have influence over their outcome. His influence on François Mitterrand – whose conversion to free market liberalism was so important to reaching agreement on the Single European Act (SEA) – is surely worthy of further discussion. In a similar vein, while Moravcsik's efforts to 'open up the state' instead of treating each state as a unitary actor are important, the state is the only actor so treated, and it is only 'disaggregated' in the case of preference formation. If IGCs are the focus, it would surely be instructive to look in more detail at exactly how heads of state or government prepare for them: who actually draws up positions, for example? In the author's work, statements made at head of government level often replicate, word for word, briefing notes

7. A. FORSTER, *Britain and the Negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty: A Critique of Liberal Intergovernmentalism*, in: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 3(1998), pp.347-368 and especially pp.357-365.

8. F. SCHARPF, *Selecting cases and testing hypotheses*, in: H. WALLACE, J. CAPORASO, F. SCHARPF, *Review Section Symposium ...*, op.cit., p.165.

drawn up by, for example, permanent representatives to the EC.⁹ Where does responsibility for a 'national position' lie? Can the 'position' of Margaret Thatcher in the SEA be untangled from the process that produced it? Must it be assumed that national officials, whether based in state capitals or in Brussels, share the same 'rational' and 'national' interest as the governments they serve? In other words, can the archival record shed light on how national preferences are formed? Ministers and officials, together with other national actors like trades unionists, business leaders or media commentators leave behind copious evidence of efforts at shaping negotiating policy, but it is not explored here. Continued deconstruction of Moravcsik's assumptions compels other questions. Can the dividing line between 'the state' and 'Europe' be clearly identified when many of those involved in the preparation of 'national' preferences are based full time in European institutions like COREPER or meet regularly in European ministerial councils? Would the convergence of national policies have had any significance if there had been no Delors to capitalise upon it? Would it have been so marked if the states concerned had not been bound together in the existing structure of the EC? At the most basic level, does membership of the EC/EU change the nature of 'nation states' so that models drawn from theories of international relations or comparative government do not, in fact, make a best fit?¹⁰ An echo of each of these questions is raised by each of the articles assessed below.

*Preferences and Power in the European Community:
A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach¹¹*

In this 1993 article, Moravcsik expands, elaborates and modifies his original 'intergovernmental institutionalism' and re-labels it 'liberal intergovernmentalism' (LI). He begins with a controversial and provocative claim, that from the Treaty of Rome to the Maastricht Treaty, 'the EC has developed through a series of celebrated intergovernmental bargains, each of which set the agenda for an intervening period of consolidation' (p.473). He sums up his claims in the introduction:

'The EC can be analysed as a successful intergovernmental regime designed to manage economic interdependence through negotiated policy coordination. Refinements and extensions of existing theories of foreign economic policy, intergovernmental negotiation and international regimes, provide a plausible and generalisable explanation of its evolution. Such theories rest on the assumption that state behaviour

9. For example, compare briefing note in 'Report of visit to Soames and attached paper, Hancock to Maitland, 10 February 1969' with 'Record of a Meeting between the Prime Minister and the Federal German Chancellor at the Federal Chancellery, Bonn, at 4pm on Wednesday, February 12, 1969', both in: The National Archive, Kew London PREM/13/2628.

10. For discussion of these questions, see W. SANDHOLTZ, *Membership Matters: Limits of the Functional Approach to European Institutions*, in: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 3(1996).

11. A. MORAVCSIK, *Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach*, in: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 4(1993), pp.473-524.

reflects the rational actions of governments constrained at home by domestic societal pressures and abroad by their strategic environment. An understanding of the preferences and power of its Member States is a logical starting point for analysis. Although the EC is a unique institution, it does not require a *sui generis* theory' (p.474).

According to this theory, integration occurs in three stages. First, governments formulate preferences – aggregating them on the basis of preferences expressed by domestic groups, in the context of international constraints. Next, they come to agreement in international negotiations, where relative bargaining power is determined by differential preference intensity. Finally, they pool sovereignty in institutions for the fulfilment of the agreements just made in order to minimise transaction costs and to control domestic agendas. 'Preferences and Power' thus augments the theory set out in 'Negotiating the Single European Act', in particular delineating more detailed models of preference formation, of state power in EC negotiations, and of the circumstances under which states pool sovereignty in institutions.

The above-stated fundamental objection to Moravcsik's practice – focusing on IGCs in order to test a theory of the primacy of the role of states in European integration – must be restated here, and for each of the works in which he presents a theory of European integration. Indeed, its restatement of this claim ensured that 'Preferences and Power' attracted a great deal of comment. Identifying, but then ignoring, 'federalist' and 'national security' motivations for governments to pursue integration in favour of concentrating on economic interdependence further constrains the focus of empirical research (pp.484-485). Two responses are noted here. Daniel Wincott argues that 'liberal intergovernmentalism' is not a theory at all, and that Moravcsik's work is illegitimately biased.¹² He confronts Moravcsik's claim that integration proceeds by grand bargains, which are consolidated in the periods between treaty-making negotiations. Thus he explores the 'daily grind' of European integration, widening the focus from intergovernmental negotiations themselves to conclude specifically that 'many of the 'innovations' of the Single European Act were already the day-to-day practice of the Community' (p.603). Moravcsik replied with a further claim that such day-to-day practice, as in the development of EC environmental policy, was initiated in the European Council or the Council of ministers rather than the supranational institutions, so that it reinforces his theory rather than undermining it. However, no empirical evidence is given.¹³

Wincott also suggests that Moravcsik's focus on the economic field causes him to ignore 'the innovations which were genuinely introduced by the SEA' and that the role of supranational institutions demands further research (p.606 and p.608) – surely, removing the word 'institutionalism' from the name of his theory aptly

12. D. WINCOTT, *Institutional Interaction and European Integration: Towards an Everyday Critique of Liberal Intergovernmentalism*, in: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 4(1995), pp.597-609.

13. A. MORAVCSIK, *Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Integration: A Rejoinder*, in: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 4(1995), p.618

indicates Moravcsik's disregard for the significance that supranational institutions, like the European Commission or Parliament, might play in the organisation or furthering of integration. His response to Wincott's challenge focuses on the initial decision of states to delegate or pool sovereignty to institutions and a theoretical, principal-agent derived model of the control that states exercise over institutions once they are created.¹⁴ It is therefore not particularly enlightening regarding how integration might proceed (or, alternatively, not proceed) in between treaty-revising conferences.

Forster, on the other hand, continues his more in-depth and empirically-based assessment of each of Moravcsik's assumptions.¹⁵ Taking just two examples, Forster suggests first that, at Maastricht, national preferences emanated from governments themselves, rather than from societal groups. In the Maastricht negotiations the British Conservative government was focused not on aggregating preferences expressed by national groups, but on maintaining party and cabinet cohesion (p.358). Second, the example of social policy demonstrates that the outcome of negotiations is not always based on the 'need to compromise with the least forthcoming government' (p.361). Moravcsik's assertion that governments are powerful through *not* wanting particular policies (having 'asymmetries in the relative intensity of national preferences', p.499) is intuitively unsatisfactory; Forster demonstrates that it is empirically baseless.

Two broad comments may be made. First, Moravcsik is forced to consider multiple alternative variables in explaining the way in which 'the EC has developed', as he put it in his abstract. Taking account of these variables makes his account of European integration fuller and more persuasive, but it undermines the elegance and parsimony of his original statement that 'the EC has developed through a series of celebrated intergovernmental bargains, each of which set the agenda for an intervening period of consolidation'. Second, several of the key assumptions on which LI rests seem, on the basis of empirical research, to be invalid or otherwise flawed.

Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, Influence, Institutions¹⁶

In this 1999 article, Moravcsik works with Kalypso Nicolaides: their research questions are shaped by LI theory. They seek to explain not European integration in its entirety, but rather, 'the process and outcome of the negotiation of the Treaty of Amsterdam'. They ask what explains 'the national preferences of the major governments'; given these, 'what explains bargaining outcomes among them'; and finally, given these outcomes, 'what explains the choice of international institution

14. Ibid., pp.621-625.

15. A. FORSTER, *Britain and the Negotiation ...*, op.cit.

16. A. MORAVCSIK, K. NICOLAIDES, *Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam:*

Interests, Influence, Institutions, in: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 1(1999), pp.59-85. For another view by the same authors, see *Keynote Article: Federal Ideals and Constitutional Realities in the Amsterdam Treaty*, in: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Annual Review, 1998.

to implement them'. They conclude that '[i]ssue-specific interdependence explains national preferences. Interstate bargaining based on asymmetrical interdependence explains the outcomes of substantive negotiations. The need for credible commitments explains institutional choices to pool and delegate sovereignty'. All other factors, like ideology or supranational entrepreneurship, are secondary (p.59). In this way, the Amsterdam Treaty is 'like the previous 'grand bargains' in EU history' (p.60).

This article omits the grand theoretical claims seen in the two previously discussed. Moravcsik and Nicolaides' modelling in researching the Amsterdam Treaty is much more nuanced, particular and open to interpretation even than the stark statements in the abstract, quoted above. The results are therefore much less constrained by LI theory than might be expected from the earlier work. The authors illustrate multiple causal factors in explaining the process and outcome of the Amsterdam negotiation, and acknowledge several possible exceptions to the explanation set out in the abstract. Fitting the abstract and the main body of research together, therefore, is challenging. Several examples follow.

First, in the arena of preference formation, since the authors concede that 'learning' during negotiations is possible (impossible under Moravcsik's earlier assumption of perfect information from the outset), the previous analytical and, by implication, temporal distinction between preference formation, on one hand, and bargaining, on the other, must be thrown out. Preference formation is downgraded to 'a rational ranking of concerns about issue-specific interdependence' (p.62). Moreover, the significance of both the very existence of the EU, and also the process of intergovernmental negotiation, for national preference formation is clear. In Moravcsik's earlier work, as has been seen, governments merely aggregated group preferences in the domestic setting, with an acknowledgement of the constraints imposed by the international context but nothing more. Here, not only is it acknowledged that some national positions were dependent on the outcome of other negotiations, but the authors also note that there was a perception (at least) that the negotiations themselves could have a significant impact on the domestic politics of the member states: the Council's hesitation to publicise its own positions for fear of aiding the British Conservative party is a case in point (p.67). As a result, the analysis seems much more persuasive, but it is also much more complex, and surely further from 'parsimonious theory' than Moravcsik's earlier work.

Second, in a throwaway comment, Moravcsik and Nicolaides overturn another of Moravcsik's earlier claims: they contrast the negligible role that supranational actors played in Amsterdam with the 'exceptional opportunity' taken by such actors 'to mobilise [...] potentially powerful transnational interests' during the negotiation of the SEA – a position rejected by Moravcsik in 'Negotiating the Single European Act', as has been seen (p.72).

Third, several different factors creep into the explanation of the result of bargaining: while differential preference intensity is still the primary factor, the authors mention states being willing to make concessions with 'small, if still

extant, costs' in the 'Christmas tree effect'; the acceptance of undesirable integration because of the desire to avoid 'crisis' or 'to demonstrate a co-operative attitude', even in the case of large, powerful states like Britain; the use of both new and old flexibility options such as protocols and constructive abstention to facilitate agreement (pp.73-75). Similarly, in explaining the pooling of sovereignty in institutions, exceptions to the rule of seeking 'credible commitment' to the bargains just made are acknowledged in the cases of Italian and British positions on the extension of Qualified Majority Voting in the Council; or in deferring a potential agreement on changing representation in the Council and Commission to some future negotiation. There are other oddities. Moravcsik and Nicolaides comment on how the governments 'seemed relatively unconstrained by the previously existing institutional structure', as though that flexibility were something new in European integration. They casually mention 'the potential for uncontrolled spillover to take place', a concept hitherto rejected by Moravcsik. These and other factors are acknowledged 'to increase unpredictability', undermining the hopes of liberal intergovernmentalist theory to have a predictive value. (pp.76-81). The work of other scholars, such as Simon Hug and Thomas König on the significance of ratification hurdles to both preference formation and negotiations, only increases complexity and the consequent difficulty of prediction.¹⁷

Despite these exceptions and caveats, in their conclusion Moravcsik and Nicolaides restate liberal intergovernmentalism and argue that '[a]lternative explanations [...] provide superior explanations for only a few aspects of the Amsterdam Treaty' (p.82). They conclude that the 'primary lesson of Amsterdam for bargaining theory is [...] that no amount of institutional facilitation or political entrepreneurship, supranational or otherwise, can overcome underlying divergence or ambivalence of national interest' (p.83). Once again, therefore, given that the focus of research is an intergovernmental conference, the authors are stating the obvious. Thus although they finish with a call for more research – both empirical testing and theoretical refinement – the clear necessity of handling multiple variables and of dealing with the role of contingency undermines the both the coherence, and, surely, the elegance of the original theoretical statement – even in assessing one set of treaty-amending negotiations, let alone theorising European integration *in toto*. In a footnote, Moravcsik and Nicolaides not only acknowledge that liberal intergovernmentalism 'does not constitute a general theory of European integration', they assert that '[n]either one of us believes such a theory exists' (fn p.60). This inconspicuous disavowal jars with Moravcsik's earlier statements, for example that 'the primary source of integration lies in the states' or that 'the EC has developed through a series of celebrated intergovernmental bargains', quoted above.

17. S. HUG, Th. KÖNIG, *In View of Ratification: Governmental Preferences and Domestic Constraints at the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference*, in: *International Organisation*, 2(2002), pp.447-476.

***A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and
International Co-operation¹⁸***

In the same year, Moravcsik moved his attention from states to the supranational institutions of the EU, responding to the claims of some neo-functional writers by specifically focusing on the *informal* power of supranational actors in intergovernmental negotiations (rather than formal powers in the day-to-day working of the EU). He rejects the neo-functional assessment that such informal powers are significant, instead ‘privileging the role of national governments and domestic politics’, testing this theory against ‘all five major treaty-amending decisions in the [then] forty years of EC history’: the Treaty of Rome, the Common Agricultural Policy, the European Monetary System, the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (p.269). He concludes that in most cases, supranational intervention was ‘late, redundant, futile and sometimes even counterproductive’ (p.270). The empirical research for this article is drawn from Moravcsik’s book, ‘The Choice for Europe’.

Moravcsik’s analysis is thus much more tightly bounded in ‘A New Statecraft’ than in the first two articles examined here: there is no attempt to extrapolate the findings of the lack of power for supranational actors in interstate negotiations to European integration more generally, for example. Nevertheless, he maintains his assumption that IGCs tend to result in significant new integration, rather than codifying existing practice, as discussed above: it still requires closer empirical examination. Further, responding to the neo-functional position, as Moravcsik sees it, does not necessarily mean confining attention to IGCs: do supranational actors have influence in the day-to-day business of European integration, and if so, how does that influence shape the options before governments in IGCs? More specifically, Oran Young takes issues with Moravcsik’s analysis within an explicitly social scientific framework. Young draws attention to what he sees as ‘significant ambiguities’ in the article. He suggests that Moravcsik has underestimated or over-simplified the variety of types of leadership that supranational actors can provide, and that the opportunities to exercise such leadership are broader than Moravcsik allows.

This misperception draws on another: Young argues that international bargaining is not as rational or efficient as is implied by Moravcsik: ‘N-person interactions are far more complex and far less deterministic than Moravcsik’s vision seems to apply’, so that there are many more openings in which supranational actors can exercise leadership than the tightly defined occasions listed in ‘A New Statecraft’. Young admits that his own work on other international bargaining may not be applicable to the EU.¹⁹ However, part of Moravcsik’s argument is that, although the EU itself is *sui generis*, the theoretical tools from

18. A. MORAVCSIK, *A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Co-operation*, in: *International Organisation*, 2(1999), pp.267-306.

19. O. YOUNG, *Comment on Moravcsik, “A New Statecraft? Supranational Entrepreneurs and International Co-operation”*, in: *International Organisation*, 4(1999), pp.805-809.

other aspects of political science may be applied to it. Moravcsik replies to Young's criticism with a claim that the latter has not confronted his 'detailed theoretical and empirical analysis'.²⁰ Nevertheless, Young's conclusion that Moravcsik's analysis 'raises more questions than it answers' is a compelling one.²¹

Some of those questions may best be expressed counterfactually. Taking just one example, Moravcsik dramatically downplays the role one of the 'founding fathers' of Europe, Jean Monnet in explaining European integration. By beginning with the Treaty of Rome, however, Moravcsik misses an opportunity to assess Monnet's role at the foundation of the first European Community, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), in the Treaty of Paris. Would there have been a Treaty of Paris – which Moravcsik ignores throughout his scholarship – without Monnet? What was his input to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and to what extent did that input transfer into the creation of the EEC and EURATOM? One might imagine that writing the proposals known as the 'Schuman Plan' and resulting – after intergovernmental negotiation – in the ECSC constitutes 'influence'. Moravcsik mentions only Monnet's 'advocacy of the Schuman Plan' and his advocacy and organisational skills toward the Treaty of Rome, but does not address the creation of the ECSC itself (p.286). The same query must apply to this article, therefore, as to 'The Choice for Europe': why start with the Treaty of Rome and not the Treaty of Paris, alliteration in subtitles notwithstanding? Moravcsik insists that supranational actors work within constraints determined by nation state actors, but does not acknowledge that nation state actors work within a context originally framed and proposed by a supranational actor in the Treaty of Paris.

*What Can We Learn from the Collapse of the European Constitutional Project?*²²

In the last substantive article addressed here, Moravcsik examines the creation of the European Constitution. He addresses three assumptions about participatory politics that he believes underlay the decision to hold a constitutional convention: that increasing the opportunity for participation generates increased public participation, that increased participation creates more informed deliberation and decision making, and that popular deliberation creates institutional trust, shared identity and political legitimacy (pp.222-234). He presents evidence (empirical, anecdotal, intuitive and often unreferenced) that each of these assumptions is flawed and that, as a result, the constitutional experiment was doomed to failure. Further, he states that understanding this failure should pre-empt any further

20. A. MORAVCSIK, *Theory and Method in the Study of International Negotiation: a Rejoinder to Oran Young*, in: *International Organisation*, 4(1999), pp.811-814.

21. O. YOUNG, *Comment on Moravcsik* ..., op.cit., p.809.

22. A MORAVCSIK, *What can we learn from the Collapse of the European Constitutional Project*, in: Forum with F. SCHARPF, M. ZUERN, W. WESSELS, A. MAURER, *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, 2(2006), pp219-241.

attempt to politicize European integration through the use of referenda or alternative constitutions. Finally, 'the failure of the constitutional project in fact demonstrates the Europe's [sic] stability and success' (p.235).

Moravcsik's exploration and denunciation of the assumptions that, as he sees it, underlay the 'constitutional experiment' are interesting and credible, but they are utterly unsubstantiated. He gives no hard evidence for his assertion that the constitutional convention and its output were 'an exercise in public relations' (p.220). In fact, his single use of primary sources (conversations with unidentified European parliamentarians 'on the eve of the convention') identifies a desire for more federalism as their motivation for supporting a new constitution, not a desire to engage with the European populace (p.221 and fn). No effort is made to identify the public or private motivations of other actors in pursuing a European constitution.

Moravcsik's characterisation of the final Constitution as instituting only minor reforms and 'tinkering' with the existing order (p.236) fits neatly with the 'PR exercise' approach: if it did not really change anything, then re-branding Europe in order to engage with its populations is the only plausible explanation for its existence. Holding this 'minor reform' position, however, means that Moravcsik skates over the potentially significant reforms that were part of the Constitution: the replacement of the pillared structure of the EU with a unified structure (Articles I-12-17) does not even bear mention; nor does the incorporation of a mutual defence clause (I-41(7)), or the increased potential for 'enhanced co-operation' among sub-groups of the member states (I-44), or the new option of voluntary secession from the Union (I-60). The creation of a non-rotating presidency (I-22) and a new Foreign minister (I-28) rate only the briefest word, with no suggestion of the possible consequences of the establishment of such high profile positions (p.236). No significance is attributed to the codification of rights in Part II of the Constitution: for scholars at least the promise that 'the arts and sciences shall be free from constraint' and that academic freedom 'shall be respected' (II-73) is of interest.²³ Surely, therefore, a closer reading of the Constitution, in historical perspective, is necessary in order to assess it. Moravcsik argues that we 'must go further to recognise the EU as it is, rather than as we would wish it to be' (p.237): is it possible that he himself is characterising the EU, or perhaps its constitution, as 'less than it is' for the purposes of his argument? Finally, although this article does not engage directly with Moravcsik's broader theorising on the EU, his applause of the replacement in the Constitution of 'ever closer union' with 'unity in diversity', with its implication of a change away from federalist discourse, draws attention again back to his perception of the central role of the member states in integration (p.237).

Over the course of these five articles then, Moravcsik refined his LI theory considerably – and yet at the same time it remains curiously static. On one hand,

23. The full text of the Constitution is available at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:SOM:EN:HTML>.

particularly in the work with Nicolaides, he takes account of an increasing number of variables in explaining European integration. These additions make the theory's representation of the history of European integration fuller and more persuasive, although they must also undermine its predictive capabilities. On the other hand, Moravcsik holds to his central hypothesis that, as stated in his book, 'European integration resulted from a series of rational choices made by national leaders who consistently pursued economic interests'.²⁴ This article therefore moves on to examine the methodology that has produced these results.

2. Method

In seeking to formulate a 'coherent liberal theory' in his 1997 article 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics', Moravcsik sets out his view of what good social science is.²⁵ He formulates 'three core theoretical assumptions' and derives from them 'a coherent liberal theory' which, he argues, 'deserves to be treated as a paradigmatic alternative empirically coequal with and analytically more fundamental than the two dominant theories in contemporary IR scholarship: realism and institutionalism'. He states that 'it is widely accepted that any non-tautological social scientific theory must be grounded in a set of positive assumptions from which arguments, explanations, and predictions can be derived'. His aim is a theory with 'superior parsimony, coherence, empirical accuracy, and multicausal consistency'. In exploring these four criteria, Moravcsik makes some weighty claims. Liberal theory explains 'important phenomena overlooked by alternative theories, including the substantive content of foreign policy, historical change, and the distinctiveness of interstate relations among modern Western states'. By correcting biases inherent to realist and institutional theory, liberal theory 'might well supplant many widely accepted realist and institutionalist, as well as constructivist, explanations of particular phenomena in world politics'. By specifying its assumptions, it can be synthesized 'into a multicausal explanation consistent with tenets of fundamental social theory' (pp.513-517). One of the advantages of reformulating theory in this way, Moravcsik suggests, is to 'compel empirical studies to give serious consideration to hypotheses drawn from it and discouraging omitted variable bias' (p.538). He wishes to 'facilitate empirical research that would move us beyond [...] simplistic assertions about the limited explanatory domain of liberal theory' (p.541). In discussing a synthesis of different IR theories, Moravcsik calls for 'analytical priority' for liberalism (p.542). He concedes that its 'analytical priority' does not necessarily mean greater explanatory power, 'which is an empirical matter' (fn p.543) and that new insights into international relations could be gained by 'relaxing' the assumptions made here

24. A. MORAVCSIK, *The Choice for Europe* ..., op.cit., p.3.

25. A. MORAVCSIK, *Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics*, in: *International Organisation*, 4(1997), pp.513-553.

(pp.547-548). Nevertheless, liberal theory is 'a logically coherent, theoretically distinct, empirically generalisable social scientific theory – one that follows from explicit assumptions and generates a rich range of related propositions about world politics that reach far beyond cases of cooperation among a minority of liberal states' (p.547).

This view of the purpose of theory and thus the practice of social science permeates Moravcsik's other writing. In 'Preferences and Power', he suggests that neo-functionalism may have failed to endure as a theory because 'it lacked a theoretical core clearly enough specified to provide a sound basis for precise empirical testing and improvement' (p.476). Likewise, in his 1999 article 'Is something rotten in the State of Denmark', he criticises constructivist theorists for failing to begin by creating 'distinctive, testable hypotheses' and then finding methods to 'test such hypotheses against alternative theories or a null hypothesis of random state behaviour' (p.670).²⁶ The divergence in practice, and thus in underlying epistemology, between history and theory is encapsulated in this quote. What we *do* first, as scholars, is different, as is how we conceptualise knowledge. Do we begin with assumptions about how the world works, the conception of a theory or model, and then seek to test 'the real world' against it? Or do we begin with empirical research and seek to elaborate an understanding of the past through the evidence that thus emerges? Moravcsik is explicit in this matter. He states that in

'international political economy, as in other social phenomena, it is widely accepted that prediction and explanation, particularly over time, require theories that elaborate how self-interested actors form coalitions and alliances, domestically and internationally, and how conflicts among them are resolved'.

He further asserts that 'theories must be derived independently of the matter being studied', on the basis of a series of assumptions or 'microfoundations' that must be specified beforehand (p.477). In 'Taking Preferences Seriously', he argues that liberal theory implies *then* doing difficult empirical research:

'State preferences must be clearly distinguished from strategies and tactics and then must be inferred either by observing consistent patterns of state behaviour or by systematically analysing stable elements internal to state, as revealed in decision-making documents, trustworthy oral histories and memoirs, patterns of coalitional support, and the structure of domestic institutions'.

The theory creation comes first, and the empirical research is organised in the light of the theory (pp.543-544).

Most historians do not work this way, and many explicitly reject this method of working. Even Donald Puchala, who otherwise lauds Moravcsik as a scholar on a par with Ernst Haas, notes that the former 'gathers evidence and tests positions derived from' intergovernmentalist positions, implying a certain degree of selection.²⁷ Gaddis states simply that 'what we can learn should always figure more

26. A. MORAVCSIK, *Is something rotten in the State of Denmark: Constructivism and European Integration*, in: *Journal of European Public Policy*, 4(1999), pp.669-681.

prominently in our set of priorities than the purity of methods by which we learn it' – a position that Moravcsik would presumably reject outright.²⁸ Moreover, as Wincott indicates, Moravcsik contradicts himself in 'Preferences and Power', arguing that 'detailed empirical knowledge' is required to select assumptions in the first place so that, it would seem, assumption formation and theory building *cannot* precede empirical research (p.498).²⁹ In a further anomaly, Moravcsik states that 'the formation of preferences analytically (though *not always temporally*) precedes bargaining, which in turn precedes delegation'.³⁰ While forming theories often requires an 'as if' approach, inverting temporal sequences is surely not the optimum approach when studying history: as Gaddis comments, '[y]ou don't have to be a professional historian to understand that causes must precede consequences'.³¹ At a more basic level, historians call the whole use of formal assumptions into question. Are states 'rational actors' – for the given definition of 'rational'? The study of history makes this assumption difficult if not impossible to hold even without taking Moravcsik's dis-aggregation of the state into effect. The deterministic impact of attempting theory-creation before empirical research is immense: deciding that European integration is driven by interstate bargains, and then researching interstate bargains to test the theory is surely problematic. In a footnote to 'In Defence of the Democratic Deficit', Moravcsik comments that other scholars focus on things that are 'important trends, but atypical of the EU as a whole' (fn p.607): how is such a stance defensible when he himself does not research 'the EU as a whole'?³² The resulting bias in the selection of sources is clear.

Sources

The final section of this article assesses sources in Moravcsik's empirical research. It suggests that Moravcsik's method of working *requires* a choice and use of sources that would be problematic for many historians.

27. D. PUCHALA, *Institutionalism, Intergovernmentalism and European Integration*, in: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 2(1999), pp.317-331.

28. J.L. GADDIS, *The Landscape of History* ..., op.cit., p.109.

29. WINCOTT, 'Institutional Interaction', p 600. Wincott dissents, arguing that 'theoretical guidance' is necessary in determining 'which details of empirical knowledge are significant.'

30. A. MORAVCSIK, *Liberal Intergovernmentalism* ..., op.cit., p.613, emphasis added.

31. GADDIS, *The Landscape of History*, p 106.

32. A. MORAVCSIK, *In Defence of the Democratic Deficit*, in: *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 4(2002), pp.603-624 and fn p.607.

Source choice

All of the articles discussed here are based heavily on secondary sources. 'Negotiating the Single European Act' adds a few newspaper articles (notably from *The Financial Times*) and occasional references to interviews. In ninety-seven footnotes (some with multiple references, some containing substantive comments) there are twenty-four references to what could be described as primary sources, many of which are drawn from one edited collection.³³ In 'Preferences and Power', there are no primary sources referenced. 'Explaining the Amsterdam Treaty' draws on some interviews (on which see below) and published primary sources such as Commission reports and the Amsterdam Treaty itself. 'A New Statecraft' is based on the empirical research in the book, 'The Choice for Europe', and includes solely the memoirs of Jean Monnet as extra primary material. 'What Can We Learn' uses Eurobarometer data and one edition of *EU Observer*.

Relying on secondary sources is not necessarily a cause for censure, and nor is drawing in later scholarship on empirical research done for a major book. However, particularly in the claims made in 'The Choice for Europe', Moravcsik has set himself up for criticism. He asserts on more than one occasion that hard, primary research is necessary for the empirical testing of theory, and that his own work rests on these foundations. In his book, he devotes several pages to discussing the importance of 'hard primary sources', and the 'rigorous methods typically employed by historians' (pp.80-85). Yet in his article, 'The Origins of Human Rights Regimes', Moravcsik reveals a disinclination for archival or other primary research. He notes that Britain is 'a country for which we have a wealth of reliable archival documents and oral histories' – but then goes on to acknowledge that he had 'restricted himself here to materials found in published sources'.³⁴ No reason is given: perhaps time constraints can be inferred. More elementally from the historian's perspective is the extent to which Moravcsik's use of primary sources has been called into question. Robert Lieshout, Mathieu Segers and Anna Van der Vleuten make a devastating critique of his historical practice in their review article for *The Journal of Cold War Studies*, concluding that his 'interpretation does not stand up under scrutiny', that his sources are 'soft' and his evidence 'weak'.³⁵ It is therefore problematic when empirical research in one work is used as a foundation for later scholarship.

Verifiability

Lieshout *et al* were at least able to trace Moravcsik's empirical research through his references. However, in each article discussed here, both general claims and particular facts are left unreferenced: in 'Negotiating the Single European Act', for

33. M. GAZZO (ed.), *Towards European Union* (two volumes), Agence Europe, Brussels, 1985, mistakenly cited here more than once as *Towards European Unity*.

34. MORAVCSIK, 'The Origins of Human Rights Regimes', fn p 239.

35. R.H. LIESHOUT *et al*, *The Choice for Europe ...*, op.cit., p.116.

example, Moravcsik states without substantiation that many of the 300 legislative items that made up the Single European Act had previously been proposed by the Commission but ignored by governments, using this ‘fact’ to illustrate the impotence of the Commission (p.47). In ‘What can we learn’ Moravcsik states, in an entire section based on unsubstantiated claims, that European legislation accounts for ‘only about 20% of European regulation and legislation’ (p.235). His argument in this section – that Europeans are satisfied with the existing ‘constitutional settlement’ in Europe – is persuasive, but it is not verifiable. Further, interviewees are not consistently identified, making it impossible to try to replicate Moravcsik’s research. ‘Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam’ cites an ‘interview with five Commission officials’. Interviews with Michel Petite and Richard Corbett are mentioned in both this article and Moravcsik and Nicolaides’ ‘Keynote Article’, but in neither is a job title nor full details of the interview given.³⁶ Elsewhere, Moravcsik refers to ‘those European parliamentarians with whom I spoke on the eve of the convention’.³⁷ If interviewees have spoken on the condition of anonymity (under the ‘Chatham House Rule’), the methodological consequences of using their testimony should be addressed.³⁸

Self-citation

A linked issue methodologically is Moravcsik’s marked proclivity for citing his own work, which increases notably from 1991 to the present. In the earliest article examined here, ‘Negotiating the Single European Act’, Moravcsik cites himself just once. ‘Preferences and Power’ has three self-references in the thirty-three footnotes and there are a further eight in the text. ‘Explaining the Amsterdam Treaty’ contains a total of eighteen references to the earlier work of Moravcsik or Nicolaides or both. In ‘A New Statecraft’, fifteen of ninety-four footnotes include self-references, and as has been seen, the whole empirical research is drawn from ‘The Choice for Europe’. ‘What Can We Learn’ has thirteen self-references. Moravcsik may be the authority on LI theory, and may choose to cite his earlier work rather than restating arguments or evidence previously laid out. However, self-citation is clearly risky when both Moravcsik’s assumptions and his empirical proofs have been called into question by social scientists and historians alike. On several levels, therefore, Moravcsik’s source use is problematic.

36. A. MORAVCSIK, K. NICOLAIDES, *Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam* ..., op.cit., fn p.70, and *Keynote Article*, op.cit.

37. A. MORAVCSIK, *What Can We Learn* ..., op.cit., fn p.221. This practice is not confined to Moravcsik: see also A. FORSTER, *Britain and the Negotiation* ..., op.cit.

38. Contrast R. ULLMAN, *The Covert French Connection*, in: *Foreign Policy*, 75(1989), pp.3-33.

Conclusions

Moravcsik himself noted that ‘the world contains more complexity than any single theory can encompass’.³⁹ If historians have difficulty with his theories, his assumptions, his methodology and his sources, then why even try to engage with his work – and by extrapolation, with the work of other theorists of European integration? The short answer is that Moravcsik forces a response: his work is so confident and provocative that it is impossible to step away and decline to join battle. Each of the small, substantive questions in this article demands an answer: to what extent did Monnet’s role in the creation of the ECSC have an impact in later integration? Did Delors’ influence in Paris translate into influence in the negotiation of the Single European Act, and if so, how? Is there an historical pattern in whether IGCs break new ground or consolidate existing practices in European integration? To what extent have government preferences been formed before the start of any given negotiation, how were they formed, and how much has each government known about the preferences of the other member governments? Rebutting Moravcsik’s position therefore necessitates a return to the coal face of the sources. Each of these questions is deliberately posed in the past tense, however: historians seek to represent what has already happened in European integration – including identifying cause and effect, and seeking patterns of influence and interaction by all means – rather than to create theories or hypotheses about the present or future.

Less comfortably for historians, engaging with Moravcsik forces self-reflection about methods and sources. If the assumption that individuals act ‘rationally’ is unsatisfactory, with what do we replace it? Historians surely have views about ‘what people are like’ and what motivates individuals and groups to act in particular ways, even if they are not as precisely expressed as those of social scientists. We have equally important views about the extent to which a ‘true’ representation of the past can be made, or the extent to which we trust archival sources or interview subjects in creating such a representation. Being honest about those assumptions – with ourselves as well as our readers and students – can only strengthen our historical practice through opening it to scrutiny. Only in this way can we assess Moravcsik’s work on its own terms as well as from an historical perspective. Does he produce a theory with ‘superior parsimony, coherence, empirical accuracy, and multicausal consistency’, as he claims to seek to do in ‘Taking Preferences Seriously’? Are his assumptions (‘microfoundations’) justifiable? Is ‘parsimony’ compatible with ‘multicausal consistency’? Do the goals of parsimony, and coherence have an impact on ‘empirical accuracy’? Has Moravcsik’s empirical research been unduly skewed by the weight of his theoretical ideas? Historians are not immune from the danger of research questions (or availability of sources, or research grants) having an unjustifiable impact on the

39. A. MORAVCSIK, *Is something rotten ...*, op.cit., p.672 (he promises to return to this point but does not do so).

structure of empirical research. Source selectivity is thus equally important for both fields, as Richard Evans' deconstruction of David Irving's sources has shown.⁴⁰

Both Moravcsik's methodology and his empirical research, therefore, force historians to re-examine how we conceptualise and research European integration. The very discomfort and lack of fit between social science and history in this case compel both further empirical research, and greater precision and clarity in elaborating our goals and methods in studying history.

40. R. EVANS, *Lying about Hitler: History, Holocaust and the David Irving Trial*, Basic Books, New York, 2002. This example is *not* intended to suggest that Moravcsik is like Irving in his methods of handling sources, merely to demonstrate that historians (a title that Irving claims for himself) must look to their own practice of source use in addition to challenging those of social science.

Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen

Roland DANNREUTHER (ed.) - *European Union Foreign and Security Policy. Towards a neighbourhood Strategy*, Routledge, London and New York, 2004, 225 p. – ISBN 0-415-32298-7 – 26,68 €.

Le débat actuel qui consiste à savoir si l'UE est un acteur international alimente de plus en plus la production éditoriale, signe indéniable de l'intérêt porté à ce questionnement, dont les conséquences sur le thème de l'identité européenne sont fortes. Il est abordé dans ce livre, édité par Roland Dannreuther, suivant une perspective particulière, qui consiste à juger si cette même UE défend une vision cohérente dans son environnement immédiat. C'est ainsi que sont passés en revue les différents pays et régions où l'Europe peut, ou pourrait développer une politique étrangère et de sécurité communes: Europe centrale et orientale bien entendu (Pál Dunay), Turquie (Gilles Dorronsoro), Europe sud-orientale (Ettore Greco), Russie, Ukraine, Moldavie et Belarus (Andrei Zagorski), Scandinavie (Hiski Haukkala), Caucase et Asie centrale (Neil MacFarlane), Afrique du Nord (Fred Tanner) et Moyen Orient (Roland Dannreuther), études empiriques auxquelles il faut ajouter des approches plus thématiques, celles d'Antonio Missiroli sur la notion de «voisinage», de William Wohlforth sur le lien transatlantique, et de John Gault sur la sécurité énergétique.

Onze cas au total sont étudiés, donnant un éclairage sur le rôle de l'UE dans certaines politiques de voisinage, avec une attention particulière au processus d'élargissement en Europe centrale et orientale, à l'engagement dans les Balkans, au conflit israélo-arabe, et à la politique à l'égard des pays de l'ex-URSS. Chaque contribution répond à cinq thèmes de recherche: le développement de politiques communautaires pertinentes (ou non) depuis la fin de la Guerre froide; l'impact de l'influence stratégique de l'UE; l'étendue de l'autonomie de cette dernière par rapport aux politiques des Etats membres; l'influence d'acteurs extérieurs dans les affaires européennes; le passage ou non de l'UE d'un statut de puissance civile à celui d'acteur stratégique. Le livre a paru dans les premiers mois de l'année 2004, avant donc l'adhésion officielle des dix à l'UE, et ne tient pas compte de certains événements forts ayant trait aux thèmes étudiés, tels que la révolution orange en Ukraine ou l'ouverture des négociations d'adhésion avec la Turquie.

Dans l'introduction, Roland Dannreuther, professeur à l'université d'Edimbourg, lui-même spécialiste des relations internationales, rappelle que la politique européenne de voisinage est une conséquence directe de l'après-Guerre froide: la nécessité de s'engager dans la stabilisation des pays de l'ancien Pacte de Varsovie s'est imposée peu après l'écroulement de l'hégémonie soviétique après 1989, et le résultat de ce fait fut et reste un défi stratégique et géopolitique consistant à remplir un vide inquiétant. Qui plus est, la logique interne de l'intégration européenne stipule que l'acquis communautaire ne saurait être limité à l'ouest mais devrait être étendu à l'est; or, l'avenir du projet d'intégration est lié au succès de l'engagement

stratégique de l'UE dans son environnement immédiat. Selon Dannreuther, ce défi a trois dimensions: l'élargissement, la Politique étrangère et de sécurité commune (PESC), et la Politique européenne de sécurité et de défense (PESD), tous trois devant faire face aux divers défis sécuritaires issus de la périphérie de l'UE. Le but est donc de juger jusqu'à quel point l'Europe occidentale, UE et Etats membres, a été capable de se comporter de manière cohérente à l'égard des pays voisins depuis la fin de la Guerre froide.

Afin de savoir si les différentes politiques et stratégies en direction du voisinage immédiat font apparaître l'UE comme un acteur stratégique cohérent, les contributeurs de ce volume suivent une approche empirique et analytique, ce qui fait que le titre peut être considéré comme trompeur: l'aspect procédural et les mécanismes institutionnels propres à une diplomatie «européenne» ne sont pas traités dans cet ouvrage, alors que les sources principales de l'action et des programmes (Commission et Conseil) ne sont pas vraiment abordées. Le but central de l'ouvrage est de démontrer qu'une politique étrangère européenne émerge par-delà les politiques nationales de coordination, les politiques supranationales et celles qui sont basées sur la formule intergouvernementale de la PESC. Les différents systèmes sont considérés comme étant solidement interconnectés, dans le même temps où les auteurs reconnaissent que la coopération pâtit d'un certain manque de coordination. Cela dit, l'influence de l'Europe apparaît plus forte qu'une simple analyse de la seule PESC peut le suggérer, ce qui souligne la complexité du processus décisionnel de l'UE en la matière.

Même s'il est ainsi difficile d'obtenir une photographie complète de la mosaïque des polices et stratégies de l'UE, l'ouvrage cherche à fournir une conceptualisation cohérente des politiques étrangères de l'UE en direction des régions voisines et à voir si l'UE peut être considérée comme un acteur stratégique par celles-ci. L'originalité est d'utiliser une perspective stratégique et de contribuer dans le même temps aux débats plus larges à propos de l'UE comme acteur international. Cette approche est suivie par tous les contributeurs, qui essaient de répondre au formulaire de recherche décrit ci-avant, en analysant les différentes politiques et stratégies de l'UE.

A la suite de ces différentes analyses, Roland Dannreuther tire la conclusion que «l'ambiguïté en apparence insoluble de son identité externe» reste la principale faiblesse de l'UE. Qui plus est, l'ouvrage ne tient pas compte de l'élargissement de l'UE à 25 membres, qui a d'ores et déjà compliqué une carte stratégique de l'Europe déjà peu claire. Les auteurs reconnaissent de fait l'apparition d'une certaine «fatigue de l'élargissement» chez les Occidentaux, alors que la perspective de l'adhésion est vue par les candidats comme une simple «carotte économique», bien que l'élargissement ait pour finalité le but fortement politique et stratégique de promouvoir la stabilité dans le voisinage. La question de la géométrie variable est ainsi reposée en fin d'ouvrage, afin de repenser un système qui doit tenir compte de la délicate question de la souveraineté dans un ensemble à 25, tout en s'interrogeant sur l'attitude à tenir vis-à-vis de la nouvelle périphérie d'une UE

fortement excentrée vers l'Est. Ainsi, toutes les contributions mettent en avant le fait que le processus décisionnel de l'Europe, trop opaque et bureaucratique, rend une ligne d'action cohérente de plus en plus difficile à obtenir. La principale raison à cela est le caractère *sui generis* de l'UE. Celle-ci n'est pas un acteur unitaire avec une autorité centrale en matière de politique étrangère et de sécurité, ce qui mène à ce problème général, dont pâtit toute velléité d'action commune: les politiques de l'UE sont souvent riches en rhétorique, alors qu'elles manquent des ressources appropriées et des mécanismes pour atteindre les buts désignés, le principe de la conditionnalité par exemple n'étant pas forcément le garant d'une véritable réussite en matière de démocratie s'il n'est pas accompagné de demandes contraignantes. Les politiques européennes restent trop souvent conduites par des facteurs externes, et gênées par la logique complexe du processus de décision interne de l'UE, ce qui amène à différentes formules provisoires ou des politiques non coordonnées à l'égard d'un «extérieur» que tous les acteurs ne voient pas de la même manière. Or, la PESC a une importance capitale concernant l'identité européenne: interne (penser à la finalité géographique) comme externe (statut et rôle dans l'ordre international).

Ainsi, ce livre présente un travail fondé et cohérent en analysant l'engagement stratégique de l'UE dans sa périphérie, audaces et résistances comprises. Même s'il y a des différences en termes de qualité concernant les articles, toutes les contributions fournissent une analyse convaincante et bien écrite. Certes, l'approche d'ensemble du livre est très descriptive, et cela aurait été plus intéressant encore si les auteurs avaient engagé une discussion un peu plus théorique dans leurs analyses (ce qui est parfois le cas, comme dans la contribution de William Wohlforth).

Ce livre va sûrement susciter l'intérêt de toute une série de lecteurs. Ces derniers trouveront une riche analyse empirique des différentes régions qui «voisinent» l'Europe, ou pourront s'intéresser à l'impact de l'UE dans certains secteurs clés, ainsi qu'à une politique étrangère commune pour l'instant éclatée, parfois plus contingente qu'intentionnelle.

Bertrand Vayssière

Maître de conférences à l'université de Toulouse II-Le Mirail

Roland DANNREUTHER, John PETERSON (eds) – *Security Strategy and Transatlantic Relations*, Routledge, London and New York, 2006, 262 p. – ISBN 0-415-40189-0 – 30,03 €.

Issu d'un double colloque de l'UACES (*University Association for Contemporary European Studies*, réseau de différentes universités européennes), cet ouvrage rassemble les contributions d'auteurs d'horizons divers: Ronald D. Asmus (*German Marshall Fund*), Alyson Bailes (*Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*), Fraser Cameron (*European Policy Centre*), Anoushivaran Ehteshami (Durham), Jolyon Howorth (Yale), Annika Bergman, Luker March et Chad Damro

(Edimbourg), Sean Molly (Glasgow) et Jim Wyllie (Aberdeen). Le livre peut lui-même être décrit comme le premier traitant de l'impact du *National Security Strategy* (NSS) américain (2002) et de la *Stratégie européenne de sécurité* (SES) de l'UE (2003) sur les relations transatlantiques. Ces nouvelles stratégies sont analysées comme tentatives de reconceptualiser la nature radicalement changeante de la sécurité internationale après le 11 septembre, et de redéfinir des doctrines adaptées à l'après-Guerre froide. Etudier celles-ci permet de percevoir les tensions transatlantiques, particulièrement pendant et après la guerre en Irak, tout en observant les points communs et les différences entre deux regards sur le monde.

Cet objectif a été atteint par un groupe de travail de l'UACES, qui s'est d'abord réuni à Edimbourg, en février 2005, puis à Bruxelles en septembre. Tous les contributeurs ont dû répondre à trois questions clés, en relation avec leurs sujets d'analyse: jusqu'à quel point les stratégies de sécurité américaine et européenne convergent ou divergent-elles? Quelles politiques tangibles peuvent être vues comme le résultat de ces nouvelles stratégies, particulièrement dans le secteur de la «guerre contre le terrorisme»? Quelles sont les implications des stratégies de sécurité américaine et européenne à l'égard de certaines régions spécifiques, surtout le Moyen Orient, la Russie et la Chine?

Voici réunies les principales conclusions de l'ouvrage:

Toutes les contributions considèrent que les NSS et SES ne sont pas en soi des documents stratégiques de premier ordre, mais de simples documents de travail. Ce sont donc avant tout des aspirations à être à la hauteur des défis lancés par un environnement international qui a incontestablement changé. Ces documents n'affectent cependant pas l'autonomie stratégique des décideurs des deux côtés: les deux stratégies de sécurité restent d'ailleurs différentes, même si toutes deux expriment des ambitions nouvelles. Les Américains essaient de renouer avec un passé où politique étrangère et stratégique et «destinée manifeste» sont étroitement liées; la SES, de son côté, a une ambition différente, première tentative de donner un sens concret à ce qu'un acteur international européen serait et quelle valeurs il pourrait défendre: inévitablement, cette tentative entraîne une certaine forme d'autonomisation vis-à-vis des Etats-Unis et de l'OTAN, à la base d'une identité européenne. En ce qui concerne les convergences et les divergences, l'ouvrage ne confirme pas la conception populaire que le fossé s'élargirait entre Europe et Amérique: un consensus général émerge même plutôt autour de l'idée que les deux ensembles convergeraient dans l'ambition clé d'une «diplomatie de transformation». Etats-Unis et Union européenne sont également présentés comme des modèles de stabilité, de liberté et de prospérité, ce qui renforce leur volonté de changer le monde à leur image. Il semble également y avoir convergence dans l'identification des principales menaces aux valeurs communes, ressenties comme telles par les deux parties prenantes. Autant le NSS que la SES identifient le terrorisme, la prolifération des armes de destruction massive, les conflits régionaux, et les Etats faibles comme des défis réclamant une solution urgente. Certes, le NSS use d'un ton très sceptique, alors que la SES se montre plus optimiste dans son évaluation des bénéfices de l'après-Guerre froide. Mais, en substance, les deux

documents se rejoignent pour dessiner le même monde extérieur et fournir la même stratégie de base.

Les divergences concernant les moyens et les instruments pour atteindre ces mêmes buts existent parallèlement: les Européens ont été particulièrement choqués par le ton jugé «néo-impérialiste» du NSS, ainsi que son triomphalisme; pour beaucoup d'Américains, la SES n'est pas satisfaisante, et signifie un échec de l'Europe, incapable d'aider une Amérique blessée. Le NSS se révèle être un document relativement réaliste, à la recherche de cette *balance of powers*, seule capable de favoriser la paix (issue signalée cinq fois dans le document) grâce à l'utilisation des moyens adéquats pour faire respecter et triompher une approche d'inspiration wilsonienne pour l'expansion de la liberté. Ainsi, le document appuie une prétention universaliste d'intégration socio-économique. Le modèle européen, lui, croit plus dans la persuasion que dans la coercition. Le temps peut cependant gommer les différences: le besoin de stabiliser l'Irak a fini par rassembler les points de vue, même évolution pour la Corée du Nord ou l'Iran concernant les armes de destruction massive.

L'avenir de ces deux documents est présenté de manière très prudente, voire négative. Les contributeurs sont d'accord pour démontrer les échecs des stratégies de sécurité américaine comme européenne dans de nombreux secteurs (Russie de Poutine, Chine, lutte contre Al Qaeda). De manière plus particulière, l'Irak a représenté beaucoup pour le NSS, mais l'échec semble patent: la rhétorique de liberté s'est concrètement transformée en renforcement de la domination chiite dans le pays, expansion de l'influence iranienne et peur croissante des régimes sunnites du Golfe à l'extérieur. Tout cela pourrait bloquer la transformation voulue de la région. De fait, l'avenir du NSS est largement lié aux évolutions ultérieures sur le terrain, et explique l'intransigeance de Washington en même temps que ses attentes. Pour la SES, le problème est différent, et repose d'abord sur sa nature et sa nouveauté: est-ce seulement une déclaration d'intention, des vœux pieux? C'est vrai que le NSS s'est frotté à l'Irak, alors que, de son côté, la SES a été compromise par les non français et néerlandais. Dans ces conditions, pourra-t-elle dépasser le simple dénominateur commun et se donner les moyens de l'action?

En conclusion, l'ouvrage nous rappelle que l'administration américaine a présenté un nouveau NSS en mars 2006, qui donne plus d'attention à l'égard des Etats forts tels que la Russie, la Chine, l'Iran ou l'Inde, de même qu'au lien transatlantique. La lecture des différentes contributions démontre cependant qu'Al Qaeda, la Chine, ou d'autres qui restent peut-être encore à déterminer, n'ont pas remplacé le rôle joué par la Russie pendant la Guerre froide dans le renforcement d'une politique transatlantique cohérente. Etats-Unis et Union européenne sont ainsi susceptibles d'avoir des vues et des priorités différentes, déterminées par leurs géographies, leurs cultures et leurs moyens, accentuant un fossé stratégique de plus en plus profond. Rien ne dit cependant que ce fossé peut faire des deux puissances des concurrents, comme le démontre le rapprochement qui a suivi la guerre en Irak. En ce sens, l'ouvrage se termine sur une note optimiste, considérant que les

relations transatlantiques reposent toujours sur un «lien», que les deux bords auraient intérêt à institutionnaliser dès aujourd'hui.

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Berthold RITTBERGER – *Building Europe's Parliament. Democratic Representation Beyond the Nation-State*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, 234 p. – ISBN 0-19-927342-1 (hb) – 54,00 £.

In recent years some political scientists have rediscovered and explored the history of European integration. Andrew Moravcsik first utilized historical case studies for his rational choice examination of the intergovernmental negotiation of “grand bargains”. In contrast, scholars adopting historical institutionalist and sociological institutionalist approaches to studying the European Union (EU) actually require historical depth. Historical institutionalists argue, in essence, that the creation and evolution of institutions over time creates “path-dependencies” for current and future constitutional and policy options. Sociological institutionalists contend that their historical experience influences the political behaviour of actors, as do their beliefs and values which evolve over time. Whereas these different competing institutionalist approaches are often based on rigid ontological and theoretical assumptions, Berthold Rittberger, in his study of delegation of powers to the European Parliament (EP), attempts to integrate them for explaining how this institution developed from a weak assembly to a co-legislator, with the Council, in many policy fields.

As a political scientist, Rittberger was puzzled to find that existing theories failed to explain the delegation of powers to the EP. Rational choice institutionalists like Mark Pollack at best admitted that their explanatory models did not cater for the increase in EP powers. After all, why should member-states give up powers to an institution that was not a “principal agent” and could not be easily controlled to guarantee policy outcomes in line with national preferences? To address this weakness in the existing political science literature, Rittberger has combined aspects of different “institutionalisms” with democratic theory. In a typical social science research design, his hypotheses outlined in two introductory chapters are tested in three case studies, the creation of the Common Assembly in the treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (1951), the delegation of limited budgetary powers to the EP in the Treaty of Luxembourg (1970) and the extension of the EP's powers in the Single European Act (1986) and the Maastricht Treaty (1992). The analysis is largely based on published documents and primary sources, literature, a few interviews and some archival sources.

Rittberger argues that two main reasons account for the delegation of powers to the EP. The first is the concern of national political elites with preserving democratic procedures established at the national level within the newly created supranational polity. In essence, powers become transferred to the supranational

level to enhance the member-states' problem-solving capacities (an argument in line with Alan Milward's historical approach). Decision-making in "Brussels" reduces the procedural legitimacy of decision-making, however, which requires compensatory constitutionalisation at the European level. Secondly, such legitimacy concerns become articulated in what Rittberger calls the "founding moments" of the creation of new supranational institutions or the deepening of integration in treaty revisions. He argues, in contrast to Moravcsik, for example, that procedural legitimacy concerns genuinely matter in processes of constitution-building, and that normative constraints influence the outcome of intergovernmental bargains. Diverging member-state preferences for tackling the procedural legitimacy deficit are primarily explained with different national traditions of democratic governance. Such preferences are not stable, however, and can be influenced by strategic rhetorical action to shape and define strategies for addressing the "democratic deficit". In this context, Rittberger draws on Frank Schimmelfennig's approach for explaining why France eventually agreed to the limited, but highly symbolic extension of EP powers in 1970, and countries like Britain and Sweden to the eventual extension of co-decision in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997).

From the perspective of a historian, Rittberger's study (originally submitted as a PhD thesis at Oxford University) suffers from a limited source base and utilization of recent historical literature typical of a social science research design. Substantially, its main weakness is arguably the treatment of states as cohesive actors with cohesive preferences, however. National political actors operated under the same national constitutional set-up, but neither experienced nor judged its merits in the same way. At the time of the Schuman Plan, this became blatantly clear in the Belgian constitutional crisis over the "King Question". Similarly, the German Christian-democrats and Social-democrats had strongly diverging preferences for the constitutional set-up of the Federal Republic between a federal state with a relatively weak centre (in Bonn) and the centralisation of competences (in Frankfurt) to facilitate economic planning. Yet, Rittberger largely ignores the fragmentation of domestic preferences for European-level constitutionalization. Moreover, competing national actors also set up and utilized multiple transnational networks to support their particular constitutional preferences. Their democratic legitimacy strategies were not limited to the inter-state forum of treaty negotiations and bargains, but extended to parliamentary and public debates. These strategies were also influenced by the EP itself, once it had come into being, which acted for a long time primarily as a promoter of enhancing its powers, developing its own rhetorical strategies to foster this overarching objective. Finally, the constitutional preferences of multiple, not just national state actors, evolved over long time-spans, something that the case study approach cannot capture well.

Nonetheless, Rittbergers's book raises crucial questions about the historical evolution of the current EU. Historians can learn a lot from the stringent analysis of the process of delegation, and what might have motivated it, and address similar issues in their archive-based studies. In fact, the EP has been too marginal to

contemporary historical research on the EU due to its limited formal powers until the Single European Act. The long debate about the Community's parliamentarization and the actual role of the EP in the political process, which appears to have been more important than the lack of formal powers would suggest, clearly deserve to be studied more in the future.

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Bertrand VAYSSIÈRE – *Vers une Europe fédérale? Les espoirs et les actions fédéralistes au sortir de la Seconde Guerre mondiale*, P.I.E.-Peter Lang, Bruxelles, 2006, 416 p. – ISBN 978-90-5201-353-4 – 34,90 / 38,40 €.

Fruit du texte remanié d'une thèse soutenue en 2000 à l'Université de Toulouse le Mirail – *Un groupe de pression européen: l'Union européenne des fédéralistes (1940-1956)* –, l'étude de Bertrand Vayssière est consacrée à ce mouvement européen qu'est l'UEF, tant d'un point de vue interne que dans l'horizon élargi de l'Europe et du monde. L'essence de cette organisation porte déjà en elle l'ouverture et enjambe les cadres nationaux. En effet, l'UEF, fondée en décembre 1946, se voit constituée *ab initio* de divers mouvements fédéralistes conçus sur une base nationale variée. Elle représente, de manière inédite, une plate-forme commune aux fédéralistes. L'étude que lui consacre Vayssière, en plus d'être une mine de renseignements sur le groupement lui-même, éclaire d'un jour nouveau les grands débats et espérances qui traversèrent le cheminement du projet européen.

La genèse de cette nouvelle génération d'europhiles – le deuxième conflit mondial et son milieu de la résistance – est d'abord envisagée. La guerre qui sévit est, pour les fédéralistes, la preuve de l'échec affligeant des États-nations. En plein conflit, des penseurs sont actifs, des mouvements sont formés, les fédéralistes multiplient activités et prises de position ('Manifeste de Ventotene', réunions europhiles en Suisse, 'Déclaration des résistances européennes', etc.). Forts d'une croyance qu'il sera possible, à la Libération, de tout changer, ils veulent, dans un esprit révolutionnaire, enrayer le cycle guerrier en assurant à l'Europe un avenir fédéral.

Au lendemain de la guerre, tous les espoirs sont permis en ce qui concerne le futur supranational de l'Europe. Dans cette effervescence, les 15 et 16 décembre 1946 voient la création de l'UEF au siège du mouvement *La Fédération* à Paris. Douze formations issues de sept pays jouent ainsi, malgré leur diversité, la carte de l'union.

L'optique demeure, à cette époque, révolutionnaire et, afin de lutter pour le renouveau, l'UEF se doit d'être pétrie de militantisme. La volonté d'un engagement véritablement actif, couplé de recrutements et de campagnes d'opinion, est l'une des résolutions par lesquelles les fédéralistes tiennent à se démarquer de leurs prédécesseurs. Ils reprochent aux projets europhiles de l'entre-deux-guerres leur inefficience; la conflagration de 1939-1945 en étant, à

leurs yeux, le témoin patent. Un foisonnement de critiques fleurit à l'encontre de ce qu'ils considèrent comme l'élitisme, le verbiage ou les 'réalisations internationales stériles' de leurs devanciers. Les espérances ou sentiments européens antérieurs doivent désormais être transformés en militantisme efficace.

Avec la naissance de l'UEF, les fédéralistes tentent de faire connaître leurs idées auprès des gouvernements et opinions. Durant cette nouvelle phase, les principaux congrès se tiennent – congrès qui, notons-le, occupent, d'une manière générale, une place fort importante dans l'ouvrage de Vayssière –, la période est à la découverte réciproque des divers mouvements, des personnalités s'affirment, avec pour corollaire certains différends idéologiques.

Cependant, malgré l'élan de la Libération et les aspirations qu'elle avait générées, les désillusions happeront rapidement les fédéralistes. Contrairement à leur croyance, le paysage politique n'est pas si ébranlé et les États-nations reprennent vie. De plus, la guerre froide va modifier complètement la donne mondiale et entraîner, dans son sillon, l'UEF vers d'inéluctables changements de cap. Le Fédéralisme se voit contraint de s'aligner sur l'un des deux 'grands'. Il abandonne, dès lors, son rêve d'État européen à l'échelle du vieux continent, comme celui d'Europe 'troisième force', pour se borner au cadre d'une Europe 'occidentale', alliée des États-Unis. Cependant, la menace que constitue le bloc de l'Est apporte de l'eau au moulin fédéraliste, ses représentants s'en servent, en effet, pour tenter d'unir les Européens, dans une réaction de défense. Ainsi, les visées révolutionnaires de l'époque de la résistance fondent pour se muer en un fédéralisme plus pragmatique.

L'ouvrage de Vayssière poursuit son parcours chronologique initié au cœur de la Seconde Guerre mondiale en traversant moult événements et réalisations d'importance, tel le Congrès de La Haye, en 1948, le changement de donne lié au plan Schuman, la mort de Staline, le combat de l'UEF pour la CED, ... pour l'achever à la fin de l'année 1956, année qui signe la scission de l'UEF.

Si la structure du livre suit un déroulement chronologique, les problématiques et questions transversales y sont privilégiées.

Une première ligne de force concerne le mouvement envisagé d'un point de vue interne. Son histoire propre, ses composantes, ses options doctrinales, les tensions qui le sous-tendent ..., sont des thématiques traitées au fil de l'ouvrage. Plate-forme commune, centre d'impulsion, l'UEF regroupe divers groupements fédéralistes sans les absorber. Ces derniers gardent une existence autonome, l'affiliation à l'UEF n'étant qu'une deuxième appartenance pour les adhérents des formations nationales. Le livre est, par conséquent, riche de renseignements quant à ces mouvements qui ont contribué à la fondation de l'UEF ou s'y sont joints par la suite: Movimento Federalista Europeo (le MFE créé pendant la guerre est, au niveau du fédéralisme européen, la branche la plus importante ne fût-ce qu'en termes d'activistes), Europa-Union, La Fédération, etc. La cohabitation entre ces formations éclatées ne sera pas toujours apaisée, il en va de même pour la relation entre les hommes qui les composent. Cette échelle individuelle est omniprésente dans l'ouvrage, en particulier, quant aux ténors de la cause fédéraliste: Altiero

Spinelli, Henri Brugmans, Alexandre Marc, Henri Frenay, ... dont les rapports furent, eux aussi, pour le moins houleux. Loin de constituer un bloc homogène, l'UEF doit donc faire face à des tensions internes récurrentes de multiples natures, les divergences en termes d'option doctrinale, comme la dissension entre fédéralistes 'intégraux' et 'constitutionnels', n'y sont pas étrangères.

L'échelle européenne est également très riche dans l'étude. Si le milieu fédéraliste pâtit de son hétérogénéité, il est aussi confronté aux autres tendances de la nébuleuse européenne, plus ou moins divergentes de sa propre ligne de conduite (p.ex., celle constituée par les unionistes). Bertrand Vayssière étudie les contacts existants et les étincelles qu'ils peuvent produire, comme au sein du Mouvement européen, dont l'UEF est l'un des six fondateurs.

La dernière échelle est internationale et l'auteur met en exergue combien elle conditionne l'action des fédéralistes et l'évolution du mouvement. La Seconde Guerre mondiale tout d'abord qui en est la matrice, la Guerre froide ensuite qui balayera les rêves d'une Europe 'troisième force', le rôle des États-Unis, les relations franco-allemandes, etc. sont des événements cruciaux pour comprendre l'histoire de l'UEF.

Enfin, l'ouvrage se clôt par des annexes exposant clairement une série de données fort intéressantes. Des tableaux récapitulatifs des organisations membres de l'UEF, classées par pays, apportent, lorsque les informations furent disponibles à l'auteur, des renseignements sur le nom du président du mouvement, le nombre de sections, d'adhérents et de parlementaires. Trois clichés (1947 – à partir de 1950 – 1956) se suivent chronologiquement, permettant de saisir l'évolution relative à ces données. Deux autres tableaux chronologiques concernent la presse fédéraliste avec les indications suivantes: titre de l'organe périodique, mouvement dont il est issu, périodicité et directeur. Ensuite, une chronologie de l'histoire de l'UEF expose les éléments les plus importants et fixe les cadres chronologiques. Un index, *in fine*, a été constitué fort utilement, vu l'abondance de personnalités, d'organisations, etc. citées tout au long du volume.

Structuré, clair, rigoureux et fourmillant d'informations, le livre de Bertrand Vayssière est indispensable à tout qui veut pénétrer le monde complexe et bigarré des fédéralistes de l'après-guerre, leurs relations avec l'europhisme et l'impact qu'a pu avoir l'échiquier européen et mondial sur le mouvement et sa doctrine.

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Guy VERHOFSTADT – *Les États-Unis d'Europe*, coll. Voix politiques, éditions Luc Pire, Bruxelles, 2006, 67 p. – ISBN 2-87415-609-4 – 11,00 €.

Le livre du Premier ministre belge se veut être un «manifeste», à même de relancer une Europe en mal de projet depuis l'échec du TCE lors des référendums français et néerlandais. Conscient de l'affaiblissement de l'Europe face à des concurrents

confirmés (Etats-Unis), et d'autres émergents (Chine, Inde), «l'ergotage» ne lui paraît plus un luxe que l'on peut s'offrir. C'est dire que ce court essai ne s'embarrasse pas de fioritures: la solution fédéraliste s'impose au fil des pages, autour d'un projet qui soit à nouveau commun (une «stratégie socio-économique communautaire»). Certains axes forts doivent être suivis dans le sens de «l'intégration», tels que la justice ou la politique étrangère, quitte à accepter pour de bon la thèse des «cercles concentriques», la partie de l'Europe prête à aller jusqu'au bout du processus existant déjà aux yeux de l'homme politique, correspondant à l'actuelle «zone euro».

Le thème de la crise européenne, si à la mode depuis un an, est repris ici par l'auteur, mais analysé assez froidement (c'est tout le mérite de Verhofstadt de laisser de côté les effets oratoires qu'il a pu un temps utiliser dans ses campagnes): que faire d'une Europe qui ne passionne plus les jeunes, qui n'apporte pas de réponse aux inquiétudes quotidiennes de la population? Il faut par conséquent se pencher sur les raisons de l'échec pour corriger une trajectoire de plus en plus faussée. En effet, il serait abusif, voire démagogique ou politiquement intéressé, de croire que les Européens ne veulent plus d'Europe ... C'est vrai dans un sens, mais l'interprétation de l'auteur est ici prise en défaut: d'après lui, le soutien indéfectible de l'opinion à l'idée européenne est prouvée par l'Eurobaromètre, et le principal défaut que les votants ont trouvé au projet de TCE est qu'il respire trop le compromis (p.14 ; autre simplification, qui a trait à l'histoire : la CED aurait été rejetée en France «sous l'influence [du seul] Charles de Gaulle», p.24)! Plus sensée est la démarche suivie par Verhofstadt pour comprendre les ressorts du non, et elle aboutit à une réponse moins simpliste que la précédente: l'angoisse et le doute ont une forte part dans ce rejet d'une Europe qui ne paraît plus être qu'un avatar, ou un fourrier de la mondialisation. Cet état atteint les couches les plus profondes de l'individu ainsi mis en danger, qui ont trait à l'identité. Dans ce constat, on peut dire que l'auteur fait preuve de courage, reconnaissant (et il s'agit d'un fédéraliste convaincu) que l'Europe ne peut pas exister, ou être comprise, en focalisant son action sur la seule réglementation. En ce sens, toute accélération ne peut provoquer qu'un décrochage, ce que l'ouverture des négociations avec la Turquie a confirmé.

Dès lors, l'Europe ne pouvant se surimposer, elle devra changer de projet et de philosophie, et accepter de faire certains choix. De toute manière, c'est vrai que l'évolution récente de l'Europe, multipliant les régimes d'exception, démontre que le projet est de plus en plus optionnel, ce qui dans l'immédiat traduit un affaiblissement de la notion de coopération européenne. Constat d'importance: l'Europe repose sur un déficit d'image, savamment entretenu par certains hommes politiques (l'auteur n'insiste hélas pas assez sur ce point, où aucun exemple, même tiré d'un lointain passé, ne vient étayer ses propos), qui encouragent les opinions à se retourner contre l'hydre bruxelloise. Tout cela entraîne une inertie générale dont Verhofstadt, en tant qu'acteur, a été récemment témoin: l'échec retentissant du Conseil européen de juin 2005, le détricotage du Pacte de croissance et de stabilité, tout va dans le sens d'une indiscipline, sourdement encouragée par un devoir de résistance ou de désobéissance à une Europe présentée comme liberticide ou

gaspilleuse. Or, le message du Premier ministre est positif: le premier devoir, qu'il signale dans son manifeste, est de dire la vérité, rappelant que l'Europe n'a jamais été, et n'est pas, un simple projet de libre-échange. Les exemples concrets de la PESC et de l'euro sont intellectuellement cohérents, mais rencontrent-ils la sympathie ou le soutien des Européens? Voilà une autre question à laquelle le manifeste ne s'embarrasse pas de répondre. De même, l'auteur ne pose-t-il pas les bases d'un débat biaisé en appuyant sur un parallèle «frappant» entre Etats-Unis et Union européenne (p.35; allusion maladroite prolongée par l'idée que le modèle américain «nous indique clairement la voie à suivre en Europe», p.40)? En tout cas, le basculement des premiers vers une formule entièrement fédérale, qui date de 1929 et des effets de la crise, a fort peu de chances de se reproduire pour l'UE, dans la mesure où la crise qu'elle expérimente depuis une dizaine d'années n'est pas strictement parallèle: elle est beaucoup plus politique, et pas aussi foudroyante que l'autre.

Cela dit, l'auteur continue sa diatribe contre la démagogie politique, n'hésitant pas à donner ici des exemples plus précis de ce qu'il ne faut pas faire (l'idée de directoire de Nicolas Sarkozy, de retour à la lire de la part de Roberto Maroni). Le but de la manœuvre est désormais d'allier le projet et l'efficacité, ce qui sous-entend un véritable partage des pouvoirs, idée qui rompt ici clairement avec l'euro-optimisme béat, et qui surprend même par sa précision: pour Verhofstadt, culture, sport, soins de santé, sécurité sociale, enseignement, gestion des services publics et appareil judiciaire doivent rester du ressort des Etats! Voilà qui est osé et rompt avec le politiquement correct européen, même si on peut révéler certaines contradictions dans le discours de l'homme politique belge (comment respecter une justice vraiment nationale quand on exprime le vœu qu'Eurojust devienne au plus vite une réalité, comme le dit Verhofstadt plus haut?). Toujours est-il que l'auteur propose cinq missions à la «nouvelle Europe»: mise en place d'une politique économique et sociale communautaire, avec un pilotage politique assuré par un «cabinet socio-économique européen», l'adoption d'un code de convergence tenant en compte les besoins et les réalités spécifiques à chaque Etat et une réforme des régimes fiscaux dans l'optique d'une meilleure compétitivité à l'échelle mondiale; politique technologique ambitieuse qui passe par un relèvement de la R&D (Verhofstadt propose que le budget consacré soit le deuxième poste européen après l'agriculture) et l'adoption d'un véritable brevet européen (l'auteur confesse en passant le semi-échec de la stratégie de Lisbonne); création d'un véritable espace européen de justice et de sécurité, de manière à englober la lutte contre la criminalité (peut-être trop largement attribuée à l'Europe de l'Est) et le terrorisme en passant par une concentration des forces, qui ne nécessiterait pas la création d'un service européen de plus, mais permettrait la rencontre et le travail en commun d'acteurs compétents de chaque pays; création d'une diplomatie européenne, avec un ministre européen des Affaires étrangères ayant un réel pouvoir, un service diplomatique européen et un seul siège au Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies; création d'une armée européenne, ce en quoi le ministre reprend un sujet qui lui est cher et où la Belgique, avec d'autres pays, a toujours été

à la pointe face à une résistance par ailleurs signalée (voir le « pétard mouillée » que fut la proposition de créer un quartier général européen en 2003). Pour cela, l'Europe doit avoir les moyens de ses ambitions, et jouir d'une véritable autonomie budgétaire, qui ne passe pas par les cotisations nationales basées sur le PNB (en passant, l'auteur rappelle l'anomalie de certaines « ristournes historiques », qu'il semble vouloir remettre en cause).

Pour améliorer la visibilité de l'Europe, Verhofstadt propose également de repenser les institutions, en commençant par changer leur nom (exemples de la Commission ou du Haut représentant de la PESC) et à redéfinir leurs fonctions. Louable intention, mais qui fait oublier à Verhofstadt que les trois pouvoirs traditionnels de la théorie de la séparation propre à chaque Etat n'existent pas en tant que tels à l'échelle européenne (d'où la difficulté de « veiller à ce que chacun des trois pouvoirs démocratiques reçoive les compétences et les missions que l'on attend d'eux », p.64). Il y a donc un travail important à réaliser afin de parvenir à ce qu'il propose : un gouvernement européen d'un côté, un système bicaméral de l'autre!

Plus réaliste est la suite de son discours, où l'auteur semble tirer les conséquences des dernières campagnes, désastreuses pour l'UE. L'idée dominante est que l'Europe à 25 n'est pas possible à réaliser en l'état, d'où l'importance de reconnaître qu'il existe un « noyau dur européen » (p.66) correspondant précisément à la zone euro. Peut-on rappeler à Verhofstadt qu'il déplore lui-même le fait que certains des membres de cette zone, et pas des moins influents, se signalent par leur manque d'empressement à respecter les règles européennes édictées par eux et pour eux? Ne risque-t-on pas d'avoir du mal à obtenir ce « noyau politique » qu'il espère?

Au final, le manifeste de Verhofstadt nécessite une relecture, qui expurge totalement le reste d'idéalisme européiste du texte dont l'auteur s'est employé à décrire la nocivité. Son projet peut-il, comme il l'espère, séduire les jeunes générations? Il n'est pas certain que ces dernières soient à la recherche d'une rationalité politique qui concernerait plutôt le monde de la pratique politique communautaire *stricto sensu* (clarification des missions, lutte contre les doubles emplois, etc.). Il semble que Verhofstadt n'ait tout simplement pas répondu à ce qu'il a justement posé au départ de son exercice : l'angoisse et le doute sont deux maux qui sont corrosifs et plus à l'œuvre dans la mise en place de nombreux fantasmes anti-européens que l'absence de clarté politique que l'on peut reprocher à l'UE. On ne voit pas en quoi les mesures préconisées peuvent répondre à ce que les Européens expriment, en l'occurrence la recherche d'un refuge, qui effectivement pourrait être joué par l'UE, mais certainement pas dans les conditions actuelles. Il est évident qu'un référendum européen est une bonne idée pour répondre à une question aussi essentielle que l'adoption ou non d'une constitution européenne ..., mais il faudrait d'abord savoir, avant d'organiser un tel événement, si chacun des Européens est prêt, au préalable, à renoncer à un paysage politique qui lui est bien plus familier. En d'autres termes, le but ici préconisé ne consiste-t-il pas à *substituer* plus qu'à construire quelque chose de vraiment neuf?

Pourquoi un gouvernement européen, créé du jour au lendemain, serait-il forcément légitime? Même question pour un parlement ayant de réels pouvoirs? Tant que l'on ne tiendra pas compte que l'idée de souveraineté ne se décrète pas, mais qu'elle repose sur une lente acceptation où sympathie et devoir d'obéissance sont étroitement mêlés, on continuera à contourner le problème européen face aux nations. La veine hugolienne signalée au début de l'ouvrage est peut-être désormais archaïque, si belle soit-elle, comme toute utopie qui a épuisé tous ses charmes face à une réalité tenace. Peut-être désormais devra-t-on abaisser les objectifs, et réclamer la formule modeste, mais plus accessible, des «Etats-nations unis de l'Europe»?

On doit tout de même retenir de cet ouvrage la courageuse entreprise du Premier ministre belge, seul homme politique de premier plan à avoir reconnu l'absence de sens de la démarche constitutionnelle proposée en 2005. Cette rupture avec l'«eurospeak» est déjà un premier pas, qui devra être suivi par d'autres, si l'on veut éviter que la vie politique européenne ne se situe que dans l'ordre virtuel.

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Marie-Thérèse BITSCH, Wilfried LOTH, Charles BARTHEL (dir.), *Cultures politiques, opinions publiques et intégration européenne*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2007, 477 p. – ISBN 978-2-8027-2373-8 – 65,00 €.

Fruit d'un colloque organisé à Luxembourg du 15 au 17 juin 2005, qui ne pouvait pas trouver mieux comme thème 15 jours après le double «non» franco-néerlandais au traité de constitution européenne (même si le colloque était programmé depuis de longs mois). A partir d'une multitude de cas, présentés par une variété de chercheurs très large, l'occasion était belle de se pencher sur cet éventuel «vouloir-vivre» européen, après lequel toutes les sciences humaines sont à la recherche. A l'heure où le «déficit démocratique» reproché à l'Europe débouche une nouvelle fois sur une sanction par l'opinion, que peut-on dire des sensibilités des différents peuples face à la construction européenne? Celles-ci semblent faites d'invariants, d'origine nationale, qui influent sur l'image de l'Europe, comme c'est le cas de la vision française, étudiée au niveau des dirigeants (Gérard Bossuat): des facteurs conjoncturels jouent, comme la guerre froide, mais également le désir de s'aider de l'Europe pour recouvrer une puissance peu ménagée par la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Cette vision, qui rapproche la IV^e République de de Gaulle, continue sur un mode moins «lyrique» à partir de Pompidou, tout en évitant la question du cadre politique (intergouvernemental ou fédéral?), qui rebondit sans réponse jusqu'à nos jours.

Autre cas, celui de l'Autriche (Michael Gehler). Dans ce pays, le rêve impérial s'est dissous depuis longtemps, ce que montrent les sondages, où l'opinion s'avoue peu concernée par la politique extérieure. Après la demande d'adhésion (17 juillet 1989), certaines réticences se font jour, dans un pays qui, de par sa situation

géographique et historique, a une sensibilité beaucoup plus forte aux événements se produisant à l'Est. Le référendum d'approbation, en 1994, est largement en faveur du «oui», mais un «oui» qui n'est pas fait que de bonnes raisons (l'auteur parle de «fuite en avant»).

Wolf D. Gruner s'interroge sur les résonances du débat fédéraliste chez les Allemands depuis la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale: ce dernier passe par le compromis de la Loi fondamentale de 1949, dont le préambule exprime le vœu d'une Europe unie. Ce débat a également des conséquences intérieures, qui met en œuvre, au quotidien, une collaboration étroite entre l'Etat fédéral et les Länder en matière de politique européenne. Ainsi, l'histoire récente démontre une certaine constance des Allemands, qui ont toujours été en faveur de solutions fédérales appliquées à l'Europe.

En ce qui concerne le Danemark et l'Europe (Sebastian Lang-Jensen), l'étude de la gauche de ce pays donne de curieux résultats. Au départ, la CEE est vue comme un instrument de l'Allemagne en particulier et du capitalisme en général, comprenant des pays qui ne partagent pas les «valeurs» des Danois. En conséquence, la gauche adopte une rhétorique indépendantiste, tout en appuyant les tentatives de créer une union entre pays nordiques, plus axée sur le consensus que sur l'intégration, mais qui toutes échouent. Sans surprise, la gauche se montre hostile lors du référendum de 1972. Depuis, nombreux de ses membres ont changé leurs points de vue, et c'est maintenant plutôt la droite qui est crispée sur la défense de l'identité danoise.

Alexander Reinfeldt étudie le cas de la Grande-Bretagne, où l'opinion n'a pas été aussi hostile que l'on peut penser. Celle-ci est plutôt versatile, partagée entre les sirènes du gouvernement britannique et celles de la Commission européenne (pour sa part, la CECA a installé un bureau à Londres dès 1956). Cela dit, la communication est plutôt à destination des élites de la part de cette dernière; quant au gouvernement britannique, il a tendance à ne pas adopter une politique constante d'information, utilisant l'opinion comme moyen de pression auprès de l'Europe.

Comment l'opinion publique se comporte-t-elle face aux élargissements? Pour l'opinion française (Anne Dulphy et Christine Manigand), ces derniers ont toujours posé problème. Molle et suiviste en 1972, l'opinion publique s'est montrée très rétive en ce qui concerne l'entrée des pays du Sud; l'hostilité est carrément déclarée à propos du dernier élargissement. Dans les mentalités, il existe une limite économique (et au fond culturelle) qu'il est difficile de franchir; de même, l'euroscepticisme est devenu plus fort à la fin des années 80, avec pour sommet le 29 mai 2005. Les auteurs appuient d'ailleurs sur le manque de prise en compte par les élites de cette hostilité «annoncée».

Jürgen Elvert étudie plus généralement les différents referenda qui ont mis aux prises les opinions avec la question des élargissements. Différents sentiments s'expriment ainsi dans les pays qui accèdent: en Grande-Bretagne, l'argument est principalement économique, mais témoigne également de la peur de s'isoler, et de

l'espoir que le pays prendra les commandes. Dans les autres pays étudiés, c'est le seul point de vue économique qui semble primordial.

Le «sentiment européen» n'apparaît pas vraiment dans tous les cas considérés, où la dimension politique est quasiment absente. Le cas polonais (Wojciech Prazuch) démontre un enthousiasme très fort de départ, même si le manque d'informations est patent. Au sein même de l'opinion, les différences sociales sont très fortes. Cela dit, le soutien à l'intégration n'empêche pas un certain pessimisme et la peur de se retrouver en «seconde classe». Pour la Hongrie (Balázs Hidvéghi), un retour à l'histoire rappelle que ce pays a depuis longtemps choisi la voie de l'occidentalisation (le fameux «dernier bastion de l'Ouest»). Cependant, même s'il est le premier à intégrer les structures internationales dès les années 80, le rapprochement avec l'UE perd de son charme à mesure que l'entrée se fait attendre, la population passant par des phases d'enthousiasme et d'apathie.

Le débat à propos de la Turquie (Jürgen Nielsen-Sikora) souligne l'image très négative et stéréotypée que les Européens ont des ressortissants de ce pays. Quelles qu'en soient les conséquences, cette controverse représente pourtant un moyen pour l'Europe de se déterminer elle-même et de définir ses limites, réelles ou imaginaires.

Peut-on parler de corrélation entre les opinions publiques et la vie politique européenne? Jan-Henrik Meyer tente de définir ce qu'est une sphère publique européenne à partir de la réception du sommet de La Haye en 1969. Pour cela, il étudie six journaux allemands, français et anglais qui relatent les événements et décrivent les acteurs de ce sommet. Les visions de Georges Pompidou et de Willy Brandt sont contrastées, de même que les différentes politiques évoquées: la PAC est ressentie comme une exigence française, la Commission comme un organe technocratique mais indépendant, alors que la nécessité d'un progrès démocratique à l'échelle européenne est signalé par tous.

Comment les élites font-elles passer le message européen? L'Europe défendue par Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, étudiée par Michèle Weinachter, varie entre une vision «d'en-haut» (domaine réservé, politique «entre experts») qui peut rencontrer l'incompréhension du public, et une pédagogie plus fine (phase d'écoute de la Convention sur l'avenir de l'Europe), surtout à partir de 1989, où l'ancien président assume une vision très fédéraliste de l'Europe.

Birte Wassenberg étudie la campagne pour les élections européennes de 1979 en France et en Allemagne. Dans ce dernier pays, l'intégration européenne n'est pas l'objet de querelles, ce qui aboutit à un exercice politique consensuel, où prime l'intérêt national (Otto von Habsburg est le seul à surnager); du côté français, les querelles sont nombreuses, notamment à cause du problème de la supranationalité, et du retour du vieux démon allemand (Jacques Chirac, Michel Debré et leur liste «Défense des intérêts de la France en Europe»). Au final, l'auteur juge le «test assez décevant» dans les deux cas.

Vincent Dujardin prend le pouls de l'opinion belge, de la Libération jusqu'à 1979. Le pays, qui a abandonné depuis lors la neutralité, se montre dans l'ensemble favorable à l'intégration, mais sans bien connaître les différentes institutions, de

même que tous les plans «européens» qui se succèdent. Le Marché commun paraît «très utile», mais on ne sait pas très bien avec qui on le fait. L'auteur fait le constat d'une dégradation, qui touche également la classe politique, que freine à peine la campagne de 1979.

Philippe Poirier, enfin, s'intéresse aux mouvements opposés à la «méthode communautaire». Les principales forces politiques présentes au Parlement européen n'ont pas de problèmes avec celle-ci. Parallèlement, les notions d'euroscpticisme et de souverainisme font une entrée remarquée dans le vocabulaire et les sensibilités politiques des différents pays membres de l'UE. La première peut être conservatrice ou extrémiste, la seconde est d'inspiration néo-gaulliste, mais a été récupérée par les libéraux (Margaret Thatcher), sans compter les mouvements régionalistes (FPÖ, Lega). Dans tout les cas de figure, ces ferments d'opposition font désormais partie intégrante du paysage politique européen, comme l'ont montré les différentes campagnes référendaires et leurs résultats négatifs.

Quelle est la part du facteur européen dans la culture des milieux sociaux? L'étude des syndicats français par Sylvain Schirmann montre des tendances lourdes et une évolution éclairée par l'histoire. Ces syndicats se sont montrés plutôt en faveur d'une législation sociale européenne, et d'un Parlement européen avancé. Cela dit, on ne peut pas parler de convergences entre les syndicats étudiés (CGT, FO, CFDT), qui ne se retrouvent que dans la critique de l'architecture institutionnelle.

Brigitte Leucht examine la politique de concurrence mise en place en Europe dans la foulée de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Cette dernière a un sens depuis longtemps aux Etats-Unis, mais il a fallu l'imposer à des sociétés européennes réticentes, notamment à travers les autorités d'occupation et le Plan Marshall, que ce soit par la décartellisation en Allemagne ou l'accueil aux Etats-Unis d'experts et d'hommes politiques (parmi eux, Walter Hallstein). La CECA a été un moyen (articles 65 et 66) au service d'un véritable combat culturel.

Nigalé Bagayoko compare les opinions exprimées par les militaires français en poste au sein de l'UE et celles d'officiers n'ayant pas ces liens avec les institutions européennes. La différence est flagrante, se traduisant par une confiance plus large au sein du premier groupe, ainsi que plus de réalisme à l'égard de l'OTAN. A leur propos, l'auteur parle d'«immersion institutionnelle» et de «conversion».

Autre milieu, celui de l'administration européenne étudié par Katja Seidel. Le problème du recrutement est jugé si important qu'Hallstein lui-même le prend en charge. Les difficultés de départ (1958-1962) sont évoquées: il s'agit de constituer une administration indépendante, tout en subissant les pressions des Etats. L'auteur parle d'un véritable «esprit de corps» à propos des fonctionnaires A des Directions Générales (DG) concurrence et agriculture, eux-même aiguillonnés par le souvenir de la guerre, la sensation d'être des «pionniers» et l'effet d'entraînement des commissaires charismatiques à la tête de ces deux DG.

L'ouvrage se termine sur le thème de la transmission de l'idée européenne et de l'émergence d'une identité européenne. Luc Blanchart étudie l'enseignement de l'Europe

en Belgique, et parallèlement le sentiment identitaire des Belges. Les résultats sont différents d'une communauté à l'autre, mais le constat est sans appel pour l'ensemble du système et de ses acteurs: l'enseignement de l'Europe est trop tardif, trop peu axé sur le politique, et démontre un manque d'intérêt et d'audace de la part des enseignants.

L'étude de courts-métrages et de films documentaires pendant les années 50 par Gabriele Clemens démonte les rouages d'un travail de relations publiques à la recherche d'un public transnational. Les donateurs d'ordre de ces films sont essentiellement américains, par le biais du Plan Marshall (plus de 200 entre 1948 et 1953), mais ils peuvent également être issus de mouvements militants (exemple du Banquet des Fraudeurs de l'Europa-Union) et de la CECA. Ces films insistent tous sur le thème de la guerre comme expérience commune, attribuant, parfois lourdement, une «faute originelle» aux différentes nations. L'Europe culturelle ne joue dans l'ensemble qu'un rôle secondaire: il s'agit d'une Europe de la prospérité, floue politiquement.

Enfin, l'étude du patriotisme constitutionnel par Muriel Rambour rappelle l'origine proprement allemande du terme (Dolf Sternberger). Ce dernier insiste sur la dimension démocratique qui entoure une définition très politique de l'Europe, un peu à l'image des déclarations de Copenhague de 1973 ou de 1993. Qu'en est-il de la part affective propre à tout attachement «patriotique»? Peut-on être d'accord avec la position de Habermas et de Derrida qui estiment que la position des Européens sur l'Irak correspond à un nouveau départ pour l'idée d'appartenance politique qui devrait les rassembler? Le débat reste ouvert, mais, depuis peu, on peut dire qu'il s'est plutôt focalisé sur la défense des identités nationales face à la dilution «orchestrée» par l'UE.

Ainsi donc, la politisation de l'Europe et l'eupéanisation du politique ne sont pas des faits démontrables, relevant plus, dans l'immédiat, d'intentions ou d'expériences à caractère limité, que d'un processus général en cours. C'est le mérite de cet ouvrage de vérifier que la discussion est ouverte à tous, partout en Europe, et qu'elle permet de revisiter certaines certitudes. Nous ne sommes plus à l'heure des tabous et des «théologies européennes», car, pour reprendre Denis de Rougemont (Robert Frank), «l'Europe n'est plus une question de vie ou de mort». Même si ce constat peut soulever une part d'inquiétude, il doit nous rappeler que jamais les Européens ne se sont interdits les voies du recommencement qu'offre tout débat ouvert, surtout en ce qui concerne un projet qui doit rester collectif.

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Michel DUMOULIN (dir.) – *La Commission européenne, 1958-1972. Histoire et mémoires d'une institution*, Office des publications officielles des Communautés européennes, Luxembourg, 2007, 642 p. – ISBN 978-92-79-05495-2 – 30,00 €.

Une institution peut-elle avoir une mémoire? Qui plus est une institution elle-même issue du néant, et «qui [doit] inventer [sa] route au fur et à mesure qu'[elle avance]»? La Commission européenne est une création des Traités de Rome, où la négociation l'a emporté sur l'enthousiasme, et où la prudence a primé sur l'audace.

Le résultat est curieux: de nombreux objectifs, mais aussi une multitude de garde-fous. Face aux Etats qui ont démontré à cette occasion leur «obstination» à vivre, un organe est créé, qui n'aura pas les coudées franches de la Haute Autorité de la CECA, mais qui a la possibilité de représenter un «intérêt commun», qu'il reste à définir et à défendre.

Comment cet organe nouveau va-t-il se comporter? Quelles vont être les réussites et les handicaps, politique par politique? Ce sont ces questions que compte aborder ce passionnant ouvrage, qui applique pour la première fois à une institution européenne ce qui a déjà été fait par ailleurs auprès d'autres collectivités de nature politique: la collecte de témoignages, afin de faire connaître le système de l'intérieur. Qui sont les témoins? De vrais «Européens»? Ce terme-là ne signifie pas grand-chose, du moins au départ. Des pionniers? Le vocable paraît plus juste, et légitime le travail entrepris par la multitude d'historiens de toutes nationalités qui ont œuvré sous la direction du professeur Michel Dumoulin, avec le soutien de la Commission Prodi. Cette entreprise a un intérêt historique immédiat: simple question de générations, les premiers acteurs de la CEE sont aujourd'hui décédés ou bien à la retraite. Ceux qui ont été retenus pour cette étude (120 anciens fonctionnaires au total), dont les témoignages ont été collectés pendant trois années, ont occupé différents postes, plus ou moins exposés, pendant une période cruciale, celle des Six (1958-1972). Pourquoi ce temps-là? Il ne faut pas chercher au-delà des explications fournies en début d'ouvrage et que nous avons déjà explicitées: *fugit tempus*! La recherche n'en est pas moins favorisée par ce travail original: le témoignage oral est une source de choix, surtout pour une histoire qui cherche à dépasser le cadre parfois trop asséché de l'institutionnel (signalons que ces sources vont elles-mêmes être déposées aux archives de Florence). Simple question de sauver un «patrimoine» (p.36) d'un nouveau genre? Cette histoire des «premiers temps», des audaces bientôt balayées par la geste gaullienne, puis par le premier élargissement, ne relève-t-elle pas également de la nostalgie?

Plusieurs articles insistent, à l'appui des témoignages, sur le joyeux désordre de départ, à une époque où la Commission n'a même pas de siège fixe. Joyeux en apparence: dès l'origine, la lutte est à couteaux tirés entre cet «exécutif» de l'Europe venu de nulle part, et les différentes chancelleries des Six, qui verraient d'un bon œil la mise au pas de la Commission par le Coreper, né simultanément. Pourtant, les objectifs affichés sont ambitieux, élastiques grâce à ce «traité-cadre» qu'est celui de Rome: suppression de toutes les entraves au marché intérieur, nouvelle politique de développement agricole, politique commerciale commune, politique de la concurrence, politique d'aide aux pays en voie de développement. Autant dire que la Commission est dès le départ un creuset où s'entrecroisent les idéaux et les expériences des différents acteurs, sur des dossiers avec lesquels tout le monde, suivant sa propre histoire, n'est pas forcément familier. S'il est difficile de parler d'une «culture politique» spécifique, les différents articles permettent d'évoquer page après page un laboratoire en perpétuelle ébullition. On doit également écarter l'accusation de technocratie qui est si vite lancée contre ces pionniers de l'aventure communautaire (et leurs successeurs), les ravalant au

simple rôle d'exécutants sans âme d'une politique commerciale et libérale, ou (c'est plus révélateur) d'«empêcheurs de tourner en rond». Dès le départ, le ton est donné, en particulier par le premier président, Walter Hallstein: derrière la technicité, derrière l'économie, il y a un projet d'ensemble, encore ténu et qu'il n'est d'ailleurs pas de bon ton d'évoquer encore à haute voix, celui d'inventer une nouvelle société, plus grande et plus juste, une société qui ne retient pas de l'Europe que l'idée d'harmonisation et de productivisme, mais également ses valeurs et son humanisme. Hallstein croit en la force motrice du développement, et la Commission doit être le dépositaire de cette «logique matérielle».

L'ouvrage est lui-même partagé en deux parties. La première s'intéresse plus particulièrement aux acteurs et à la difficile naissance de la Commission, dans un contexte où toutes les menaces n'ont pas été levées: propositions du comité Maudling, démissions successives des président et vice président de la Haute Autorité, bientôt l'arrivée de Charles de Gaulle au pouvoir. Après les travaux du Comité intérimaire (qui devient le Coreper), la Commission peut voir le jour, et son président désigné le 7 janvier 1958: ce sera l'Allemand Walter Hallstein. Cet homme a une haute idée de ce que doit être l'intérêt général de la CEE, et s'emploiera à le défendre avec une équipe restreinte de neuf commissaires. Il est vrai que le traité donne à la Commission un rôle capital, qui est celui d'être le «moteur de l'intégration» (capacités d'initiative, d'exécution et «gardienne des traités»). Cela ne suffit pas, étant donné la mauvaise volonté d'Etats qui se sentent dessaisis de politiques essentielles: une guérilla oppose le plus souvent les membres de la Commission aux administrations nationales. Très conscient de son rôle et souhaitant le faire savoir, Hallstein met en œuvre un protocole communautaire qui fait bouillir de rage le général de Gaulle (qui saura s'en rappeler). La crise de la chaise vide elle-même est l'occasion de voir s'affronter les deux hommes. Sa résolution, qui passe par la rencontre des 28 et 29 janvier, à Luxembourg, débouche sur le trop fameux «compromis», texte extra-judiciaire qui est d'abord une délibération formelle non faite pour entrer dans les traités, un «accord sur le désaccord» pour reprendre les termes de Walter Hallstein. Elle annonce une coupure dans la jeune histoire européenne à tous les points de vue, le triomphe de l'intergouvernementalité et, comme conséquence immédiate, la défaite de la pensée européenne de Hallstein, remplacé par Jean Rey en 1967, qui n'aura jamais l'étoffe et la marge de manœuvre de son prédécesseur. C'est le début d'une semi-paralyse de l'intégration européenne, mais également la vérification que, malgré sa rhétorique sur la souveraineté, la France ne pouvait se passer de l'Europe.

Certes, on a quitté l'époque des approches «théologiques» (Raymond Barre) de la question européenne, pour s'atteler à des tâches plus terre à terre, avec une institution qui s'est agrandie suite à la fusion des exécutifs (en passant, on se rend compte sans surprise que la Commission de la CEE est la grande gagnante de cette opération, surtout par rapport à l'Euratom). Ces tâches ont été accomplies par des hommes, que certains chapitres nous font mieux connaître, notamment à l'aide des témoignages toujours judicieusement utilisés: Jean Rey, Franco Maria Malfatti, le

président-«météore», le commissaire Sicco Mansholt, très présent dans le paysage bruxellois, par son activisme, ses coups d'humeur et sa longévité, le secrétaire exécutif puis général de la CEE Emile Noël, le «dixième membre de la Commission», sans parler du «onzième», le directeur du service juridique commun, Michel Gaudet. A travers ces deux derniers, ce sont les membres anonymes mais récurrents des appareils bruxellois qui nous sont mieux présentés, leurs évolutions, leurs convictions (car l'étude, chapitre après chapitre, démontre que l'engagement n'est pas vain chez ces premiers fonctionnaires): directeurs généraux ou assistants, l'organigramme (si surveillé par Hallstein) répartit les tâches, ayant toute son importance dans la conduite que s'est imposée la Commission pendant toute cette décennie. Ce corps des fonctionnaires européens, on le découvre encore un peu mieux dans des chapitres consacrés à leur installation à Bruxelles: prises de fonction, rencontres et socialisation, motivations, scolarisation des enfants, bref, l'aspect humain de ces acteurs d'un nouveau genre et de tous horizons, dans un lieu qui très rapidement se prête au jeu et se coule parfaitement dans le rôle de capitale «européenne» (même si la question officielle du siècle mettra du temps à être réglée).

Les politiques sont traitées les unes après les autres dans une seconde partie, avec leurs succès et leurs échecs. L'importance de la notion de marché commun est rappelée d'emblée, comme étant le socle du projet communautaire, et se présentant comme la raison de vivre et d'agir de la Commission (élimination des contingents et des droits de douane, élaboration d'un tarif extérieur commun). Le succès est tel que le calendrier arrêté au départ est finalement anticipé. En ce qui concerne la politique de la concurrence (inédiée pour la plupart des pays européens), il s'agit de surveiller des habitudes qui ont été trop fréquentes dans le passé, notamment les ententes ou les aides d'Etat. Parallèlement, le phénomène de concentration est encouragé du moment qu'il est européen: pas facile à l'époque où chaque Etat veut mettre sur pied ses propres «champions nationaux». Les péripéties de la PAC sont mises en avant, rappelant l'importance de la conférence de Stresa, où Mansholt a su jouer un rôle positif dans un véritable bouillon de culture d'où naîtront peu à peu les règles de la première politique communautaire. En ce qui concerne les relations extérieures, la Commission commence à se faire connaître, notamment par le biais des négociations commerciales, et des représentations, pas toujours bien vues par les Etats, qu'elle ouvre un peu partout dans le monde; le même mode d'affirmation peut être signalée, en fin de période, la question de l'élargissement.

Intéressant également de noter les différences qui peuvent exister de pays à pays en ce qui concerne l'aide aux pays en développement, le passé colonial de certains des Etats membres jouant ici un rôle considérable. On peut aussi observer les tentatives d'une politique économique et monétaire ambitieuse, avec la création d'un Comité de politique conjoncturelle et l'effort d'assurer une meilleure coordination (plan Barre du 12 février 1969). Certaines politiques paraissent d'emblée difficiles: la politique régionale qui n'est qu'un simple encadrement, celle des transports, dans un domaine qui reste un «bastion des nationalismes», de même que l'Europe sociale. Concernant ce dernier cas, il ne faut pas oublier les

objectifs strictement économiques des Traités de Rome, dans une période de croissance qui semble être sans fin. Quant à la politique industrielle, elle n'a même pas été mentionnée: on peut évoquer certaines actions sectorielles, comme dans les chantiers navals ou l'industrie textile, mais encore très modestes, malgré les débats intenses provoqués par un best-seller comme *Le Défi américain* de Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber. Le problème est le même concernant l'énergie, qui plus est dispersée entre les trois communautés européennes, ou pour l'action en matière de recherche et technologie. En revanche, la politique de l'information démontre qu'il y a une quête de l'opinion dès le départ, avec certains noms récurrents (Jacques-René Rabier, François Fontaine, François Duchêne, Emanuele Gazzo), ainsi que la recherche d'une meilleure visibilité (institution d'un porte-parole de la Commission). Cependant, les contacts privilégiés restent ceux qui sont noués avec les journalistes et les lobbyistes.

Un livre précieux, lui-même symbole d'une coopération réussie. Outre les articles qui offrent une présentation exhaustive des hommes et des politiques, on trouvera dans cet ouvrage une chronologie complète, les organigrammes successifs, le détail des sources (en particulier les archives orales, qui sont autant d'instruments de travail à exploiter), ainsi qu'une bibliographie très complète. Les documents, souvent inédits, qui parsèment les différents articles en rendent la lecture plus agréable. La preuve est faite que la Commission n'est pas qu'une institution que certains s'acharnent à trouver «technocratique», mais une aventure humaine engageant des personnes de chair et de sang, et qui toutes se retrouvent à Bruxelles pour inventer les bases d'une communauté inédite. A quand le même travail pour une période plus proche de nous?

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Antonio VARSORI (ed.) – *Sfide del mercato e identità europea. Le politiche di educazione e formazione professionale nell'Europa comunitaria*, Franco Angeli, Milan, 2006, 219 p. – ISBN 88-464-7981-5 – 18.00 €.

In recent years, the history of European integration has witnessed a surge of attention on European Economic Community/European Union (EEC/EU) policies, and in particular on the policies that have had a growing impact on the evolution of European society. This new interest of historians is a consequence of the increasing political competences that the EEC/EU has gained since the Seventies. From that time, the EEC/EU could not only be conceived as a mere economic entity because it has widened its powers to other relevant policy fields (i.e. research and development, social cohesion, environmental policies, etc).

The book under review, edited by Antonio Varsori, pays special attention to vocational education and training (VET) policies and to their emergence in the European Community and in some international organizations, such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). This book

is one of the results of a wider research project coordinated by the editor, which aims to illustrate the development and impact of VET policies in the different stages of European integration, as well as the role played by the EEC/EU institutions in this field and the activities run by the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Centre européen pour le développement de la formation professionnelle – Cedefop) between its birth in 1975 and the Nineties.

Varsori's chapter presents the general framework of VET policy evolution. He shows that in the "Europe of the Six" vocational and education training was first considered as an aspect of social measures to be implemented in order to meet production and labour market requirements. This approach was renewed under the particular climate of social unrest of the early Seventies, which was exacerbated by the demands of the student and trade union movements. However, while the EEC institutions' interest in VET was rapidly increasing, the member states' governments expressed mounting opposition because – as Varsori argues – they were eager to preserve their exclusive competence in the domain of education. The difficulties encountered in the establishment of Cedefop in 1975 were a clear example of the ongoing dispute between the Commission and the European Parliament on one side and the Council of ministers on the other side. While the Commission conceived Cedefop as a useful support to improving Community action in education and social fields, the Council tried to keep the new agency under its control in order to restrict Cedefop's functions to studies and research activities, without the possibility of influencing national education policies.

Despite these limits, Cedefop has played its own role in VET. This book helps to reconstruct Cedefop's activity in facilitating transnational cooperation in the field of VET policies, as it encouraged EEC/EU institutions and the member states to face central issues in the promotion of socio-economic development, such as the recognition of higher education and professional qualifications throughout Europe, the management of new technologies, and opportunities for young people and women to participate in the labour market. To this end, Marina Cino Pagliarello focuses on the Study Visit Programme for experts and people in charge of vocational training that was first promoted by Cedefop in 1985. Another central contribution to the Europeanization of educational policies is presented by Emanuele Torquati, whose chapter examines the birth and the evolution of the "Jean Monnet Action". As Torquati says, the "Jean Monnet Action", which started in 1989 with the support of the president of the European Commission Jacques Delors, became the "fulcro" – the hub – of a more complex Community strategy aiming at the expansion of European studies in the academic world. This project proved to be successful and contributed not only to creating a direct link between the Commission and the Universities but also to establishing Chairs and Modules especially dedicated to the teaching of European studies in different disciplines. The Study Visit Programme and the "Jean Monnet Action" – to which we must add Erasmus and Socrates Exchange Programmes – illustrate the widening of EEC/EU horizons from a solely economic dimension to become a more socially oriented entity. In this process, a key role was played by the European Parliament, which has

always tried to push other institutions and national governments to face education issues within the Community framework. The chapter by Simone Paoli is of particular interest to historians because it clearly illustrates from a diachronic perspective the Parliament's long-lasting struggle to stress the importance of facing the common problems related to vocational education and training that arose with the creation and the concrete functioning of the common market.

The volume also sheds some light on the activities of international organisations, paying special attention to UNESCO's actions in the Sixties. In particular, Sara Banchi emphasizes the project realized in the Ivory Coast between 1961 and 1967 to create a centre to provide vocational training in the rural domain and to train permanent teaching staff in the region. This case study gives an important insight into the progressive qualification of VET as an investment in human capital. This is a sign of the growing awareness of the importance of VET as an essential tool to increase competitiveness and material growth, as well as to equip people with the widest possible range of skills and competences. In this sense, nowadays VET policies are considered to be a fundamental pillar of the Lisbon Strategy because – as Elena Mainardi's chapter reports – they play a central role in enhancing the “knowledge society” model the EU has decided to implement in order to successfully face global market challenges. In this sense – the book seems to suggest – VET may also contribute to shaping the elusive concept of European identity, by focusing on the concrete achievements of the EU that have improved opportunities for European citizens in their lives and work.

This volume deserves recognition for its achievements. It constitutes an original contribution to current historiography in both its subject matter and methodology. It manages to clearly illustrate the inclusion of VET policies in the Community framework and in doing so it deals with a subject that had not yet been fully investigated from a historical perspective. The methodology is also interesting because, by taking into consideration several actors involved in vocational and education training (international organizations, European institutions, national governments, etc.), the book gives an idea of the multilevel interaction that takes place in the implementation of many other important EU policies.

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Marc JOLY - *Le mythe Jean Monnet. Contribution à une sociologie historique de la construction européenne*, CNRS éditions, Paris, 2007, 238 p. - ISBN 978-2-271-06575-9 – 15,00 €.

Cet ouvrage balance entre, d'une part, une réflexion sur le mythe et ses origines, appliquée à la construction européenne au travers de son plus célèbre représentant, et, d'autre part, une prise à partie politique contre cette même construction au nom d'un engagement militant transparent. Il n'est pas mauvais de rappeler que l'auteur est militant du MDC de Jean-Pierre Chevènement, et qu'il a déjà fait paraître un livre sur «le souverainisme» (Guibert, 2001), dont certains ont souligné l'apport, et

d'autres le parti pris. Il faut de plus insister, ce que fait d'ailleurs Marc Joly (bien qu'à la fin, p.202), sur le fait que ce livre a été écrit dans une ambiance (et dans un but?) polémique, au moment de la campagne autour du Traité constitutionnel européen.

L'ouvrage commence par une allusion très marquée au traité modifié, présenté comme un complot fomenté «d'en haut»: le ton est donné, en particulier par la page 11, où le mot «élite» (ou sa déclinaison «élitaire») apparaît cinq fois, appliqué à ce que l'auteur, dans une approche très systémique, nomme le «pouvoir-Europe», nouvel avatar de ce que certains ont pu appeler «l'eurocratie». Il faut d'emblée souligner une contradiction dans ces propos: peut-on, comme le fait Marc Joly, souligner l'idée d'une «crise de type idéologique» à propos de l'Europe (p.12), et reconnaître, à plusieurs reprises, qu'il y a autant de visions de l'Europe que de pays membres? De même, le consensus, présenté comme la marque de ce pouvoir-Europe, est-il toujours à l'avantage de celui-ci? Le compromis de Luxembourg n'est-il pas une forme de consensus qui a d'abord eu pour but d'éviter toute avancée de l'intégration européenne? Mais non, la thèse est posée: l'Europe, manquant de légitimité, comploterait contre la démocratie. La démonstration se fait cependant au mépris de toute leçon historique, faisant par exemple abstraction des débats sur la CED et de leurs effets sur la construction européenne. Le travail de Joly consiste d'abord à stigmatiser le pouvoir autonome engendré par la CEE/UE, en s'appuyant sur une approche très politique (p.24), où les «citoyens» auraient des intérêts opposés à ceux de «l'Europe» (qui, tout au long de l'ouvrage, ne sera jamais vraiment définie). Il s'agirait alors pour cette dernière, forcément anti-démocratique, de «vendre» son projet.

D'où Norbert Elias, sur lequel notre auteur s'appuie pour faire la «chasse aux mythes». Dans cette optique, Monnet paraît l'homme idéal en tant que «M. Tout-le-Monde» (p.26: entre parenthèses, n'est-ce pas une garantie de démocratie que M. Tout-le-Monde soit un modèle à suivre, plutôt qu'un improbable Sauveur?), demiurge et créature de l'Europe (et pourtant, ce que l'auteur oublie, panthéonisé en France). Le pauvre homme est bombardé «mythe élitare» (p.34), «Américain» (dans la note 18 p.45), et, plus ambigu encore, «Français dénationalisé» (p.75). Il n'a même plus de secrets de conscience, puisque Joly arrive à savoir quand Monnet «n'est pas forcément sincère» (p.194)!

Ces formules creuses, à l'emporte-pièce, continuent dans la partie intitulée «le civilisateur», où l'auteur démonte le «complot mythologique» qu'il a éventé au départ de son ouvrage. Cela dit, son propos commence avec une nouvelle légèreté historique: Monnet n'a pas été démis de son poste de président de la Haute Autorité (p.35), mais l'a quitté volontairement, pour se consacrer au Comité d'action qu'il a créé dans la foulée. Certes, il est juste d'évoquer le fait qu'il se range derrière un projet de CEE qu'il n'a pas voulu, mais qu'il légitime par son «magistère sacré». L'auteur oublie seulement de préciser que ce n'était pas vraiment le fruit de sa propre volonté ... Parallèlement, le mythe de la CECA, qui aurait été savamment entretenu par Monnet à travers ses *Mémoires*, ne servirait qu'à couvrir un «marchandage diplomatique classique entre l'Allemagne et les Etats-Unis» (p.50).

La CECA ne serait en effet ainsi qu'un écran de fumée masquant «la domination écrasante du capitalisme américain» (p.67), et celle de technocrates que Joly illustre à l'aide d'une seule citation volontairement provocatrice de Pierre Uri (p.69). Dans cette optique, même le Plan institué par le gouvernement français ne relève que d'une volonté de domination technocratique (n'est-ce pas de Gaulle qui l'a institué?). L'auteur reconnaît pourtant lui-même que si cette volonté a existé, elle a été étouffée par la volonté des Etats (p.81, p.87, encore p.158), et que Monnet se donne avant tout «l'illusion» de contrôler le processus, avec son Comité d'action. L'essentiel est qu'il légitimerait le processus européen alors en cours aux yeux des Européens: mais comment, puisque l'on sait que ce Comité était à vocation justement très élitiste?

Le mythe Monnet fut celui d'un «despotisme éclairé» (p.105), définition plus juste, pour une fois bien illustrée (p.196); mais n'est-ce pas ce que disait déjà Hubert Védrine de la politique européenne de François Mitterrand? Condamner rétrospectivement cette tendance relève d'une part de l'anachronisme, et d'autre part sert avant tout une volonté de polémique qui se drape d'atours scientifiques vite envolés: pourquoi Joly veut-il absolument lier l'œuvre de Monnet à la pensée de Norbert Elias (il parle même d'un dialogue qui s'installerait entre eux p.181, p.186)? Ne veut-il pas remplacer un mythe par un autre? Il semble qu'il ait besoin d'un cadre rassurant, que chaque chose soit à sa place (voir sa propre définition de l'européisme, p.147), quitte à forcer le cadre. Elias a étudié les Capétiens et leur domination progressive en France: le parallèle avec Monnet peut-il tenir? On s'inquiète quand l'auteur avance une explication «capitaliste» à la première entreprise (p.130), qui de plus a tous les aspects du darwinisme social. De toute façon, n'ayant pas peur de la contradiction, l'auteur trouve Monnet trop rationnel pour soutenir la comparaison (p.138)!

Dans l'ensemble, cet ouvrage est moralisant, et trop engagé politiquement. Il est plein de considérations très générales sur le fonctionnalisme, qui masquerait une confiscation voulue du pouvoir, et n'arrive pas à entrer dans la psychologie, ni du personnage principal, ni de l'opinion, ici habilement orchestrée pour la faire entrer dans le cadre rassurant d'une thèse, qui, après examen, ne vaut pas plus qu'une charge politique sans grande envergure. L'auteur voit le complot européen partout, ce qui lui permet de lier les «forfanteries» d'hier avec celles d'aujourd'hui, et de régler ainsi ses comptes avec le TCE, et autres prétendues tentatives d'étouffer le principe de citoyenneté. Décidément, Jean Monnet a bon dos ...

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N. Piers LUDLOW – *The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s. Negotiating the Gaullist challenge*, Routledge, London and New York, 2006, 269 p. – ISBN 0-415-37594-0 – 103,99 €.

In der Erforschung der Geschichte des europäischen Integrationsprozesses zeichnet sich in den letzten Jahren der Trend ab, die Integration bestimmter Politikbereiche

mit einem multinationalen Ansatz zu untersuchen. Im Blickpunkt steht dabei nicht mehr ein einzelner nationaler Akteur, sondern die Autoren untersuchen das Zusammenspiel der verschiedenen an der Integration beteiligten Länder und der europäischen Institutionen. Diesem Ansatz ist auch die Studie des renommierten Londoner Historikers N. Piers Ludlow verpflichtet. Ludlow geht in seiner Studie jedoch über den sektoralen Ansatz hinaus und nimmt den Integrationsprozess der 1960er Jahre in seiner ganzen Breite in den Blick. Er rekonstruiert dabei die EWG-Verhandlungen überwiegend mit Quellen aus den Archiven des Ministerrats und der Kommission der EWG. Mit Hilfe des Aktenmaterials aus den nationalen Archiven der Mitgliedstaaten versucht Ludlow zu analysieren, warum die einzelnen Regierungen bestimmte Positionen in den EWG-Verhandlungen vertraten.

Im Mittelpunkt des in 7 Kapitel aufgeteilten Werks steht der Umgang der EWG mit der Europapolitik des französischen Staatspräsidenten Charles de Gaulle zwischen 1963 und 1969. Laut Ludlow lassen sich die Auseinandersetzungen in der EWG der 1960er Jahre auf drei Grundkonflikte zurückführen, die ihre Wurzeln in den vagen Bestimmungen des EWG-Vertrags hatten. Zum einen musste präzisiert werden, wie und mit welchen Prioritäten das politische Programm des EWG-Vertrags umgesetzt werden sollte. Zum anderen musste sich das institutionelle Gleichgewicht noch finden. Außerdem musste die Frage ausdiskutiert werden, wer Mitglied in der EWG werden konnte und wie sich der Erweiterungsprozess vollziehen sollte. Diesen Grundkonflikten spürt Ludlow in seiner chronologisch angelegten Studie nach.

Ausgangspunkt ist dabei das Veto de Gaulles gegen einen britischen EWG-Beitritt vom Januar 1963. Die daraus resultierende Krise konnte relativ rasch überwunden werden, da sich alle Beteiligten von Fortschritten in der Integration Vorteile erhofften. Insbesondere konnte man so dem französischen Partner vor Augen führen, wie stark auch Frankreich auf die EWG angewiesen war. Dabei half der ambitionierte Aktionsplan, den der deutsche Außenminister Gerhard Schröder im April 1963 im Ministerrat vorstellte. Wie Ludlow betont, habe Schröders umfangreiches Programm jedoch nur Akzeptanz gefunden, weil es der Luxemburger Ratspräsidentschaft gelungen sei, das Papier so zurechtzustutzen, dass es für alle annehmbar gewesen sei.

Anschließend schildert Ludlow vor allem die Auseinandersetzungen über die Ausgestaltung der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik (GAP) im Jahr 1964, die bei einigen Ländern zur Frustration über die Europapolitik de Gaulles führten.

Schwerpunkt des Buches sind die beiden folgenden Kapitel über die Krise des leeren Stuhls, die Ludlow vor allem als Machtkampf zwischen der Bundesrepublik, den Niederlanden und Italien auf der einen sowie Frankreich auf der anderen Seite interpretiert. Belgien habe die wichtige Rolle übernommen, mäßigend auf die Kontrahenten einzuwirken. Mit dem Luxemburger Kompromiss vom Januar 1966, der die Differenzen über institutionelle Fragen und den Einsatz von Mehrheitsbeschlüssen nicht abschließend klärte, gelang es immerhin, Frankreich wieder an den Ratstisch zurückzuholen. Damit konnten die Arbeiten an der Ausgestaltung der GAP und die Suche nach einer gemeinsamen EWG-Position in der Ken-

nedy-Runde des GATT wiederaufgenommen werden. Zwischen Mai und Juli 1966 verabschiedete die EWG wichtige Entscheidungen für diese Bereiche.

Als das EWG-Schiff nach dieser stürmischen Phase in ruhiges Gewässer steuerte, kam die englische Beitrittsproblematik erneut auf die Agenda. Die Labour-Regierung unter Premierminister Harold Wilson rang sich dazu durch, einen britischen Beitrittsantrag zu stellen. Ludlow weist zurecht darauf hin, dass, im Gegensatz zum ersten Veto, de Gaulles zweites Veto gegen einen britischen Beitritt vom Dezember 1967 die Arbeiten der EWG fast zum Stillstand brachte. Bereits vorher festgelegte Termine, wie die Vollendung der Zollunion und der Beginn der Endphase des Gemeinsamen Agrarmarkts zum 1.7.1968, konnten noch vollzogen werden. Auch die alltägliche Routinearbeit wurde bewältigt. Aufgrund der Differenzen in der Beitrittsfrage gelang es jedoch nicht, weitere wichtige Integrationsfelder zu erschließen. Vor allem die Niederlande und Italien boykottierten zentrale Vorhaben wie zum Beispiel die Ausarbeitung einer europäischen Technologiepolitik durch die Groupe Maréchal. Erst als sich nach dem Rücktritt de Gaulles im April 1969 eine flexiblere Haltung des neuen französischen Staatspräsidenten Georges Pompidou abzeichnete, kam die europäische Integration wieder in Bewegung. So gelang es den Staats- und Regierungschefs der sechs Länder auf der Haager Gipfelkonferenz im Dezember 1969 sich in der Beitrittsfrage zu einigen und im Gegenzug die Fortführung des für Frankreich vorteilhaften Agrarfinanzierungsmodus zu vereinbaren. Außerdem wurden mit der Währungspolitik und der politischen Zusammenarbeit zwei Politikfelder erschlossen, die für die Zukunft der EWG/EU von zentraler Bedeutung werden sollten. Mit den Beschlüssen der Haager Gipfelkonferenz sieht Ludlow die gaullistische Herausforderung als überwunden an.

Im Zuge seiner Studie kann Ludlow mehrere zentrale Entwicklungen herauspräparieren, die deutlich machen, warum die von Ludlow untersuchte Zeitspanne eine so große Bedeutung für die Geschichte des Integrationsprozesses beanspruchen kann. So veränderte sich unter anderem das Zusammenspiel der Institutionen im Entscheidungsprozess der EWG. Hatte zunächst alles auf eine zunehmend wichtigere Rolle der Kommission hingedeutet, so sieht Ludlow den Ministerrat und den ihm untergeordneten Ausschuss der ständigen Vertreter (COREPER) als institutionellen Gewinner der Phase zwischen 1963 und 1969. In dem untersuchten Zeitraum wurde deutlich, dass keine Regierung gewillt war, auf ihren Einfluss zugunsten der Kommission zu verzichten. Trotz der Bedeutungszunahme des Ministerrats diagnostiziert Ludlow für die Endphase der 1960er Jahre ein „leadership vacuum“ (S.212) für die EWG. De Gaulle polarisierte nur noch und die Bundesrepublik, die sich durch die gaullistische Herausforderung in eine aktivere Rolle gedrängt sah, konnte aus Rücksicht auf den französischen Partner und die eigene Vergangenheit die Führungsrolle nicht kraftvoll genug ausfüllen. Nach dem erfolgreichen Haager Gipfel war im Prinzip klar, dass das „leadership vacuum“ nur durch regelmäßige Treffen der Staats- und Regierungschefs aufgefangen werden konnte. Von daher lag der Schritt zur Institutionalisierung der Gipfeltreffen, wie er ab 1974 vollzogen wurde, nah.

Auch im Bereich der Ausgestaltung der vom EWG-Vertrag genannten Politikfelder waren die Jahre zwischen 1963 und 1969 entscheidend. Vor allem wurden die Grundzüge der GAP festgelegt und das Stadium der Zollunion bereits vorzeitig zum 1.7.1968 erreicht. Neue Politikfelder wurden durch den Haager Gipfel erschlossen. Entscheidend für die Zukunft waren auch die Festlegungen im Bereich der Mitgliedschaft. Im Prinzip konnten die Antragsteller Mitglied werden, wenn sie bereit waren, die bisherigen EWG-Regelungen zu übernehmen. Dass sich die EWG anpassen musste, wie noch 1961/63 von Großbritannien gefordert, war jetzt nicht mehr diskutabel.

Insgesamt gelingt es N. Piers Ludlow hervorragend, den Integrationsprozess zwischen 1963 und 1969 zu analysieren und wichtige Entwicklungsprozesse zu verdeutlichen. Dabei versucht Ludlow den europäischen Integrationsprozess auch immer wieder in die Entwicklungen der internationalen Politik der 1960er Jahre einzuordnen. Zudem ruht sein Blick nicht nur auf der Politik Frankreichs, der Bundesrepublik oder Italiens, sondern er streicht an zentralen Stellen auch immer wieder die wichtige Rolle der kleineren Staaten heraus. Das sehr gut lesbare Buch dürfte somit nicht nur zum Standardwerk für die Geschichte der EWG in den 1960er Jahren avancieren, sondern bietet auch den Historikern/Politologen, die sich mit der jüngeren Geschichte der EWG/EU befassen, eine Fülle von Einsichten.

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QUADRIO CURZIO Alberto – *Economisti ed economia. Per un'Italia europea: paradigmi tra il XVIII e il XX secolo (Economists and Economics. In Praise of a European Italy: Paradigms between the XVIII and the XX Centuries)*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2007, 387 p.- ISBN 978-88-15-11531-7, 29,00 €.

The volume collects nine essays drafted by Alberto Quadrio Curzio (some in collaboration with other scholars - Claudia Rotondi, Roberto Scazzieri, Mario Talamona) in the twenty years spanning 1986 to 2006.

The essays, mostly historical, economical and institutional in nature and supplied with primary bibliographic references, focus in particular on personalities, mainly economists (C. Beccaria, P. Verri, C. Cattaneo, L. Einaudi, E. Vanoni, P. Saraceno, F. Vito, G. Demaria, G. Fuà), and on the role of distinguished institutes (Istituto Lombardo-Accademia di Scienze e Lettere and Società Italiana degli Economisti) and companies (Edison) that helped promote Italian culture and place it into the European context during the second half of the eighteenth and the twentieth centuries.

In the author's intention, however, the volume is "much more than a collation of essays written in different periods" (p.3). In this respect, it is purposely opened by the introduction, in which Quadrio Curzio outlines and motivates the arrangement of the collection and provides its interpretive key, and insightful conclusive remarks.

In fact, as pointed out by the author and as emerges from reading the volume, despite being divided into four sections (along chronological and thematic criteria), the essays are closely interrelated by recurrent themes and perspectives. Among these, a focus on the intellectual and operative commitment of those personalities and institutions that promoted fruitful interactions among institutions, market and society in which personal liberty and responsibility “positively” combined - most notably, within this context, Quadrio Curzio identifies an economic-political paradigm defined as ‘social liberalism’ or ‘community liberalism’ (p.18) distinguished from both liberalism and socialism -; a pro-European perspective, and the acknowledgment of the role of culture and science in the progress of civilization.

In detail, part one, entitled “Profili di economisti istituzionalisti, liberali ed europeisti: tra XVIII e XIX secolo” (Profiles of institutionalist, liberal and pro-European economists between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries), converges on three personalities, Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794), Pietro Verri (1728-1798) and Carlo Cattaneo (1801-1869), considered to be the “makers of the Lombard paradigm” (p.23) – the adjective indicating here the territorial and cultural milieu within the much broader European context in which these versatile scholars carried out their studies in economics, philosophy, law and history. In particular, their economic thought is characterized by open-minded reception of European philosophical and cultural insights and by lively interest in contemporary society; in this respect, they also acknowledge the relevant role played both by institutions, as complementary to individual action in fulfilling needs, and by the civil (economic-commercial, technological, legal) society, as the intermediate body between individuals and the State. They moreover see knowledge as aimed at the definition of guidelines for action for economic governance and the advancement of society as a whole. The volume discusses in particular Verri’s and Beccaria’s proposal for a monetary reform capable of bringing Italy closer to other European countries on the bases of their economic interdependence (part one, chapter II), and Cattaneo’s awareness, as realized in the founding of the “Politecnico” (1839), of the contribution of science and knowledge to economic and social progress (part one, chapter III).

Part two, “Paradigmi economici dell’accademia e dell’industria lombarda: tra XIX e XX secolo” (Economic paradigms of academia and industry in Lombardy between the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries) investigates two different institutional contexts: the Istituto Lombardo – Accademia di Scienze e Lettere and Edison. The Istituto, founded in 1797 on the initiative of Napoleon Bonaparte, began its activity in 1803, and despite political and nominal changes it has unflinchingly maintained, among its key principles and aims, the promotion of scientific knowledge for civil progress to be realized by the continuous dialogue between natural and humanistic sciences and by open-mindedness towards European thought. In this respect, the author examines the scientific production of authoritative Italian economists, emphasizing the role of economic science as a discipline bridging “scientific-technological and legal-philosophical perspectives at

a cultural level” (p.145). The case of Edison, the energy sector company founded by Giuseppe Colombo (1836-1921) in 1884, is discussed as the living example of the contribution of the application of scientific and technological knowledge to civil progress. The essay retraces the history of the company through its administrators, seen as belonging to the wider group of “engineers-economists and technologists-entrepreneurs” (p.153) that realized economic development opportunities in Northern Italy between the second half of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, and highlights their unabated commitment to the internationalization of the company and to human resources training as key factors in their entrepreneurial action.

Part three, “Profili di economisti per lo sviluppo istituzional-economico in Europa: il XX secolo” (Profiles of economists committed to institutional and economic development in Europe: the twentieth century) focuses on three economists: Luigi Einaudi (1874-1961), Ezio Vanoni (1903-1956) and Pasquale Saraceno (1903-1991). The essay on Einaudi traces the ripening of his thought upon European federalism during his sixty-year activity (1897-1956). Einaudi envisages European federalism as the resolute political condition, both to the crisis in the equilibrium of European nations as emerged in the two World Wars and to their social and economic interdependence, and in the Forties and Fifties defines it along a specifically liberal perspective in terms of its political-institutional and economic-institutional structure (bicameral parliament, shared military forces, financial means, market and monetary unification). Einaudi’s contribution is essentially theoretical in nature; however, his views significantly influenced those Italian personalities playing an active role in the process of European unification, such as Altiero Spinelli and Alcide De Gasperi. The essay on Vanoni and Saraceno delineates their contribution – the former as engaged in the economic Ministries, the latter as producing models that were to shape Italian economic and industrial policies – to the process of second post-war reconstruction of Italian economy aimed at its re-insertion into the European circuit.

Part four is entitled “Un paradigma associativo tra economisti e tre profili caratterizzanti nella seconda metà del XX secolo” (An associative paradigm among economists, and three key figures in the second half of the twentieth century). It opens by tracing the history of the Società Italiana degli Economisti, from its foundation – in 1950, during an economists’ meeting in Turin –, to its statutory changes (in 1984 and 1998) and its most recent evolution, and underlines the significant extent to which the Associazione has played a key role in promoting and supporting the progress of economic science in Italy. The personalities and thought of three of its key members, that is the economists Francesco Vito (1902-1968), Giovanni Demaria (1899-1998), Giorgio Fuà (1919-2000), are then illustrated in the final essay.

In the conclusion Quadrio Curzio returns to the findings presented in the volume in the light of a reflection on their significance today, and outlines the main features of his ‘social liberalism’, or ‘community liberalism’, paradigm as anticipated in the Introduction and discussed, among others, also in: *Noi*,

l'economia e l'Europa, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1996; *Sussidiarietà e sviluppo. Paradigmi per l'Europa e per l'Italia*, Milano, Vita e Pensiero, 2002.

The volume by Quadrio Curzio represents thus a crucial contribution to the definition of the identity of Italy within the European context and a fruitful source of stimulating inspiration for future theoretical and operative paths.

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LUDLOW Piers (ed.) – *European Integration and the Cold War. Ostpolitik - Westpolitik, 1965-1973*, (Cold War History Series 17), Routledge, London, 2007, 194 p. – ISBN 978-0-415-42109-6 (hb), 95,29 €.

The historiography of European integration largely developed out of the historiography of the Cold War. Since its beginnings in the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, it has outgrown to become an independent research field in contemporary (European) history in its own right – a research field, moreover, whose subject matter, the present-day European Union (EU), is alive and kicking compared to the post-war Cold War which ended in this form around 1990. As Piers Ludlow claims with some justification in the introduction to this book, however, “the history of each has tended to be studied and told with next to no reference to the other” (p.1). Some scholars like Wilfried Loth and now Ludlow himself continue to straddle the growing divide between the two research fields, but most concentrate on one or the other, with their different networks, conferences and publication outlets. Yet, as Ludlow argues in the conclusion, the Cold War and European integration “did not take place in hermetically sealed containers entirely prevented from contact with one another” (174). This edited book sets out to redress this apparently sorry state of affairs and to reconnect Cold War and European integration historiography by focussing on the period from the “Empty Chair” crisis in 1965 to the first enlargement of the European Communities (EC) at the beginning of 1973. In part this is a pragmatic choice as new sources from government archives have become available. It is also an interesting transition period, however, with new internal and external policy challenges and the partial replacement of the France of Charles de Gaulle with the Britain of Harold Wilson (from 1974) as the EC’s (most) “awkward partner” (Stephen George).

The nine chapters in this book address different issues covering the entire time-span or only, in one case, seven months. In the first chapter, Georges-Henri Soutou contrasts the approaches of de Gaulle and his successor as French president, Georges Pompidou, towards the Cold War and integration issues. In a diplomatic historical perspective on national foreign policy-making, Soutou re-states in a variation of one of many European “special path” theses about national histories that “as usual, the French are a special case”. Somewhat surprisingly for scholars of the history of the present-day EU, this was not least the case because both presidents were “against European integration” (p.11). Why

then, one might be tempted to ask, did de Gaulle fight so vigorously for the very supranational Common Agricultural Policy and Pompidou support the plan for monetary integration?

In the second chapter, Garret Martin studies de Gaulle's second veto against British membership, bizarrely starting his analysis in September 1967 despite clear indications that the French president never changed his mind on the issue since the first veto, something clearly understood by the British government. Like several other authors in this book, Martin uses traditional realist language endowing countries with emotions such as when he argues, for example, that "France" "distrusted Britain" (p.44). In the third chapter, Wilfried Loth – partially based on sources from the French Archives nationales collected for him by Claudia Hiepel – discusses the relationship between Pompidou and the new social democratic German chancellor Willy Brandt from 1969 to 1974. In the subsequent chapter, Andreas Wilkens revisits the links between Brandt's *Ostpolitik* and EC politics, which perhaps provided the most important connection between the Cold War and European integration as it also induced Pompidou to support British accession.

The following two chapters by Helen Parr and James Ellison discuss from a British perspective the second British application for membership and Anglo-American relations over the issue. Parr evidently likes the Labour prime minister very much, arguing that "Wilson sowed the seeds of a British vision of the European Community that flourished only later" (p.101), although what this "vision" was precisely, remains unclear. Indeed, subsequent British governments have usually claimed that the "vision thing" was not for the allegedly pragmatic British, but characteristic of mad continental European federalists. Indeed, what appears to be emerging in outlines in these more recent studies of British policy, which are as Anglo-centric as ever, is a version of EU history somewhat reminiscent of Niall Ferguson's perspective on British Empire which once more appears to have spread a glorious civilisation at a very small cost – in this case at least only of repetitive referendum, budget, negotiation and media crises in the EU, not hundreds of thousands of dead indigenous people in newly subjugated colonies. At the same time, Ellison's competent exposition of the boring topic of Anglo-American relations over the second British EC application inadvertently demonstrates the disjuncture between the Cold War and European integration, as US support neither influenced the second British application nor even any more de Gaulle's opposition to it.

In his mini chapter of only nine pages, Jan van der Harst reiterates how subsequent Dutch governments were torn between their supranational institutional and policy preferences for the EC and their traditionally Atlantic foreign policy outlook on NATO, relations with the US and British EC accession. Ludlow then analyses how the European Commission related to the Cold War. In what he calls its own "bureaucratic logic" (p.144), the Commission's policy concerns were primarily of a domestic EC nature and not related to conflicts in NATO, for example. Indeed, as Ludlow rightly claims (p.147), the relative stability of NATO and the US role in providing security for Western Europe in the Cold War made it

so much easier for the Community to concentrate on the “low politics” of integration in fields like agriculture and competition policy, for example. At the same time, the early 1970s saw only a very modest collective attempt with the formation of the European Political Cooperation to create some limited foreign policy autonomy from the western superpower. Finally, Jussi Hanhimäki, in the ninth chapter, argues that two crucial conditions for close Atlantic cooperation remained largely constant in this period, that is the convergence of basic economic interests despite petty trade wars and the importance of NATO for Western Europe as a security shield. Hanhimäki also shows that “Europe” was not in fact a central policy concern for US administrations in this period (p.153) which had to deal with other challenges such as the war in Vietnam and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. The US did succeed, however, in avoiding a breakdown of Western unity or the creation of a much more autonomous European foreign policy – although arguably, neither one nor the other required much US activism but in fact reflected the preferences of most, if not all, NATO partners.

Many of the empirical insights in this chapter are accessible in more elaborate form in recently published books, for example by Parr on Wilson’s European policy or Ellison on Anglo-American relations over “Europe”, or they have circulated for a very long time as in Wilkens’ many publications in French and German on exactly the same topic as his book chapter, or they form part of larger projects like Hiepel’s *Habilitation* on the European concepts and policies of Brandt and Pompidou in the case of Loth’s chapter. Nonetheless, it can of course be useful to bring them together in an edited volume, although it is plainly annoying that such an expensive book should contain so many printing errors (especially missing French special signs with a loss of their accompanying letters), for example eleven on page 8 of the introduction and an incredible 23 on page 65 of Loth’s chapter. Yet, the chapters do not attempt to address a common set of questions, they make no cross-references, and they mainly appear to be united by a traditional diplomatic historical approach to understanding national European policy and inter-state relations. The central problem is of course that this may be an adequate framework for analysing “high politics” security and military issues, although it is a limited approach even there, but that it is wholly inadequate for the historical reconstruction of EU politics in historical perspective, something that requires a sophisticated understanding of transnational and supranational dimensions of this emerging polity.

As Ludlow himself argues, links between the Cold War and European integration were largely limited to strategic issues which had to be addressed by heads of government and foreign ministries in particular. Conflicts within the EC and in transatlantic relations became more virulent over time in all areas in which the EC slowly, but surely acquired external competences and increased its cohesion as an international actor in fields like trade and development policy and foreign policy cooperation, for example during the Helsinki process in the 1970s. If historians of the present-day EU want to invest resources in the study of connections between the Cold War and European integration they should perhaps

focus on these policy areas and related issues from a multilateral perspective, not petty questions such as the repetitive begging of British prime ministers to be allowed to join the EC in the vain hope that this in itself would deal with all domestic structural problems of a former Empire in temporary (as it eventually turned out), not terminal decline.

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Rainer EISING, Beate KOHLER-KOCH (Hg.), *Interessenpolitik in Europa*, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2005, 389 S. – ISBN 978-3-8329-0779-2 – 69,00 €.

This important book addresses the role of (in the broadest sense: economic) interest associations in the process of European integration. It collects theoretically informed empirical studies offering precise and deep insights into the structural preconditions and the ways and means of interest articulation, representation and achievement on the European level. The methodological spectrum ranges from qualitative and quantitative approaches to case studies and comparisons, the framing of models and “thick descriptions”. Most of the contributions prefer a multi-level perspective, and the focus lies on North and West European countries. The editors claim with full justification to present an overview of the German-speaking political science research on problems of EU interest politics.

The first part of the book deals with theoretical approaches and conceptions. One of the most interesting articles explores changes concerning the logic of influence within the European Union: Taking the German Farmer’s Association and the Federation of German Banks as examples, Dieter Wolf stresses the possibility to guarantee or at least affect their member’s compliance with EU-regulations. The other articles of this part discuss lobbying activities directed to the European Parliament and the role of bureaucrats in the process of European integration.

The authors of the second part of the book examine various policy areas and protagonists, for example the financial market integration, the “Association for the Monetary Union of Europe” or the growing importance of commercial consultancies within the EU. The third part is devoted to the “Europeanization” of interest representation and mediation. Topics range from the formulation of national bargaining positions as a preparation for negotiations on the EU level to collective bargaining between the “social partners” concerning industrial law and the strategies of adaptation of economic associations to external challenges. As far as the last topic is concerned, Achim Lang and Jürgen R. Grote show that changing “political environments”, especially a growing “Europeanization”, cause adjustment efforts on the side of the associations. And Rainer Eising proves that the EU increases the power of associations already distinctive and established on a national level.

Although some of the authors have chosen a rather abstract level of examination, historians of European integration may gain in many ways from the

corresponding research of political scientists. Focussing and discussing problems of “democracy”, “efficiency”, or “interest representation” with regard to national or European interest organisations is without doubt important for them, too.

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Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen

Wilfried Loth

Explaining European Integration: The Contribution from Historians

The debate on the present results of research in the history of European integration leads to a model of “four driving forces” behind European integration: the maintenance of peace among sovereign states in Europe, the resolving of the German question, the preservation of economic productivity, and the self-assertion in the face of new world powers. From the development of these driving forces there may be deduced both the timing of specific integration initiatives as well as the decision for specific types of integration. The European Economic Community appears primarily as a political construction which only gradually gained economic attractiveness. Since the end of the Cold War the political impulses have become more important once again. At the same time, one may notice tendencies towards social integration as well as towards an increased consensus of the Europeans regarding their conceptions of political values. The central question of future integration research will concern the relationship of democratic legitimacy and efficiency in political decision-making. In search of answers, historians won't fail to point out that things being in a state of flux, the possible will be not only what used to be possible.

Les contributions de l'historiographie à l'interprétation de l'intégration européenne

La discussion des résultats actuels de la recherche historiographique relative à l'intégration européenne débouche sur le modèle des « quatre moteurs » de l'intégration européenne: le maintien de la paix entre Etats souverains en Europe, la solution de la question allemande, la préservation de la productivité économique et la volonté de s'affirmer face aux nouvelles puissances mondiales. A partir du développement de ces moteurs, on peut déduire à la fois le moment où sont intervenues certaines étapes du processus d'intégration et les formes d'intégration finalement retenues. La Communauté économique européenne semble ainsi représenter en première ligne une construction politique dont l'attractivité économique se déploie seulement par après. Depuis la fin de la Guerre Froide, les impulsions politiques gagnent en importance. Simultanément des tendances à l'intégration sociale et au renforcement du consensus autour des valeurs politiques des Européens se manifestent. La question centrale de la recherche en matière d'intégration concernera à l'avenir la relation entre la légitimité démocratique et l'efficacité des décisions politiques. Lors de la quête pour trouver des réponses les historiens ne manqueront pas de souligner que les choses bougent. Partant il faudra envisager qu'à l'avenir il y aura d'autres choix possibles que ceux qui ont depuis toujours été possibles.

Beiträge der Geschichtswissenschaft zur Deutung der europäischen Integration

Die Diskussion der Ergebnisse bisheriger Forschungen zur Geschichte der europäischen Integration führt zu einem Modell von „vier Antriebskräften“ europäischer Integration: Friedenssicherung unter souveränen Nationalstaaten in Europa, Lösung der Deutschen Frage, Sicherung wirtschaftlicher Produktivität, Selbstbehauptung gegenüber neuen Weltmächten. Aus der Entwicklung dieser Antriebskräfte lassen sich sowohl der Zeitpunkt für bestimmte Integrationsschritte ableiten als auch die Entscheidung für bestimmte Arten der Integration. Die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft erscheint danach in erster Linie eine politische

Konstruktion; wirtschaftliche Attraktivität gewann sie erst mit der Zeit. Mit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges gewannen die politischen Impulse verstärkte Bedeutung. Gleichzeitig machten sich Tendenzen zur sozialen Integration und zur Stärkung des Konsenses hinsichtlich der politischen Wertvorstellungen der Europäer bemerkbar. Die zentrale Fragestellung künftiger Integrationsforschung betrifft das Verhältnis von demokratischer Legitimität und politischer Entscheidungseffizienz. Bei der Suche nach Antworten werden die Historiker darauf hinweisen, dass die Dinge im Fluss sind und darum nicht nur möglich ist, was immer schon möglich war.

John R. Gillingham

A Theoretical Vacuum: European Integration and Historical Research Today

The field of European integration history suffers from a theoretical deficit. The one major attempt to remedy the problem, the case made by Alan Milward for "allegiance" in the first issue of JEIH, not only did not do so but failed to stimulate debate or discussion. Parochialism thus pervades the scholarly literature. A fresh start is long overdue. Historians should not be bound by either the thirty year rule or conventional wisdom, but learn to draw from other social sciences and from non-archival sources. They should above all learn to examine their subject critically. The result would be a literature which places the EU in changing contexts, views it as the product of exogenous influences as well as of human design, recognizes the complexities of causation, includes a vast array of important topics now all but overlooked, and reflects state of the art methodology. Historians might then also be able to explain how and why, in spite of its undoubted achievements, the European integration project got itself into trouble.

Un vide théorique

L'intégration européenne et la recherche historique actuelle

La recherche historique en matière d'intégration européenne souffre d'un déficit théorisant. Dans son article «Alligance» paru au premier numéro de la Revue d'Histoire de l'Intégration Européenne, Alan S. Milward a tenté de remédier au problème, mais il n'y a pas réussi, tout comme il n'a pas pu stimuler ni le débat ni la discussion autour de la question. L'esprit de clocher c'est ainsi glissé dans l'érudition. Aussi un renouveau est-il en souffrance depuis longtemps. Les historiens ne devraient plus se cacher ni derrière la règle des 30 ans relative à l'ouverture des archives ni derrière les sagesses conventionnelles; il devraient au contraire s'inspirer des autres sciences sociales et des sources non-archivistiques. Ils devraient par dessus tout apprendre à traiter leurs sujets d'une manière critique. Il en résulterait une littérature qui place l'UE dans un contexte changeant en la présentant comme étant le produit tant d'influences exogènes que des desseins humains, et qui reconnaîtrait les complexités de la relation de cause à effet. En outre, en affinant l'art méthodologique, cette nouvelle orientation de recherche engloberait la vaste panoplie des sujets aujourd'hui ignorés. Les historiens seraient dès lors capables d'expliquer comment et pourquoi le projet de l'intégration européenne – en dépit de ses succès manifestes réalisés par le passé – est en panne.

Ein konzeptuelles Vakuum

Die europäische Integration und die Geschichtsschreibung von heute

Die aktuelle Forschung auf dem Feld der europäischen Integration leidet unter einem theoretischen Vakuum. In seinem Artikel «Allegiance» - erschienenen in der ersten Nummer der

Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Europäischen Integration – versuchte Alan S. Milward zwar das Thema aufzugreifen, scheiterte aber, wobei es ihm überdies auch nicht gelang die Debatte um das Problem anzukurbeln. Engstirnigkeit beherrscht seither weiterhin eine Diskussion die einer dringenden Neuauflage harrt. Dabei sollten Historiker sich weder hinter konventionellen Weisheiten noch hinter der 30-Jahre-Regel der Öffnung öffentlicher Archive verstecken. Sie sollten sich vielmehr von anderen Quellen und anderen Sozialwissenschaften inspirieren lassen und ihre Themen kritisch angehen. Daraus entstünde eine wissenschaftliche Literatur, die die EU in einen sich verändernden Rahmen stellen und als Produkt sowohl exogener Einflüsse als auch menschlicher Absichten ausweisen würde. Die Komplexität der Wechselwirkung zwischen Ursache und Auswirkung erschiene in einem völlig neuen Licht, so wie auch eine Verfeinerung der Methodologie eine Vielzahl neuer, bis heute ungeachteter Themenkreise an den Tag fördern würde. Die Geschichtsschreibung wäre folglich in der Lage zu erklären wie und warum die europäische Integration, trotz der gemachten und unbestreitbaren Fortschritte, dennoch selbst ihr aktuelles Defizit verschuldet hat.

Wolfram Kaiser and Brigitte Leucht

Informal Politics of Integration: Christian Democratic and Transatlantic Networks in the Creation of ECSC core Europe

This article argues that the historiography of the European Union has two main weaknesses. It is too state-centric and fails to conceptualise the embedded nature of ideas and their role in the creation and evolution of an integrated 'core Europe'. Against this background we propose the utilization of social science concepts as heuristic devices for addressing these weaknesses. Revisiting the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community on the basis of new sources we suggest that the 'policy network' approach has great potential for re-conceptualising the complex relations between different sets of state and non-state actors and their policy ideas and preferences throughout EU history.

Les politiques informelles de l'intégration:

Le rôle des réseaux chrétien-démocrates et transatlantiques dans la création du noyau européen de la CECA

L'article établit que l'historiographie de l'unification européenne pêche par deux défauts majeurs. Elle est trop focalisée sur les Etats et ne parvient ni à conceptualiser les idées comme émanation sociale ni à mesurer d'une manière adéquate leur rôle dans la création et le développement du noyau communautaire. Afin de pallier ces faiblesses, il est proposé d'employer comme instruments heuristiques des concepts propres aux sciences sociales. En fondant l'analyse des débuts de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier sur de nouvelles sources d'archives, il apparaît qu'une approche du type réseaux politiques pourrait s'avérer fort utile en vue d'une conceptualisation novatrice et généralisante des relations complexes entre les différents acteurs gouvernementaux ou non-gouvernementaux et de leurs idées et préférences.

Informelle Integrationspolitik:

Christdemokratische und transatlantische Netzwerke in der Gründung des EGKS-Kerneuropa

Dieser Aufsatz argumentiert, dass die Historiographie der Europäischen Union zwei hauptsächliche Schwächen aufweist. Sie ist zu staatszentriert und vermag es nicht, Ideen als

gesellschaftlich eingebettet zu konzeptualisieren und ihre Rolle für die Schaffung und weitere Entwicklung eines integrierten Kerneuropa adäquat zu erfassen. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird vorgeschlagen, sozialwissenschaftliche Konzepte als heuristische Instrumente einzusetzen, um diese Schwächen abzustellen. Die Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl auf einer neuen Quellengrundlage analysierend wird hier argumentiert, dass der Politiknetzwerk-Ansatz sehr hilfreich für eine neue Konzeptualisierung der komplexen Beziehungen zwischen verschiedenen staatlichen und nicht-staatlichen Akteuren und deren politischen Ideen und Präferenzen im Verlauf der EU-Geschichte sein könnte.

Ann-Christina L. Knudsen and Morten Rasmussen
A European Political System in the Making 1958-1970:
The Relevance of Emerging Committee Structures

The article departs from the observation that historians of the European integration process have still not made use of their skills for analysing primary materials to conceptualise this history beyond either interstate bargaining or supranational history. As an alternative, the authors point to the relevance of thinking about the Community's history in the 1960s in terms of an emerging political system, a development that political scientists typically have pointed out as coming around the time of the 1986 Single European Act. The article examines two crucial areas where it is possible to identify the developments towards a political system, and where the political process over time have led to an institutional mutation, or politico-administrative "fusion" not foreseen in the EEC Treaty, namely the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and the Special Committee for Agriculture (SCA). The establishment and functioning of these committees demonstrate how political tasks became delegated to the level of officials, and provided new spaces where socialisation between these actors, and across member state administrations, could take place. By employing social science theories about such political processes over time, rather than snow-ploughing through political events, historians can be part of reconceptualising European integration history, and thus launch a more fruitful interdisciplinary debate about this field of research.

Un système politique européen en voie de développement. La significative émergence des structures comitales. 1958-1970

L'article part du constat que les historiens du processus de l'intégration européenne ne se servent point de leur faculté d'analyser les sources primaires en vue de conceptualiser l'objet de leurs recherches au-delà de la classique histoire des négociations inter-étatiques ou de la traditionnelle histoire supranationale. A titre d'alternative, les auteurs mettent en exergue la manière significative dont l'histoire de la Communauté était envisagée dans les années soixante en termes d'un système politique émergent, soit un développement dont les politologues se sont emparés en rapport avec l'Acte Européen Unique de 1986. L'article examine deux domaines majeurs où il est possible d'identifier une évolution vers un système politique, et où, le temps finissant, les processus politiques ont abouti respectivement à une mutation institutionnelle ou à une «fusion» politico-administrative non prévue par le traité de la CEE. Il s'agit du Comité des représentants permanents (Coreper) et du Comité spécial d'agriculture. L'établissement et le fonctionnement desdits comités témoigne de la façon dont des tâches éminemment politiques ont été déléguées à des fonctionnaires en créant de nouveaux espaces de socialisation entre ces acteurs internationaux et leurs administrations

nationales respectives. Plutôt que de se rabattre sur les seuls événements politiques, les historiens devraient donc employer les théories des sciences sociales qui envisagent les processus politiques dans la longue durée. Il s'ensuivrait une reconceptualisation de l'histoire de l'intégration européenne et partant, un enrichissement du débat interdisciplinaire en la matière.

**Die Entwicklung eines europäischen politischen Systems.
Der signifikante Auftrieb der Ausschussstrukturen (1958-1970)**

Der Artikel gründet auf einer Feststellung: die Historiographie des europäischen Integrationsprozesses versäumt es die Primärquellen mit Blick auf eine vertiefte Konzeptualisierung ihres Forschungsobjekts derart zu analysieren, dass sie nicht über die klassische Geschichte zwischenstaatlicher Verhandlungen oder die traditionelle Geschichte der Supranationalität hinauskommt. Als Alternative verweisen die Autoren auf die signifikante Art wie die Geschichte der Gemeinschaft in den Sechzigerjahren als aufstrebendes politisches System dargestellt wurde, eine Entwicklung derer sich die Politologen typischerweise im Zusammenhang mit der europäischen Einheitsakte von 1986 bemächtigt haben. Der Artikel untersucht zwei wesentliche Bereiche in denen es möglich ist, die Entstehung eines politischen Systems zu identifizieren und zu beobachten wie, nach einiger Zeit, die politischen Prozesse entweder zu einer institutionellen Veränderung oder zu einer nicht im EWG-Vertrag vorgesehenen politisch-administrativen «Fusion» führt. Es handelt sich dabei um den Ausschuss der Ständigen Vertreter und des Ausschusses zur Vorbereitung von Ratsentscheidungen im Landwirtschaftsbereich. Die Geburt und die Wirkungsweise der beiden Organe bestätigen wie vordergründig politische Aufgaben an hohe Beamten abgetreten werden und somit neue Sozialisierungsräume zwischen den internationalen Akteuren und den jeweiligen nationalen Verwaltungen entstehen. Statt sich also einzig mit rein politischen Ereignissen zu befassen, sollten Historiker jene Theorien der Sozialwissenschaften anwenden die politische Prozesse über längere Zeitspannen untersuchen. Es würde ihnen dabei gelingen die Geschichte der europäischen Integration neu zu konzeptualisieren und demnach zu einer Bereicherung der interdisziplinären Debatte beizutragen.

**Laurent Warlouzet
Re-launching the EEC and the empty chair:
Neo-functionalists vs. federalists in the European Commission (1964-1965)**

The divisions inside the European Commission are seldom studied, except when Commissioners are associated as mere proxy of their country. In this regard, political science theories are useful to understand the various pro-European strategies which are developed inside this institution. Just before the Empty Chair crisis, in 1964-1965, a conflict occurred within the Commission between the French commissioner Robert Marjolin, who supported a cautious neo-functionalist strategy based on an economic and technocratic approach, and the German president Walter Hallstein, who launched a bold federalist offensive.

**Relancer la CEE avant la Chaise vide:
Néo-fonctionnalistes vs. fédéralistes au sein de la Commission européenne (1964-1965)**

Les divisions au sein de la Commission européenne sont rarement étudiées sauf à considérer les commissaires comme de simples représentants de leur pays. Or l'utilisation des théories de la science politique permet de distinguer plusieurs stratégies de promotion de l'intégra-

tion européenne qui s'affrontent au sein de cette institution communautaire. Ainsi, la crise de la Chaise vide a été précédée, en 1964-1965, par un affrontement intense au sein de la Commission entre le commissaire français Robert Marjolin, partisan d'une démarche néo-fonctionnaliste prudente, et le président Walter Hallstein, qui choisit de lancer une audacieuse offensive politico-institutionnelle de nature fédéraliste.

Die «Relance» der EWG und der «Leere Stuhl»: die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Neofunktionalisten und Föderalisten in der europäischen Kommission (1964-1965)

Die Unstimmigkeiten innerhalb der Europäischen Kommission wurden bislang nur in Bezug auf die Kommissare als Vertreter ihrer Länder untersucht. Die Anwendung politikwissenschaftlicher Methoden ermöglicht es jedoch, verschiedene Strategien zur Förderung der europäischen Integration zu unterscheiden, die innerhalb dieser gemeinschaftlichen Organisation aufeinandertreffen. So ging der Krise des Leeren Stuhls in den Jahren 1964-1965 eine heftige Auseinandersetzung zwischen dem französischen Kommissar Robert Marjolin und dem Präsidenten Walter Hallstein voraus. Während Marjolin eine gemäßigte neofunktionalistische Vorgehensweise befürwortete, entschied sich Hallstein in politisch-institutioneller Hinsicht für eine föderalistische Offensive.

Melissa Pine

**European integration: a meeting ground for history and political science?
A historian responds to Andrew Moravcsik**

European integration is a productive field for historians and political scientists, and one in which they frequently clash. This article seeks common ground for the two fields in acknowledging the work of Andrew Moravcsik. It addresses his efforts to forge a theory of European integration before going on to examine his method of working and his use of sources, setting the practice of political science against that of history. It concludes that, while Moravcsik's work is tremendously problematic for historians working in European integration, it is also a catalyst both for further empirical research and for a more explicit assessment of scholarly practice in history.

**L'intégration européenne, un domaine où l'histoire et les sciences politiques
se rencontrent?**

Une historienne répond à Andrew Moravcsik

L'intégration européenne est un champ d'investigation fertile pour les historiens et les politologues, qui du reste s'y affrontent fréquemment. Cet article vogue à la recherche des affinités entre les deux branches scientifiques en focalisant l'œuvre d'Andrew Moravcsik. La première partie de l'exposé est consacrée aux théories de Moravcsik relatives à l'intégration; la deuxième partie examine ses méthodes de travail et sa manière de se servir des sources. Du coup, l'article met en exergue la différence entre les pratiques des historiens et celles des politologues avant de conclure que les affirmations de Moravcsik, tout en étant hautement problématiques pour les historiens, constituent un catalyseur à la fois de la future recherche empirique et de l'appréciation plus explicite de l'érudition en histoire.

Die Europäische Integration: ein Begegnungsfeld für Geschichtsforscher und Politikwissenschaftler? Eine Historikerin antwortet Andrew Moravcsik

Europäische Integration ist für die Geschichts- und die Politikwissenschaft ein produktives Feld auf dem sie allerdings häufig gegenteilige Meinungen vertreten. Der vorliegende Aufsatz sucht nach Gemeinsamkeiten beider Fachrichtungen indem er das Werk von Andrew Moravcsik in den Vordergrund stellt. Im ersten Teil werden die europäischen Integrations-theorien von Moravcsik unter die Lupe genommen, während der zweite Teil sich mit seinen Arbeitsmethoden so wie seinem Umgang mit Quellen befasst und daraus ableitend, die Praktiken der Politologen derjenigen der Historiker gegenüberstellt. Obwohl Moravcsiks Schriften für Geschichtsforscher der europäischen Integration höchst problematisch bleiben, bilden sie dennoch einen Katalysator sowohl für die künftige empirische Forschung als auch für eine explizitere Würdigung der historiographischen Gelehrsamkeit.

Alles, was Sie über Europäische Integration wissen müssen



Das Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration des Instituts für Europäische Politik (iep) dokumentiert und bilanziert seit 1980 zeitnah und detailliert den europäischen Integrationsprozess.

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Das „Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2007“ führt diese Tradition fort. In über 70 Beiträgen zeichnen die Autorinnen und Autoren in ihren jeweiligen Forschungsschwerpunkten die europapolitischen Ereignisse des Berichtszeitraums 2006/2007 nach und informieren über die Arbeit der europäischen Institutionen, die Entwicklung der einzelnen Politikbereiche der EU, Europas Rolle in der Welt und die Europapolitik in den Mitgliedstaaten und Kandidatenländern.

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Notices – Informations – Mitteilungen

Report of the Third Richie International Conference ‘The two Europes’ at the Università degli Studi Suor Orsola Benincasa, Naples, SUM-Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane, 14-15 December 2007

On December 14th and 15th 2007 the third RICHIE¹ conference ‘The Two Europes’ took place in Naples at the University Suor Orsola Benincasa and the SUM-Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane, under the patronage of the Municipality of Naples, the representation of the European Commission in Italy and the Italian ministry of Youth Policies. Under the expert guidance of Piero Craveri (Università degli Studi Suor Orsola Benincasa) and Antonio Varsori (Università degli Studi di Padova), and the other members of the scientific committee, the conference organised by Michele Affinito, Guia Migani and Christian Wenkel brought together around 25 young researchers from 12 countries.²

While European integration history has often been approached from a perspective that emphasises a common European heritage, the theme of the conference ‘The Two Europe’s’ gave the opportunity to explore the numerous dichotomies that have also determined European history in the 20th century. In the four sessions four different dichotomies were emphasised.

In the beautiful and inspiring surroundings of the Università degli Studi Suor Orsola Benincasa Karl Christian Lammers (Københavns Universitet) opened the first session on continuity and changes in the 19th and 20th centuries. This theme was dealt with primarily in an East-West context. It started with a paper by Natalia Burlinova (Moscow State University) on relations between Europe and Russia, exploring the question of whether Russia was and is part of Europe. Her presentation led to a lively debate about the nature of Russian democracy and the path from communism to a free society.

The two following papers dealt with Western reactions to crises in Eastern Europe. Valentine Lomellini’s (IMT Alti Studi Lucca) paper explored the relationship between the Italian Left and the ruling classes and opposition leaders in Eastern Europe around the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the Polish crisis of 1981. A comparison of French and German reactions to the Polish crisis was the subject of the paper by Karolina Pietras (Paris IV). Traditionally the French people have been portrayed as more sympathetic to Solidarnosc than the Germans. Pietras showed however that the image of a Franco-German contrast was largely a construct of the French press anxious to deflect attention from the passive attitude of the French government.

1. Réseau International de jeunes Chercheurs en Histoire de l’Intégration Européenne.

2. For the full programme please see <http://www.europe-richie.org/Naples2007/index-en.html>.

Maria Coros (Paris IV) presented a paper on the image of the West in Rumanian school textbooks under the Ceausescu regime. In her paper she drew attention to the contradiction between the regime's official anti-West discourse and the impossibility of that same regime to propose an alternative model for society, thus forcing it to rely for models on the system it criticised. In the last paper in this session Christian Domnitz (Universität Frankfurt-Oder) examined rupture and continuity in Central European ideas about Europe. Looking at the framings of Europe that persisted after 1989, Domnitz found that the national view of Europe predominant in Central Europe could be traced back to instrumentalisations of Europe by both the opposition and the communist elite. In the discussion Jürgen Elvert (Universität zu Köln) continued the debate about Central Europe, the Third Europe.

The second session, 'Europe as a dream. Europe as a reality', presided over by Maurice Vaisse (Sciences Po Paris) resumed the theme of Europe and the nation. In his paper 'L'Europe est ailleurs: la double altérité du Projet Européen face à l'Etat-Nation', Carol Bergami (Paris I/Universität Freiburg) explored the relationship between the European project and the national reality. Morgane Le Boulay (Paris Dauphine/Humboldt Universität zu Berlin) examined the dichotomy between the unity and the plurality of Europe with respect to the historical profession in France and Germany in the 1990s. Le Boulay found an inherent contradiction in the historical profession between its political function regarding Europe and the research done on Europe. Given that this topic directly affected many present at the conference, a lively discussion ensued in which questions were raised regarding what was meant by 'historians' and about periodisation. The next paper also dealt with a distinct group. Mauve Carbonell (Institut pour l'histoire de l'aluminium Gennevilliers) examined the background of the first members of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community. While before and during WWII they were often on opposing sides of the political spectrum, the end of the war saw them all in Luxemburg, where all of the members of the High Authority became 'Europeans'.

The three remaining papers in the second session all addressed Spain. Maria Elena Cavallaro (IMT Alti Studi Lucca) argued that the aim of Spanish foreign policy in the immediate post-Franco era was to gain international legitimacy, joining the EEC was an important step in this process. Matthieu Trouvé (Université Michel de Montaigne Bordeaux), building on the previous paper, examined the perceived European enthusiasm of the Spaniards (1975-2005). Studying public opinion, Trouvé came to the conclusion that while a comparatively high enthusiasm persisted, the Spanish public at the same time passed from enthusiasm for Europe to banalisation of Europe. The last paper of Friday was by Thomas Derungs (Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg). He argued that, given the Cold War context, the prospect of a southward enlargement supported the concept of Europe as a 'civilian superpower', portraying enlargement as the export of liberal democracy. During the discussion that followed this second session the distinction between the European ideal and the ideal of European integration was discussed.

The role of the European project in facilitating change on the national plane was furthered explored.

After an interesting and sociable dinner on Friday night, the third session on Saturday morning dealt with the notions of a political and an economic Europe. Wolfgang Krieger (Universität Marburg) presided over this session, where most papers explored the concept of dichotomy.

Matthieu Osmont (Sciences Po Paris/Université d'Artois) dealt with these notions by examining the competition between the Direction des Affaires Politiques and the Direction des Affaires Economiques et Financières at the Quai d'Orsay. After having presented the diverging backgrounds of the members of each Direction, he noted that despite their rivalry, they cooperated against competition by other departments. Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol (European University Institute Florence) analysed perceived and real dichotomies between the monetary and institutional initiatives taken by France in 1974. While the European Unit of Account and the European Council seemed to confirm the traditional dichotomy, in reality they were more complementary than contradictory. It was within the initiatives that the real dichotomies existed.

The paper by Marloes Beers (Université Cergy-Pontoise), also dealt with a dichotomy, that between small and large States. She examined the role of small states regarding political bargaining, where political or economic weight is not available to them as a policy instrument. Gabriele d'Ottavio (Università di Bologna) examined the dichotomy between economic and political integration in Germany during the negotiations for the Treaties of Rome and the Treaty of Maastricht. D'Ottavio showed that Germany was most active where economic and political considerations were combined. The next paper also addressed Germany, but compared it to Italy. Whereas this is a common comparison, Federico Niglia (LUISS Guido Carli Roma) argued that the relationship between Italy and Germany was rather characterised by ambiguity and mistrust, with the Italians feeling that Germany was a danger to their national interest. The last paper, by Giuseppe Mancini (SUM Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane), addressed the visions of Europe by Enrico Mattei, the chairman of ENI (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi). Often depicted as an ultranationalist, Europe was a priority for Mattei. Following these presentations Eric Bussière (Paris IV) discussed the links between politics and economics in a comprehensive way. During the debate, the question of the role of small states was repeatedly addressed.

The fourth session, 'Europe as a power, Europe as a tool of power', saw ample discussion of the Anglo-Saxon powers. Jenny Raflik (Université Cergy-Pontoise) started the session with an exploration of the French attitude toward Europeanism and Atlanticism during the Cold War, showing that the two could not be disassociated. A similar question but with regard to Britain under the Heath government was addressed by Giulia Bentivoglio (Università del Salento, Lecce). She argued that the attempt to simultaneously juggle two visions of Europe, European and Atlantic, failed. They were however used to strengthen the power of

the EEC, while considering the EEC as a tool of power to regain international prestige.

Mauro Elli (Università degli Studi di Milano) examined the British attitude regarding the EEC energy policy on the eve of the oil crisis. Attempts by the British with their North Sea oil to reassert themselves in Europe through a common energy policy, met with little success. Lucia Coppolaro (Universitat Pompeu Fabra Barcelona) examined the relation between the EEC and the US around the accession of the socialist countries to GATT (1959-1973). While the EEC supported their application on political grounds, they refused any trade concessions, despite strong US pressure. In the following discussion Jean-Marie Palayret (European University Institute Florence) pointed out that whereas the image of GATT is very rigid, Coppolaro showed that the rigid rules could be overcome for political reasons. The first example of this flexibility was the acceptance in 1958 of the Treaty of Rome.

In her paper, Aniko Macher (Sciences Po Paris) examined Western cultural cooperation during the Cold War. By looking at informal meetings on East-West cultural relations, she analysed the relation between politics and cultural propaganda. The last paper of the conference was by Sara Banchi (SUM Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane). By studying the Second Development Decade (1970s) from the perspective of the UN, she opened up a new panorama of relations between the Europeans themselves, with the US and with the 'South'. In his discussion Johnny Laursen (Aarhus Universitet) addressed the increased importance of the transatlantic dimension and he discussed the methodological problems historians encounter when trying to determine causality in a transnational context.

In his final conclusions Varsori summed up some of the themes recurring throughout the conference, such as the year 1973; the Transatlantic relationship; and the various dichotomies discussed: East-West, North-South, Europe-state, economic-political, small-big. As these themes show, the third RICHIE conference, while covering a very wide range of topics and uncovering many dichotomies, managed to find a lot of common ground and brought together both young researchers and professors from all over Europe for very fruitful discussions.

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Books received – Livres reçus – Eingegangene Bücher

- BARIÉTY Jacques** – *Aristide Briand, la Société des Nations et l'Europe 1919-1932*, Strasbourg, Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2007, 542 p. – ISBN 978-2-86820-307-6 – 30,00 €.
- BITSCH Marie-Thérèse, LOTH Wilfried, BARTHEL Charles** – *Cultures politiques, opinions publiques et intégration européenne*, Bruylant, Bruxelles, 2007, 477 p. – ISBN 978-2-8027-2373-8 – 65,00 €.
- CLEMENS Wurm** – *Die Türkei und Europa*, LIT-Verlag, Berlin, 2007, 288 S. – ISBN 3-8258-0782-5 – 24,90 €.
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